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1 Introduction 
1.1 Topic and theme 
“Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea”, in Latin that is the act is not culpable unless 
the mind is guilty. Guilt and intention are very essential in criminal law. Having a 
“guilty mind” refers to the fact that someone has committed a crime with the 
intention to do so. These crimes are regarded to be more severe than those committed 
out of negligence. Therefore, it is important for a court to assess if a crime has been 
committed intentionally and to determine the level of intention. This intention 
usually is not same the same as motive of the actor. So a person can kill another 
without a motive to do that. That’s not stopping us from convicting them of murder if 
they have shown the legally required intention in their act. 
But how to find out if a crime has been committed intentionally? The transition from 
intention to negligence is smooth, so it is not always self-evident. This leads to the 
fact that the legislation of a country has to define a threshold in the respective 
criminal code to which the court can stick in its decisions.  
Assessing if an offence has been committed intentionally and therefore also deciding 
about its sentence is of particular importance when it comes to the most severe 
crimes existing, like sexual crimes, crimes against persons and homicides. Those 
offences are about violence, about sexual, mental and physical violence. This 
violence deprives a person of their human rights, risking and attacking their health, 
life and bodily integrity. In some ways, however, sexual crimes can be considered as 
one of the most problematic crimes when it comes to proving the intention. 
An example of this can be cases of sexual crimes against children. If it is not all clear 
from the case that the child was under the legally defined age and the acts themselves 
have been consensual, how can we show that the actor had intent concerning the age? 
What kind of intent does the actor need to have? Or is the age just a hard fact that the 
actor should have known or should have found out? 
It seems likely that the legislations of different countries come to different 
conclusions when setting the threshold of intention. This has been the subject of 
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extended research1 as, depending on the threshold, the same offence can be 
sentenced very differently. However, there are not yet many legal comparisons 
written about this subject that would include Finland as well. In Finland, the 
comparison in criminal law has usually been done with Sweden and sometimes with 
Germany, Matikkala’s doctoral thesis2 from 2005 as an excellent exception of wider 
comparison. 
Finally, when studying the legislation and court decisions in a country in the course 
of time, one can see that there is a constant change. Developments in culture, science 
and lifestyle often have an impact on legislation and also on court decisions. Both 
legislation and court decisions also affect each other in turn. 
In my thesis, I will look into the concept of criminal intent in Finland, Sweden, 
Germany, the Netherlands, England and the United States. These countries offer a 
wide selection with both similarities and differences. This thesis focuses on Finland 
and Finnish criminal law but additionally provides a comparison with the other 
mentioned countries. 
I will also look into substantive laws of sexual crimes, assaults and homicides. And 
thirdly I will combine these two, investigating the impact of the respective concepts 
of intent on the decisions of the highest courts – which emphasis on recent 
developments in court decisions and legislation. 
1.2 Research questions 
How are the thresholds of intent in Finland, Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, 
England and the United States? What differences are there between the respective 
models and what impact has this had on recent court decisions regarding sexual 
offences, assaults and homicides? Have the court decisions in similar cases been 
convicted in a similar way in different countries? Have there recently been changes 
in legislation of one or several of these countries regarding intent and / or has the 
highest court changed its way to decide between intent and negligence? 
                                                
1 See e.g. Blomsma 2012. 
2 Matikkala 2005. 
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1.3 Methods 
In this thesis, my method is to research substantive laws, court cases, preparatory 
works, commentaries and writings of legal scholars. I will look for legal definitions 
of intent, if those exist, and I will look for legal provisions criminalizing intentional 
sexual crimes, assaults and homicides. I will research what these laws exactly 
criminalize, what the prohibited acts are and, especially, what the required intent 
concerning these offences is. 
If legal definitions of intent do not exist, I will look even more for court cases and 
court precedents, especially those given by the highest criminal court of the country, 
as well as look into the various writings of legal scholars. I will try to give a 
comprehensive view of the state that exists concerning the intent and these crimes. 
For carving out recent developments, I will closely examine recent court cases from 
the selected countries dealing about sexual offences, assaults and homicides. 
For my research I have chosen six countries and thus six legal systems to concentrate 
on. These include the Nordic countries Finland and Sweden, the Central European 
countries Germany and the Netherlands, as well as the Anglo-American countries 
England (and Wales)3 and the United States. 
I have studied Finnish, Swedish, English, German and Dutch, so this selection of 
systems is a smart choice for me in this way as well, helping me to better understand 
the laws and court cases of all these countries. Considering the universal nature of 
my topic and the many different languages of the material and sources for this 
research, I have written this thesis in English. I think that this best fits the purpose of 
this thesis to be an international legal comparison. 
1.4 Outline of this research 
In the first chapter, I have now given an outline of my research, answering to what I 
research, why I research this and where this research is exactly looking at, both 
geographically and inside the legal system of a single country of my research. Next, 
in Chapter 2, I will take a look at the concepts and forms of intent in all these 
                                                
3 ”England” is used in this thesis to refer to laws applied in England and Wales. Scotland and 
Northern Ireland are not included in this thesis. 
4 
 
 
countries. I will look for the forms of intent from the highest form to the lowest one, 
especially trying to find the lowest level and lowest limit of intent. 
In the third chapter, I will take a close look at sexual crimes and substantial laws 
concerning these crimes in all the countries of my research. I will give a 
comprehensive view of the intentional sexual offences, both rape offences and sexual 
offences committed against children as victims. I will look what kind of acts are 
criminalized and what is required in this acts, what is especially required from the 
actor’s mind. In the fourth chapter, I will do the same for homicides and assaults. 
In the fifth and sixth chapter I will give a special focus to court cases related to 
relevant questions of my topic and research questions, seeing how these substantial 
laws and forms of intent have been applied in practice, showing also differences and 
similarities in the way that these courts have ruled quite similar acts. I will 
particularly look into recent court cases and developments in court decisions and 
legislation. In Chapter 7, I will draw conclusions and give ideas for further research. 
2 Forms of intent 
2.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2 of my thesis, I will now take a look at the concept of criminal intent in 
all the countries of my research. I will look for legal definitions of intent, if those 
exist. If not, I will structure the concept of intent based on other sources. I will start 
with Finland and for Finland my research is more thorough. In this chapter, I will 
also briefly compare those other countries’ concepts of intent to that of Finland’s and 
to those I have already looked into. 
2.2 Finland 
2.2.1 Finnish criminal law 
Finland is a civil law country and the Finnish legal system is largely based on the 
European-continental civil law tradition. In Finnish criminal law, there is a lot of 
similarities with criminal laws of other Nordic countries as well as with the criminal 
law of Germany. Many criminal offences and provisions have been similarly defined 
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as they are in Swedish criminal law, but today there are more differences than before, 
like this research will show, too. 
In Finnish criminal law, intention and negligence are the forms of culpability. Intent 
or negligence is a prerequisite for criminal liability. According to Section 5 of the 
Finnish Criminal Code (Rikoslaki, RL), Chapter 3, unless it is otherwise stated, an act 
referred in the Criminal Code is punishable only as an intentional act. Thus criminal 
liability is usually constituted by intent and most acts are punishable only as 
intentional acts. According to Section 4 of this Chapter 3, the age of criminal 
responsibility in Finland is 15 years of age, so a younger actor can’t be convicted. 
An example of the statutory definition of offence where negligence is enough is 
Section 8 of the Finnish Criminal Code, Chapter 21. According to this section, the 
actor who with negligence causes the death of another person shall be sentenced for 
negligent or involuntary manslaughter (kuolemantuottamus) to a fine or to 
imprisonment for at most 2 years. 
As we can see, for some intentional offences there is also a negligent counterpart, but 
not for many of them, so the threshold between intent and negligence is very 
essential when assessing whether a person is punished for his actions or not. As we 
will later see, the sentences for intentional homicides can be much more severe than 
for involuntary manslaughter. In addition, an attempt also requires intent in order to 
be punishable. 
2.2.2 Finnish legal definition of intention 
After the Finnish Criminal Code overall reforms, there has been a legal definition of 
criminal intent in the Finnish Criminal Code since 1.1.2004, but this definition 
applies only to offence elements of consequence, not to other offence elements, and 
is often called as consequence-intent (seuraustahallisuus) in comparison with intent 
concerning any other elements than consequences, so called “circumstance-intent” 
(olosuhdetahalllisuus). I will tell more about this circumstance-intent in Chapter 
2.2.4, but in general, this kind of cases concerned with circumstances must be ruled 
merely according to the Supreme Court precedents. 
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The legal definition of criminal intent for consequences can be found in Section 6 of 
the Finnish Criminal Code, Chapter 3. It states that an actor has caused the 
consequence described in the statutory definition intentionally if the causing of the 
consequence was the actor’s purpose or they had considered the consequence as a 
certain or quite probable result of his actions. A consequence has also been caused 
intentionally if the offender has considered it as certainly connected with the 
consequence that they have aimed for. Next I will take a closer look on these forms.  
2.2.3 Forms of intent in Finland 
Three forms of intent can be found in the Finnish legal definition of criminal intent. 
These can be called either in Latin as dolus determinatus, dolus directus and dolus 
eventualis, or purpose-intent (tarkoitustahallisuus), certainty-intent 
(varmuustahallisuus) and probability-intent (todennäköisyystahallisuus). 
Even though the lowest level of intent is usually enough to convict the actor and can 
be the easiest to prove, the higher the level of intent, the higher might be the 
sentence. According to a recent Supreme Court judgment KKO 2014:54, different 
degrees of intention allow also a separate evaluation in sentencing and the actor 
certain about the fulfillment of offence elements is more blameworthy than the actor 
merely assessing that the consequence will quite probably happen. 
2.2.3.1 Purpose-intent 
An act is intentional when the purpose of the actor was to fulfill the constituent 
elements of the offence. Finnish legal scholars call this dolus form dolus 
determinatus, but more often as purpose-intent. According to Section 6 of the 
Criminal Code, Chapter 3, the actor has acted intentionally if the causing of the 
consequence described in the statutory definition was their purpose. They want and 
intend to make this consequence happen. 
This is also the case if the actor thinks that there is only a small chance their act will 
bring about the intended consequence, but not when they think that this consequence 
is impossible. Practically impossible consequence can’t be the purpose of the act.5 
                                                
4 KKO 2014:5. 
5 Frände 2012, p. 115. 
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The consequence can also be under the form of purpose-intent if it’s a necessary 
intermediate step to some other purpose.6 
2.2.3.2 Certainty-intent 
An act is intentional also when the actor regarded the fulfillment of the constituent 
elements of the offence as a certain result of their act. In Finland this is often called 
as dolus directus, but also as certainty-intent. According to the Criminal Code, 
Chapter 3, Section 6, the actor has acted intentionally if they had considered the 
consequence described in the statutory definition as a certain. 
This form of dolus is not about purpose or wanting the consequence to happen, but 
about knowing it will happen because of the act. Thus this is the case also if the actor 
thinks this consequence to be very undesirable for them. Usually in this form of 
intent, the purpose of the actor is to make some other consequence happen, but there 
are also these certain less-wanted consequences as a side effect. 
Often used example of this form is when the actor wants the insurance money and in 
order to get that blows up their plane or ship, knowing that people will die as a result, 
even though it is not the actor’s purpose to kill them. The actor is seen to have 
certainty-intent in regard to these deaths. 
2.2.3.3 Probability-intent 
The third and lowest form of intent in Finland is called either as dolus eventualis or 
more commonly as probability-intent. An act is intentional also when the actor 
regarded the fulfillment of the constituent elements of the offence as a quite probable 
(varsin todennäköinen) result of their act. The question then is, of course, how 
probable is “quite probable”? This question has sparked some academic debate. 
Quite probable is generally seen to mean that the probability of the consequence 
occurring needs to be more than 50 %, that is it needs to be more likely to occur than 
not to occur. If both of these options are equally likely, the actor is seen to have no 
intent required for conviction of intentional offences. Thus “quite probable” can be 
seen to generally mean a basic probability. 
                                                
6 See KKO 2011:26. 
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According to Matikkala the official Swedish language version of the Finnish 
Criminal Code section concerning the legal definition of intent supports this view 
too, when it uses the expression “övervägande sannonlik”, which means basic 
probability.7 
In addition to these three forms of intent I have now described, the Proposal of the 
Criminal Law Project also suggested one additional form of intent, being as the 
lowest form of criminal intention.8 In this form of intent an act would have been 
intentional also if the actor considered it as a serious possibility that their act fulfilled 
the constituent elements of the offence and in committing the act they had 
demonstrated an acceptance to fulfill the constituent elements of the offence.9 Thus 
this eventualis-intent would have required not only a considerable or serious 
possibility (varteenotettava mahdollisuus), but also a clear volitional element. 
2.2.4 Circumstance-intent 
The concept of circumstance-intent covers the intent in all those elements of the 
statutory definition of the offence that are other than consequences of the offence. It 
is about awareness, about what kind of awareness is required from the actor of the 
facts that determine whether non-consequential elements of the offence are fulfilled. 
These other elements include the age of the victim in crimes that need to be 
committed against a person under the certain age, or the type of the drugs. 
Circumstance-intent was a part of the proposed legal definition of intent in the 
Government Proposal HE 44/2002, which would have defined it similarly as is now 
defined the intent concerning consequences, requiring that the actor considered the 
existence of a statutory offence element to be quite probable.10  
However, this definition was not included in the legal definition of intent, because 
the Law Committee of the Finnish Parliament considered it to be harder to define the 
intent concerning non-consequences than it is with the intent concerning 
                                                
7 Matikkala 2014, p. 201. 
8 Rikoslakiprojektin ehdotus 2000, p. 101. 
9 Ibid. 
10 HE 44/2002 vp, p. 87. 
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consequences. The Law Committee also feared that such legal definition would have 
not applied well for the offence elements in economic crimes.11  
Thus the offence elements other than consequence have no legal definition of intent, 
but instead they are evaluated together with the provision concerning a mistake as to 
the definitional elements of an offence, which is set in Section 1 of the Finnish 
Criminal Code, Chapter 4. According to this section, if the actor at the time of the act 
wasn’t aware of the existence of all the elements required by the statutory offence 
definition, or if the actor has made a mistake concerning one of the elements, the act 
is not considered to have been intentional, but it can be seen as negligent. 
Some Finnish legal scholars have suggested that this section concerning mistake is in 
the end irrelevant in the evaluation and the intent in offence elements is the same as 
it was before and that is now not legally defined in any way. This can be seen to be 
the Supreme Court’s view, too. Other scholars have tried to reconcile the wording of 
the section concerning mistake and the aim of the Law Committee in a way that “is 
not aware” (ei ole selvillä) would require a probability less than the basic probability 
of more than 50 percent. This latter group includes Sahavirta and Frände. 
Prosecutor Sahavirta has suggested that an actor could have required criminal intent 
if they have had an approving or indifferent attitude towards the possibility that a 
property in a money laundering offence had been acquired by a crime.12 This kind of 
economic crimes are, of course, highly specific and the intent assessment could be 
quite different from, for example, homicides. 
This kind of intent would basically mean that it would be enough, if the actor had 
been aware of the risk and had approving or indifferent attitude towards this risk. 
According to Matikkala, however, mere awareness of the risk not enough, nor is a 
theory that this awareness would be replaced with an obligation to be aware.13 
According to Matikkala the section concerning mistake applies to intent in offence 
elements, since it clearly states that the act is not intentional, if the actor has not been 
aware of all the relevant elements. Matikkala, however, is not convinced that the 
                                                
11 LaVM 28/2002 vp, pp. 9–10.  
12 Sahavirta 2008, p. 174. 
13 Matikkala 2014, p. 178. 
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required awareness of the existence of an offence element could mean in these 
situations that the probability of this existence could be considered to be enough 
when it is 50 percent or less than that.14 
This, according to Frände, means that Matikkala suggests the same “quite probable” 
threshold for all the offence elements as what is set in the legal definition for the 
consequence elements.15 Frände himself hasn’t been eager to equate the expression 
“is not aware” with the requirement of quite probable, but instead he has suggested 
defining the intent on offence elements as the balance intent (tasapainotahallisuus). 
This model means that a person has intent when they consider the existence of an 
offence element as equally likely as its non-existence.16 
Frände has more recently acknowledged that the Supreme Court has consistently 
used the intent based on probability on the offence elements other than consequence 
in all those types of crimes it has dealt with17. However, as Frände points out, there 
has been yet no Supreme Court judgment about the probability intent on economic 
crimes. Thus Frände has not yet abandoned his model of balance intent.18 
Tapani and Tolvanen have been in favor of a theory in which the element is 
considered as a serious possibility (varteenotettava mahdollisuus).19 According to 
Tapani, actors with an approving or indifferent attitude towards the existence of an 
offence element are included in the basic possibility intent theory, since their 
awareness of the existence has not prevented them from carrying out the offence.20 
Some problems with proving intent have occurred in situations where the actor has 
acted with deliberate ignorance in order to not be criminally liable and thus 
intentionally tried to avoid knowledge about legally essential facts. This kind of 
situation was in the Supreme Court case KKO 2006:6421, where the drug runners 
intentionally avoided the knowledge of the nature of the drugs they were smuggling. 
                                                
14 Matikkala 2006, p. 86. 
15 Frände 2010, pp. 161–162. 
16 Frände 2010, p. 162. 
17 E.g. KKO 2010:88 and KKO 2012:66. 
18 Frände 2012, p. 127. 
19 Tapani and Tolvanen 2008, p. 232–236. 
20 Tapani 2009, p. 179. 
21 KKO 2006:64. 
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The Supreme Court case KKO 2013:1722 dealt with an offence and with a course of 
events, which are highly specific. Thus it might not be the best case to be a precedent 
about the lower level of intention. The case was about misuse of a business secret 
and was, only in the question of intention, decided by an eleven-member larger 
bench of the Supreme Court. The essential question in this case was what is the 
lowest form of intention in Finland in other elements than consequences, is it 
probability-intent or acceptance-intent/indifference-intent, like it is in Sweden, as we 
will see in the Chapter 2.3.2. 
This case also shows a clear division inside the Supreme Court on the lowest form of 
intention. A narrow majority of the judges supported the existing view of the intent 
requiring quite probable awareness. The majority of the court, six judges, concluded 
that the actor X had to understand as certain or as quite probable that the object of 
misuse was a business secret and that it has been obtained or expressed with a 
criminal act. Thus their view of the lowest form of intention was the probability-
intent. 
Four judges, however, ended up with a different view that the lowest form of 
intention is acceptance-intent or indifference-intent. According to their dissenting 
opinion, X had in this case expressed approval or apparent indifference to the fact 
that the snowmobile suits had offended B Oy’s business secrets. 
Despite the dissenting opinions, all the judges, including Judge Mansikkamäki with 
her own dissenting opinion, ended up with the same outcome that there was a 
required intent existing in this case. Thus in the end it now made no difference what 
was the lowest form of intent in this case. Still it’s very good that there is discussion 
and hopefully this kind of evaluation of intent will continue. So far the probability-
intent has been the standard that the Supreme Court uses for consequences and 
circumstances. Next I will take a look how the forms of intent are in Sweden. 
                                                
22 KKO 2003:17. 
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2.3 Sweden 
2.3.1 Swedish criminal law 
Sweden is a civil law country. The Swedish legal system shares a lot of similarities 
with the Finnish one, and in many offences the requirements are quite identical. 
According to Section 6 of the Swedish Penal Code (Brottsbalken, BrB), Chapter 1, 
the age of criminal responsibility in Sweden is 15. According to Section 2(1) of the 
Penal Code, Chapter 1, unless otherwise is stated, an act shall be regarded as a crime 
only if it is committed intentionally. Thus, like in Finland, the general rule in 
criminal law is that only intentional acts are criminalized. So the requirement of 
intent is not usually explicitly written out in the statutory offence elements of a 
certain criminal offence. 
Unlike in Finland, there is no legal definition of intent in the Swedish Penal Code. 
Thus more attention needs to be paid to the Supreme Court decisions. A legal 
definition has been suggested, but so far it has been rejected. I will now take a closer 
look in the forms of intent in Sweden and shortly compare them with Finnish ones. 
2.3.2 Forms of intent in Sweden 
The highest form of intent in Swedish criminal law is direct intention (direkt uppsåt). 
In this form of intent an actor aims to a certain consequence.23 The second highest 
form of intent is indirect intention (indirekt uppsåt), where an actor sees the 
consequence as necessary when aiming for another consequence with their act. Even 
though this former consequence is merely a side effect for the actor, they are aware 
that it will be a consequence of their actions.24 
The lowest form of intent was for a long time considered to be dolus eventualis with 
a hypothetical test, which was introduced by the Swedish Supreme Court in its 
judgment NJA 1959, s. 6325. However, today the lowest form of intent in Swedish 
criminal law is intent of indifference (likgiltighetsuppsåt). This was established in the 
                                                
23 Asp and Ulväng 2011, p. 311. 
24 Ibid. 
25 NJA 1959, s. 63. 
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Supreme Court decision NJA 2002 s. 44926, where the Supreme Court used intent of 
indifference instead of dolus eventualis with a hypothetical test.  
This intent of indifference included assessment of probability to determine whether 
there was a chance of the consequence and then assessed what was the actor’s 
attitude towards this. The intent of indifference established intent also to the cases 
where the actor was indifferent towards this consequence. This kind of form of intent 
had been suggested already, for example, by the Swedish government commission27. 
In its later decision NJA 2004, s. 17628 the Supreme Court set out some guidelines 
(riktlinker) on how the intent of indifference should be applied by the courts. This 
decision also emphasized that these guidelines should be interpreted and applied with 
certain caution and discernment (med försiktighet och urskiljning), because the 
circumstances proving the actor’s indifference can vary.29 
Today, after NJA 2004, s. 176, this form of intent includes two stages, where the 
actor can be indifferent towards the risk of consequence and indifferent towards the 
consequence. The first one of these establishes negligence, but only the second one 
will establish the intent. So the court needs to conclude that the actor has beyond 
reasonable doubt (bortom rimligt tvivel) been indifferent towards the consequence 
itself in order the act of the actor to be considered as intentional offence.30 
Next I will go to Germany, where there is a long tradition of legal research and 
theories concerning the concept of intent and especially its lower limit. 
2.4 Germany 
2.4.1 German criminal law 
Germany is a federal state and a civil law country. The highest court for criminal 
cases is the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH). The German 
Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, StGB) doesn’t have legal definitions of intention or 
                                                
26 NJA 2002, s. 449. 
27 SOU 1996:185, p. 116. 
28 NJA 2004, s. 176. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Rung 2006, p. 254. 
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negligence, so these have to be found out elsewhere, from the precedents of the 
BGH, but also often from the various writings of the German legal scholars. 
Section 15 of the German Criminal Code, however, requires intention (Vorsatz, or 
dolus) as a prerequisite for criminal liability, unless the Code explicitly mentions that 
negligence is sufficient. Thus, like in Finland and Sweden, unless the law explicitly 
provides for criminal liability based on negligence, only intentional acts can establish 
criminal liability. According to Section 19 of the German Criminal Code, the age of 
criminal responsibility in Germany is 14 years of age. 
2.4.2 Forms of intent in Germany 
As was stated, criminal intention is not legally defined in Germany, so it needs to be 
established otherwise. In Germany there are three forms of dolus, though sometimes 
the first two are counted as the same and several different theories have been created 
and supported in Germany of the lowest form of intention. 
The highest form is Absicht or the form of purpose. Sometimes this form is also 
called as the first degree of dolus directus.31 In this form the criminal consequence 
was the actor’s purpose, they aimed this consequence to happen.32 This form is about 
wanting, rather than knowledge. However, there needs to be at least a slight 
possibility that this consequence can happen.33 So this definition is similar to that of 
the Finnish and Swedish highest forms of intent. The consequence in question 
doesn’t need to be the actor’s final goal.34 
The second form of dolus in Germany is dolus directus or knowledge (sicheres 
Wissen). This can also be called as the second degree of dolus directus.35 This form is 
about almost certain knowledge.36 Thus in this form the actor knew of or was 
practically certain of the consequence of their action, but still acted. 
The lowest form of dolus in Germany can be called either dolus eventualis or 
conditional intent (bedingter Vorsatz). This form can be seen to require that the actor 
                                                
31 Blomsma 2012, p. 63. 
32 Taylor 2004, p. 106. 
33 Blomsma 2012, p. 68. 
34 Taylor 2004, p. 106. 
35 Blomsma 2012, p. 63. 
36 Taylor 2004, p. 106. 
15 
 
 
was aware that the consequence required in the statutory offence was possible and 
not entirely unlikely and that the actor condoned or accepted this consequence.37 
In Germany there are several theories of this lowest form of intention, both cognitive 
and volitional theories. Cognitive theories largely emphasize the actor’s views and 
awareness on the probability of materialization of the consequence and on the 
magnitude of the risks caused by the act.  
Volitional theories require that there is some positive statement from the actor about 
the realization of consequence or of other offence elements. The actor has either 
accepted the consequence they have been aware of or taken it to carry as part of the 
deal (in Kauf nehmen38). Sometimes the consequences, which the actor doesn’t 
accept but decides to tolerate at all hazards, are also included in the intention. 
A famous German case about intention was the Leather Belt case39 in 1957. In this 
case A and B wanted to steal O’s money. They unsuccessfully tried to drug him and 
then to strangle him so he wouldn’t resist. A and B were afraid that they would kill O 
by strangling, so they first tried to make him unconscious by hitting him with a 
sandbag. Having failed in this, they strangled O with a leather belt until he couldn’t 
move anymore. They realized that they O could die because of the strangling and this 
idea was unpleasant to them, but A and B wanted to put O out of action at all costs.  
According to the German Supreme Court, A and B had the dolus eventualis form of 
intent in killing O. According to the court, dolus eventualis requires the offender to 
foresee the consequences as possible and to approve them. So even though A and B 
did not desire O’s death, they accepted that O could die and thus approved the death. 
Now I will take a brief look at the four German theories on the lower limit of intent. 
The first theory is the Consent and approval theory (Einwilligungs- und 
Billigungstheorie, later in this thesis just “Approval theory”). In this theory the actor 
must seriously consider the occurrence of a consequence as well as accept that their 
act could fulfill the definitional elements of the offence.  
                                                
37 Blomsma 2012, p. 105. 
38 This term has been used, for example, in the decision BGH 26.4.2001 – 4 StR 439/00. 
39 BGH 22.4.1955 – 5 StR 35/55. 
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So in the Approval theory the actor must reconcile themselves to the prohibited 
consequence. However, if the actor was confident that the consequence won’t occur 
and they had a reason to believe this way, even when they had foreseen the 
consequence as a possibility, the actor has lacked intent and they have acted only 
negligently.40 
Thus in this theory both knowledge and willfulness are prerequisites for intent, the 
knowledge requiring that the actor has foreseen the consequence as possible and the 
willfulness requiring that the actor has approved the consequence or has reconciled 
themselves to it.41 This required approval of the consequence, however, doesn’t 
mean that the actor would have needed to desire this consequence42, such as the 
death of a person, like in the Leather Belt case. However, an actor that has trusted in 
the non-occurrence of the undesired consequence has still acted only with 
negligence. 
This theory is often used with the inhibition level theory (Hemmschwellentheorie) in 
murder and manslaughter cases. This theory concerns the intent to kill another person 
and assumes that there is a high threshold for a person to actively kill another human 
being. Thus it is considered that the actor needs to cross a high inhibition level. So in 
the homicide cases the court might more easily conclude that the actor had trusted 
that a death wouldn’t be a consequence of their act, even if it had been a possible 
consequence. Exceptions to this are, of course, the cases where the death of another 
person was very likely to occur, like in stabbing another in the heart.43 
The Indifference theory (Gleichgültigkeitstheorie) is another Germany theory of 
lower level of intent, first proposed by Karl Engisch. In this theory the actor needs to 
have foreseen a certain consequence as possible and been indifferent to whether this 
consequence occurs.44 In the Leather Belt case, the actors A and B would have been 
acquitted with this theory, since they weren’t indifferent to the death of O, but 
                                                
40 Roxin 2006, pp. 457–459. 
41 Roxin 2006, p. 459. 
42 Badar 2013, p. 142. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
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instead the death of O was undesirable to them. Today this theory doesn’t have a lot 
of support.45 However, as we saw, Swedish criminal law has moved to this direction. 
The third German theory is the Possibility theory. According to this theory, the actor 
must have recognized that there was a considerable or substantial possibility for the 
consequence to materialize in order to have the intent in regard to this consequence.46 
So this theory is not about volition, but rather merely about knowledge, and 
according to this theory the considerable possibility of the consequence should have 
prevented the actor from carrying out their act. 
When the actor didn’t stop themselves from acting when they had this knowledge, 
they are considered to have acted intentionally. However, this theory might 
theoretically lead to a conviction of homicide when the actor has merely just realized 
the possibility of death as a consequence of their act even if they had trusted that the 
death wouldn’t occur and had greatly undesired this possible consequence.47 
The last of the four German theories is the Probability theory. In this theory there is 
even a higher degree of knowledge required compared to the Possibility theory. 
According to this theory, the actor must have considered the consequence to be 
probable. So they have acted intentionally if they had foreseen that the consequence 
was probable and they had still acted. Like the previous theory, this theory doesn’t 
have an explicit volitional element either. Only the requirement for knowledge and 
awareness is higher, higher than possible or considerable possible, but still not any 
near certain. It could be argued that the Finnish model of probability-intent resembles 
this theory. 
So there are these four theories about the lower level of intent in Germany. Today the 
first one, the Approval theory, has been used the most by the German courts.48 In 
general, the threshold of intent in Germany could be seen as the actor having been 
aware of the possible occurrence of a criminal consequence, or circumstance, which 
was not completely remote, and the actor having endorsed this consequence or at 
least having made his peace with this possibility by committing their act.49 Clearly 
                                                
45 Taylor 2004, p. 356. Cf. Badar, p. 142, footnote 92. 
46 Badar 2013, p. 143. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Badar 2013, p. 141. 
49 Badar 2013, p. 144. 
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there are some specific circumstances and especially specific offences that need to be 
considered very thoroughly, especially the homicide offences. I will do that later on 
in my thesis. Now first I will take a look at the Netherlands and the Dutch system. 
2.5 The Netherlands 
2.5.1 Dutch criminal law 
The Netherlands is a civil law country. The Dutch legal system is partly based on 
Napoleonic French law tradition and the first codified Dutch criminal law was 
promulgated under Napoleonic Era50, but there are not many signs of that in the 
current Dutch Penal Code (Wetboek van Strafrecht, WvSr) from the year 1886. 
Dutch criminal law has some interesting features. There are no specific minimum 
penalties for particular offences. According to Article 10(2) of the Penal Code, the 
minimum imprisonment for all offences is one day. Usually there is also a possibility 
of getting a fine as a sentence instead of imprisonment. It is really noteworthy that 
this applies to offences of rape and murder too, even though this a very rare. 
According to Article 23(4) of the Dutch Penal Code, the maximum sum for a fine of 
the fourth category is 20 250 € and for a fine of the fifth category 81 000 €. 
Dutch criminal law has two kinds of criminal offences. Felony is a more serious 
offence and always needs intent or negligence, while misdemeanor is less serious and 
might not need that any mens rea element is proved.51 Similarly is in Germany. Most 
importantly with regard to my thesis, there is no legal definition of intent in the 
Dutch Penal Code.  
2.5.2 Forms of intent in the Netherlands 
Dolus or criminal intent (opzet) in Dutch criminal law is based on the definition 
“willingly and knowingly” (willens en wetens), whereas culpa or negligence is at 
hand when the actor takes a risk that their actions may have certain consequences.52 
There are three forms of intention in the Dutch criminal law. Dolus directus or 
willful intent is the highest form. It is also often called direct intention and can be 
                                                
50 Rayar and Wadsworth 1997, p. 3. 
51 Van Dijk and Wolswijk, p. 30. 
52 Taekema, p. 442-443. 
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described as acting because of a wanted consequence. Thus a person is directing their 
will towards achieving a prohibited act or consequence, willingly going for a 
prohibited consequence.53 
Dolus indirectus is acting despite a certain prohibited consequence occurring. This 
indirect intention is the second highest form of intention, requiring a state of mind in 
relation to a prohibited act or consequence which is not an actor’s main goal, but 
which is recognized by them as a necessary consequence of the attainment of their 
main goal or object. An actor here is almost certain that this prohibited consequence 
will happen. This form can also be called as “awareness of a high degree of 
probability” (noodzakelijkheidsbewustzijn)54, which defines it well, since this form is 
all about awareness. Compared to Finnish certainty-intent, this Dutch version does 
not seem to have as high requirements of certainty. 
Lowest form of intent in Dutch criminal law is dolus eventualis or conditional intent 
(voorwaardelijk opzet). Intent itself is not conditional, but the occurrence of the 
consequence is conditional on uncertain circumstances.55 In a complete offence, the 
risk that person consciously accepted must occur.56 
The Dutch legislator has recognized Dolus eventualis, but left its development to 
courts and scholars.57 It was first truly used by the Supreme Court in its cases Hoorn 
Pie58 and Cicero59. Hoorn Pie was a homicide case and will be discussed later on in 
this thesis. The Cicero case was concerned about intention in a copyright violation. 
Supreme Court’s judgment ruled that term “intentionally” could also mean 
“knowingly and willingly accepting the chance that cannot be ignored as imaginable” 
(”Willens en wetens aanvaarden van de niet als denkbeeldig te verwaarlozen kans 
dat”).60 Thus this case shaped the conditional intent in Dutch criminal law. 
Today in Dutch criminal law the conditional intent can be defined as consciously 
accepting a substantial chance of causing the consequence. The Supreme Court has 
                                                
53 De Hullu 2012, p. 225. 
54 Van Dijk and Wolswijk 2015, p. 40. 
55 Blomsma 2012, p. 100. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Blomsma 2012, p. 63. 
58 HR 19 June 1911, W 9203. 
59 HR 9 November 1954, NJ 1955, 55. 
60 HR 19 June 1911, W 9203. 
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stated this, for example, in case NJ 2007, 31361. So there needs to be a considerable 
chance that a consequence occurs and a conscious acceptance of this. The chance 
must be considerable based on general experience and it depends on the 
circumstances of the case.62 In non-lethal offences the required conditional intent is 
often inferred from the knowledge of an objectively high risk.63 
The actor can sometimes be considered to have taken a prohibited consequence “into 
the bargain” (op de koop toenemen) showing that they had accepted the possible 
consequence, a bit similarly than in German criminal law with “in Kauf nehmen”. An 
example of a case where this wasn’t the case and the court concluded that the actor 
wasn’t consciously taking consequences into the bargain, when they could have also 
died as a result, was the Porsche case64, which will be discussed more later on. In 
HIV cases Dutch courts have often used statistical calculations where experts have 
assessed the risks.65 
2.6 England 
2.6.1 English criminal law 
Unlike the previous legal systems, Finland, Sweden, Germany and the Netherlands, 
the English legal system is a common law system. However, there are also various 
codified written laws in English criminal law, so it’s not only based on legal 
precedents given by the highest court, now the Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom, and prior the year 2005 the House of Lords. The written laws, when 
applicable, are usually explicitly separated by their field of offences, so in this thesis 
I will look closer into the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and the Offences against the 
Person Act 1861. 
2.6.2 Forms of intent in England 
Mens rea elements are constructed somewhat differently in English criminal law 
compared to civil law countries. There is also dolus and culpa in English criminal 
law, but there is also an additional form of recklessness between these two. 
                                                
61 HR 20 February 2007, NJ 2007, 313. 
62 Blomsma 2012, p. 110. 
63 Blomsma 2012, p. 121. 
64 HR 15 October 1996, NJ 1997, 199. 
65 Blomsma 2012, p. 108-108. 
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Dolus can be divided into direct intention and oblique intention. Direct intention 
includes cases where the actor intends to kill the victim, when it is their purpose, aim 
and objective. An example of this is when the actor pulls the trigger of their gun 
intentionally to kill another person. Direct intent is acting in order to bring about a 
certain wanted consequence.66 
Oblique intention is acting with foresight of certainty that certain consequence will 
result. In these cases the actor can be said to have intended a result if they realized 
that this result was certain to follow from the behavior in question. So it is not the 
actor’s aim, but it is known to them to be certain.67 
In English criminal law the dimension of “intent” ends here. But what if the actor 
foresaw a prohibited consequence as a probable result of their act, should this be 
classified as intention? The answer to this in English criminal law is recklessness, 
which can be considered to cover the same questions as dolus eventualis in the 
countries yet investigated. According to Blomsma, normative concepts of these 
forms are very similar.68 However, recklessness has a broader range than dolus 
eventualis, requiring no volitional element. Still it can also be narrower, since takes 
into account the nature of legal interests in a particular case and the harm that is 
caused to these.69 
Recklessness can be defined as the conscious taking of an unjustified risk.70 So the 
actor needs to be aware of the risk. The risk can be of any degree, as long as it 
materializes. So it doesn’t need to be a considerable or serious risk. In addition to 
this, the actor also needs to believe that this risk is unjustified or unreasonable.71 The 
actor’s awareness is important here; even so that distinction between recklessness 
and negligence is usually based on the actor’s awareness or unawareness of the risk. 
Recklessness used to be assessed in some cases subjectively and in others 
objectively. The latter assessment was mostly used in criminal damages72 and was 
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based on the theory of Caldwell-recklessness, named after the case R v Caldwell73. In 
this case, the actor Caldwell was a hotel worker, who started a fire in the hotel after 
drinking a lot of alcohol. Caldwell’s defence was that due to intoxication he hadn’t 
given any thought to the possible endangerment of the people in the hotel. The House 
of Lords, however, ruled that the actor has been reckless if their act has created an 
obvious risk, even if they haven’t given any thought to it. 
The decision in case R v G and R74 changed the recklessness back to subjective 
assessment, when the House of Lords in this case ruled that the unreasonableness of 
the risk needed to be based on the circumstances known to the actor. In this case the 
12-years and 11-years old actors had gone camping near a shop, where they had 
found some newspapers and lit some of them on fire. They had thrown the lit 
newspapers under a plastic wheelie-bin and left. The fire had spread eventually to the 
shop and caused a million pounds worth of damage. The House of Lords ruled that in 
this case the actors due their infancy hadn’t known the risk of this damage occurring. 
2.7 United States 
2.7.1 American criminal law 
The American legal system is a common law system, as well. The Model Penal Code 
(MPC) is a model of codified American criminal code. It is a statutory text, but no 
state of the United States is bound to follow it. So it is a model for criminal law 
standardization and harmonization, since all the states have their own criminal codes.  
The Model Penal Code was drafted by prominent American lawyers, judges and law 
teachers of the American Law Institute. The Institute approved it in 1962 after ten 
years of drafting.75 Since 1962, the Model Penal Code has been partly adopted into 
various state’s own criminal codes, for example, the states of Illinois, New York and 
Delaware.76 The Model Penal Code has provisions regarding both general and 
substantive part of the criminal law. Next, I will take a closer look in its quite 
qualified provisions concerning mens rea. 
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2.7.2 Forms of intent in the United States 
Section 2.02 of the Model Penal Code defines the forms of culpability and the levels 
of mens rea mental state. According to this section, an actor can act purposely, 
knowingly, recklessly or negligently. I will mostly now use the first three of these 
forms in my thesis. 
The highest form is acting “purposely”. According to Section 2.02(2)(a), a person 
can act purposely, with respect to a material element of an offence, in regard to the 
nature of their conduct or a result thereof as well as in regard to the element that 
involves the attendant circumstances. In the former case, a person acts purposely, 
when it is their conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such 
a result. In the latter case, a person acts purposely, when they are aware of the 
existence of such circumstances or they believe or hope that the circumstances exist. 
The second highest form is acting “knowingly”, defined in Section 2.02(2)(b). The 
structure of the form is similar as in acting purposely, so a person can act knowingly 
in regard to the nature of their conduct or a result thereof and in regard to the element 
that involves attendant circumstances. In the former case, a person acts knowingly, 
with respect to a material element of an offence, when they are aware that their 
conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist. In the latter case the actor 
acts knowingly, if the element involves a result of his conduct, they are aware that it 
is practically certain that their conduct will cause such a result. So if the actor is 
aware of this certain probability, their knowledge is established and they are 
culpable. This is a subjective form, not what a reasonable man would have known.77 
The third form of culpability is acting “recklessly”. According to Section 2.02(2)(c), 
a person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offence when they 
consciously disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element 
exists or will result from their conduct. This risk must be of such a nature and degree 
that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances 
known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct 
that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation. Thus recklessness 
includes both accepting the result and accepting the concrete danger that the result 
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may occur. It is also noteworthy that the risk needs to be both substantial as well as 
unjustifiable. This difference to negligence is that negligence doesn’t need 
awareness, only that the actor has created a substantial and unjustifiable risk, which 
they should have been aware of.78 This is not very different from other countries. 
I have now finished with my initial look into concepts and forms of intent in all the 
countries of my thesis research. Next, I will take quite a different direction and head 
to substantive laws and sexual crimes. 
3 Sexual crimes 
3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 3 of my thesis I will now take a closer look into the substantive laws of all 
the countries of my research and examine the substantive laws concerning sexual 
crimes. I will aim to give a comprehensive view of these laws, since their content is 
highly essential in my research. What is exactly criminalized, what are the specific 
definitions, what is the actus reus or the guilty act, and what are the required and 
expressed mens rea elements in these offences? I will start this investigation by 
covering the Finnish sexual crimes legislation first. 
3.2 Finland 
3.2.1 Rape offences 
In Finland the sexual offences are criminalized in the Finnish Criminal Code. This 
legislation has been amended recently and the most recent amendments of the 
Criminal code concerning these sexual crimes entered into force on 1.9.2014. So 
what is the statutory definition of rape in Finland today? 
According to Section 1(1) of the Criminal Code, Chapter 20, the actor who forces 
another into sexual intercourse by the use or threat of violence, shall be convicted of 
rape to imprisonment for at least 1 year and at most 6 years. Thus the rape offence 
can be based on force, violence or threats of it. It can be a situation where the victim 
is not physically able to prevent the intercourse, because the actor is holding their 
                                                
78 American Law Institute 1985, p. 240. 
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hands and legs79, but it can also be a situation where the victim is mentally forced to 
the intercourse by threats of violence, e.g. the actor threatens to kill the victim.  
According to subsection 2, the rape offence shall apply also to the sexual intercourse 
where the actor takes advantage of the victim being unable to defend themselves or 
to form or express their will because of unconsciousness, illness, disability, state of 
fear or other helpless state. Thus the rape offence can be based not only on force, 
violence and threats, but also on taking advantage of a vulnerable victim. The victim 
needs to be unable to defend themselves or to form or to express their will, so it is 
not enough that the victim’s ability to do this is only diminished, e.g. being more 
uninhibited towards the sexual intercourse because of alcohol.80  
A good example of this subsection is an unconscious victim, who clearly is unable to 
meet any of the requirements, to defend themselves or form or express their will.81 
More problematic, however, could be the cases where the victim can’t express their 
will, because, for example, of being in a state of fear, which the actor necessarily 
can’t perceive as well as the victim does. 
According to subsection 3, if the rape, in view of the slight degree of the threat or the 
other circumstances of the offence, is assessed as a whole to be less serious than acts 
referred in subsections 1 and 2, the actor shall be sentenced to imprisonment for at 
least 4 months and at most 4 years. Likewise is sentenced the actor, who coerces 
another into sexual intercourse by a threat other than that referred to in subsection 1, 
i.e. with a non-violent threat. This kind of threat could be in question when the actor 
threatens to expose that the victim is having an affair.82 The provisions of the 
subsection 3 do not apply if violence has been used in the rape.  
An attempt is also punishable in all these previous offences. According to Section 
10(1) of the Finnish Criminal Code, Chapter 20, “sexual intercourse” refers to the 
sexual penetration, by a sex organ or directed at a sex organ or anus, of the body of 
another person, or taking the other person's sexual organ into your body. 
                                                
79 Matikkala 2014, p. 126. 
80 Matikkala 2014, p. 130. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Matikkala 2014, p. 127. 
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The Government Proposal HE 216/201383 added “anus” in to the definition, so now 
the definition includes also the cases where there is a sexual penetration directed at 
anus of another person by a finger or an object, when the previous wording applied 
only to the cases where a sex organ penetrated the anus of another person.84 
Taking another person’s sexual organ into your body, however, was not a part of the 
Government Proposal, but the Law Committee of Finnish Parliament added it85, so 
that the definition would include also the situations where a man’s sex organ is taken 
into the actor’s mouth.86  
Thus today e.g. taking the penis of an unconscious man into your mouth clearly 
meets the statutory offence elements of rape. With this addition the definition of the 
sexual intercourse is today gender-neutral and includes vaginal, anal and oral forms 
of intercourse between a man and a woman, a man and a man as well as a woman 
and a woman. 
The amended version of aggravated form of rape offence also entered into force on 
1.9.2014. Section 2 of the Finnish Criminal Code, Chapter 20, now includes five 
separate aggravating circumstances. An attempt of aggravated rape is also 
punishable. The actor convicted of aggravated rape is sentenced to imprisonment for 
at least 2 years and at most 10 years. 
Firstly, an aggravated circumstance is present if a grievous bodily injury, serious 
illness or a state of mortal danger has been inflicted on the victim. This circumstance 
as its previous form included the word “intentionally”, but this was removed from 
the current law. This, however, doesn’t mean that the meaning would have changed, 
but merely that this term is not required in Finnish criminal law to tell that offences 
are criminalized only as intentionally committed, since this is the general rule.87 
Secondly, rape is aggravated if the offence has been committed by several people, or 
if especially considerable mental or physical suffering has been caused to the victim. 
                                                
83 HE 216/2013 vp. 
84 Matikkala 2014, p. 118. 
85 Cf. Matikkala 2014, p. 131 about this kind of situations. Matikkala suggests that these situations 
were already covered. This book was written before these situations were explicitly added into the 
law. 
86 LaVM 4/2014 vp. 
87 See Chapter 2.2.1. 
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Thirdly, the rape is aggravated if the victim was a child younger than 18 years of age. 
This aggravating factor was just added to the latest amendment of this offence to 
protect the children under 18 years of age. Compared to most of other factors, it is 
rather mechanical to apply, but requires intent in regard to the age of the victim.88 
Fourthly, the offence is committed in a particularly brutal, cruel or humiliating 
manner. Fifthly, a firearm, edged weapon or other lethal instrument is used or a 
threat of other serious violence is made. Lastly, in all these cases the rape needs to be 
assessed as aggravated also as a whole. So in some cases it might not be enough that 
the victim had been under 18 years of age, if there are no other reasons for the rape 
offence to be considered as aggravated.  
If the rape as a whole is not assessed as aggravated, it could be possible that a case 
where the victim was under 18 years of age would be convicted under subsection 1, 2 
or even under subsection 3 of the standard rape offence of Section 1.89 The Supreme 
Court has recently given decision KKO 2013:5790 where it ruled that the court 
always needs to explicitly state whether it has assessed the offence as aggravated as a 
whole when this kind of overall aggravated assessment is a part of the statutory 
definition of the offence.91 
If the victim of rape offence is under 16 years of age, this act fulfills both rape and 
(aggravated) sexual abuse of a child, if the actor was aware of the age of the victim. 
3.2.2 Sexual offences against children 
Finnish criminal law has a standard offence of sexual abuse of a child as well as an 
aggravated form of this offence. According to Section 6(1) of the Finnish Criminal 
Code, Chapter 20, a person who by touching or otherwise performs a sexual act on a 
child younger than 16 years of age, this act being conducive to cause harm to the 
child’s development, or induces the child to perform such an act, shall be convicted 
of sexual abuse of a child to imprisonment for at least 4 months and at most 4 years. 
                                                
88 HE 216/2013, p. 58. 
89 HE 206/2013, p. 59. 
90 KKO 2013:57. 
91 KKO 2013:57, 8. 
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According to subsection 2, a person who has sexual intercourse with a child younger 
than 16 years shall also be sentenced for sexual abuse of a child, if the offence is not 
aggravated as a whole as stated in the Section 7(1). Similarly shall be sentenced a 
person who commits an act referred to in subsection 1 or act referred previously in 
this subsection with a child over 16 but younger than 18 years of age, if the person is 
a parent of the child or the person is in a position comparable to that of a parent and 
is living in the same household with the child. An attempt is also punishable. 
I have already earlier in this thesis written about the definition of the sexual 
intercourse.92 Sexual act is also defined in Section 10 of the Finnish Criminal Code, 
Chapter 20. According to its subsection 2, “sexual act” means an act that is sexually 
relevant considering the actor, the victim and the circumstances of the act. 
As we can see in subsections 1 and 2, the victim of this offence needs to be under 16 
years of age, or under 18 years of age, if the actor is their parent or comparable to 
this position and living in the same household with the child. Besides these age 
requirements, there are no additional requirements that would be have to shown as an 
evidence of the taking advantage of a child. So the age of the victim generally needs 
to be under 16 years of age, but naturally the act is deemed more harmful to the child 
the younger the child is. So, for example, the children of the age of 12 are not 
considered to be able to give any kind of consent to sexual acts.93 
Prior to the amendment that entered into force on 1.6.2011, Section 6 included 
subsection 3 stating that an act referred to in subsection 1 was not deemed as sexual 
abuse of a child if there was no great difference in the ages or the mental and 
physical maturity of the persons involved. Today this exception to the rule is in 
Section 7a. According to this section, an act is not deemed as sexual abuse of a child 
under Section 6 or the sexual intercourse form of aggravated sexual abuse of a child 
under Section 7(1)(1), if it doesn’t violate the sexual sovereignty of the person 
objected to this act and if there is no great difference in the ages and the mental and 
physical maturity of the persons involved.  
It is noteworthy that in addition to a child’s inviolable sexual sovereignty, all three 
other requirements need to be met. So we can see that the new definition is clearly 
                                                
92 See Chapter 3.2.1. 
93 Ojala 2012, p. 120. 
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more specific and narrower in scope, e.g. it can’t be applied to situations where there 
is a considerable difference in the ages, but not in the maturity of the persons 
involved.94 An age difference over five years has been considered to be a great age 
difference where this restriction wouldn’t apply.95 Even with this age difference, the 
court can still look closer into circumstances of the case and on the act and the 
relationship the child under 16 years of age had with the actor.96 
Two different forms can be distinguished of aggravated sexual abuse of a child. First 
one is sexual intercourse. According to subsection 1(1) of the Finnish Criminal Code, 
Chapter 20, Section 7, aggravated sexual abuse of a child occurs if a person has 
sexual intercourse with a child younger than 16, or with a child who is 16 but not yet 
18 and the person is the child's parent or in a similar relationship with the child and 
lives in the same household. In addition to such sexual intercourse, the offence also 
needs to be assessed as a whole as aggravated. If it is not, the standard offence of 
sexual abuse of a child in Section 6(2) is applied. 
The second form includes three qualified cases of sexual abuse of a child, when a) 
the victim is a child to whose development the crime is conducive of causing severe 
harm because of the child's age or level of development; b) the crime is committed in 
a way that is particularly humiliating; or c) the crime is conducive to causing severe 
harm to the child because of the particular trust the child has for the person or 
because of the child's particular dependency of this person. In all these situations, the 
offence also needs to be assessed as a whole as aggravated. 
The first case (a) case is based on the assessment of dangerousness and generally 
there is more harm the younger the child is. The nature of the act and other 
circumstances, such as the age of the actor, can be relevant in this assessment, as 
well. An attempt is also punishable. The person convicted of aggravated sexual abuse 
of a child shall be sentenced to imprisonment for at least one year and at most 10 
years. 
                                                
94 Matikkala 2014, p. 157. 
95 Ojala 2012, p. 118. 
96 Ibid. 
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3.3 Sweden 
3.3.1 Rape offences 
The definition of rape was recently changed in Sweden, as well. Current Section 1 of 
the Swedish Penal Code, Chapter 6, entered into force on July 1, 2013. The offence 
of rape was extended to include also the cases where the victim reacts with passivity, 
thus it makes no difference whether the victim has resisted or not. The requirement 
of victim being "in a helpless state" was also replaced with "in a particularly 
vulnerable situation" (särskilt utsatt situation). 
According to Section 1(1), a person who by assault or otherwise by violence or by 
threat of a criminal act forces another person to have sexual intercourse or to 
undertake or endure another sexual act that, having regard to the nature of the 
violation and circumstances in general, is comparable to sexual intercourse, is 
convicted of rape to imprisonment for at least two and at most six years. So this first 
subsection concerns cases where the actor has used violence or threats. 
According to subsection 2, this shall also apply if a person engages with another 
person in sexual intercourse or in a sexual act which under the first paragraph is 
comparable to sexual intercourse by improperly exploiting that the person, due to 
unconsciousness, sleep, serious fear, intoxication or other drug influence, illness, 
physical injury or mental disturbance, or otherwise in view of the circumstances in 
general, is in a particularly vulnerable situation. 
Subsection 2 is meant to protect the sexual integrity and the right to decide over 
one’s own body. So it criminalizes the circumstances where the actor has taken 
advantage of the victim’s vulnerability. This vulnerability is seen as the reason why 
the sexual intercourse or a sexual act occurred. So this law is quite similar to the 
Finnish one. 
Section 1 includes also less and more aggravated forms of the offence. According to 
subsection 3, if in view of the circumstances associated with the offence, an offence 
provided for in subsection 1 or 2 is considered less aggravated, the actor is convicted 
of rape to imprisonment for at most 4 years. These kind of less aggravated 
circumstances can occur, for example, when there is sexual intercourse with a 
31 
 
 
sleeping person, but no penetration and this sexual intercourse is immediately 
stopped when the victim has woken up and protested. 
According to subsection 4, if a crime provided for in the first or second subsection is 
considered gross, the actor is convicted of aggravated rape to imprisonment for at 
least 4 and at most 10 years. In assessing whether the offence was gross, special 
consideration is given to whether the violence or threat was of a particularly serious 
nature or whether more than one person assaulted the victim or in any other way took 
part in the assault or whether the actor exhibited particular ruthlessness or brutality 
with regard to the method used in the offence or otherwise. 
As we can see, the Swedish offence definition of rape is not based on lack of 
consent. However, questions regarding consent were widely considered in the 
Swedish government report SOU 2010:7197. This analysis came into conclusion that 
the European Human Rights Court (ECHR) judgment on the case of M.C. v. 
Bulgaria98 doesn’t mean that member states of the Council of Europe should 
explicitly include consent in the statutory definitions of rape, when the standards set 
by the ECHR judgment can be met and non-consensual sexual acts be covered in 
other ways.99 
3.3.2 Sexual offences against children 
According to Section 4(1) of the Swedish Penal Code, Chapter 6, the actor that has 
sexual intercourse with a child under 15 years of age or with such a child carries out 
a sexual act which, considering the seriousness of the violation is comparable to 
sexual intercourse, is convicted of child rape to imprisonment for not less than 2 and 
not more than 6 years. 
According to subsection 2, the same applies to the actor who commits an act referred 
to in the first subsection of a child from the age of 15 but not 18 and is a descendant 
of the actor or under the instruction of the actor, or has a similar relationship to the 
actor, or for whose care or supervision the actor to was responsible because of an 
authority's decision. 
                                                
97 SOU 2010:71. 
98 M.C. v. Bulgaria, Appl. No. 39272/98, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 3 
December 2003. 
99 SOU 2010:71, p. 203–204. 
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If the offences referred to in the first or second subsection is considered aggravated, 
sentenced for aggravated rape of a child to imprisonment for not less than four and 
not more than ten years. In assessing whether the offence is aggravated the court 
needs to pay particular attention to whether the actor used violence or the threat of a 
criminal offence or if more than one abused child or otherwise participated in the 
assault or if the actor exhibited particular ruthlessness or brutality with respect to the 
approach or the child's young age or otherwise. 
The Swedish Penal Code has a less serious form of this offence, as well. If an 
offence referred to in Section 4(1) or 4(2) with regard to the circumstances of the 
crime is considered to be less serious, the actor shall be sentenced for sexual 
exploitation of children to imprisonment for at most 4 years. 
Section 13 of the Swedish Penal Code, Chapter 6, deals with the awareness of the 
victim’s age. According to this section, there is criminal responsibility for the sexual 
offences committed against anyone below a certain age, so the responsibility exists 
also for the actors who had not realized (inte insåg) the victim’s age but had had 
reasonable grounds to believe (skälig anledning att anta) that their sex partner had 
not reached that legally required age. This provision will be discussed more later on. 
Section 14 states that a person who has committed an offence under Section 5 
(sexual exploitation of children) and Section 6 (sexual abuse of children under 15), 
first paragraph against a child under fifteen years or according to Section 8 
(exploitation of children for sexual posing) first subsection or Section 10 (sexual 
offence against child under 15), first subsection, should not be penalized if it is clear 
that the offence did not involve any abuse of the child with respect to the slight 
difference in age and development between the person who committed the offence 
and the child as well as other circumstances.  
So similarly to Finnish criminal law, the Swedish criminal law has a possibility to 
determine that the conduct otherwise fulfilling the statutory offence elements is not 
prosecuted in these specific sexual crimes. Next I will take a look at the German law. 
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3.4 Germany 
3.4.1 Rape offences 
Section 177 of the German Criminal Code includes the offence of sexual assault by 
use of force or threats. This offence includes, but is not limited to rape. According to 
subsection 1, whosoever coerces another person by force, by threat of imminent 
danger to life or limb, or by exploiting a situation in which the victim is unprotected 
and at the mercy of the offender, to suffer sexual acts by the offender or a third 
person on their own person or to engage actively in sexual activity with the offender 
or a third person, shall be liable to imprisonment of not less than one year. According 
Section 38(2), the maximum sentence is 15 years of imprisonment. 
Conditional intent is sufficient for this offence. So the actor must have held possible 
that the victim didn’t consent to the sexual contact. The actor also needs to accept 
that they can have stopped the victim’s previously started or expected resistance by 
their behavior, for example by violence, and realize that the victim sees their 
behavior as a threat.100 The actor needs to take seriously any form of resistance by 
the victim. If the actor sees the reluctance of the victim, the actor trusting in good 
outcome can only have a pipe dream of the consent by the victim.101 In cases where 
the actor takes advantage of the vulnerable situation of the victim, they need to be 
aware of the victim’s vulnerability.102 
Subsection 2 states that in especially serious cases the penalty shall be imprisonment 
of not less than two years. This kind of especially serious case typically occurs if the 
actor performs sexual intercourse with the victim or performs similar sexual acts 
with the victim, or allows them to be performed on themselves by the victim, 
especially if these degrade the victim or if they entail penetration of the body (rape). 
A likewise especially serious case is when more than one person jointly commits the 
offence. 
Subsections 3 and 4 cover even more aggravated forms of the offence with higher 
sentences. According to subsection 3, penalty shall be imprisonment of not less than 
                                                
100 Renzikowski §177, 58 in Joecks and Miebach 2012, p. 1374. 
101 Renzikowski § 177, 60 in Joecks and Miebach 2012, p. 1375. 
102 BGH 26.8.2005 – 4 StR 373/08. 
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three years if the offender carries a weapon or another dangerous instrument; 
otherwise carries an instrument or other means for the purpose of preventing or 
overcoming the resistance of another person through force or threat of force; or by 
the offence places the victim in danger of serious injury. 
Subsection 4 involves the cases where the actor uses the weapon or another 
dangerous instrument during the commission of the offence, or if the actor seriously 
physically abuses the victim during the offence, or by the offence places the victim in 
danger of death. The penalty those these cases shall be imprisonment of not less than 
5 years. So the most aggravated form of sexual offence, not leading to the death of 
the victim, carries a sentence of at least 5 years’ imprisonment. 
There is also subsection 5 in Section 177 for the less serious cases. According to this 
subsection, less serious cases under subsection 1 shall carry imprisonment from six 
months to five years and less serious cases under subsections 3 and 4 imprisonment 
from 1 to 10 years. 
3.4.2 Sexual offences against children 
The standard form of sexual abuse of a child is defined in Section 176(1) of the 
German Criminal Code. According to this section, the actor that engages in sexual 
activity with a person under 14 years of age (child) or allows the child to engage in 
sexual activity with the actor shall be liable to imprisonment from six months to ten 
years. So the victim needs to be under 14 years of age. The actor needs to be at least 
14 years of age, since this is the age of criminal responsibility in Germany. 
According to Section 176(2), whosoever induces a child to engage in sexual activity 
with a third person or to allow third persons to engage in sexual activity with the 
child shall incur the same penalty. Subsection 3 then includes a more severe penalty, 
imprisonment of not less than one year for the especially serious cases. 
“Sexual activity” in these offences can be seen to include various sexual acts. It can 
include penetration, but penetration is not required. If the act is not considered 
obviously sexual, it depends on the objective conditions whether it is considered as 
sexual activity. This kind of acts can be sitting on the victim and telling that of 
wanting to ejaculate or uncovering the upper body of a child when talking about 
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sexual matters.103 In addition to acts in subsections 1 and 2, which require sexual 
activity between the actor and the victim, Section 176 also includes forms of 
offences of sexual abuse of a child where this kind of direct sexual activity is not 
needed.  
According to subsection 4, the actor that (1) engages in sexual activity in the 
presence of a child; (2) induces the child to engage in sexual activity, unless the act is 
punishable under subsection 1 or subsection 2; (3) presents a child with written 
materials (per Section 11(3)) to induce them to engage in sexual activity with or in 
the presence of the actor or a third person or allow the actor or a third person to 
engage in sexual activity with them; or (4) presents a child with pornographic 
illustrations or images, audio recording media with pornographic content or 
pornographic speech. The sentence for all these offences is imprisonment from 3 
months to 5 years. 
Lastly, subsection 5 also criminalizes acts where a person supplies or promises to 
supply a child for an offence under subsections 1-4 or who agrees with another to 
commit such an offence. These acts shall carry imprisonment from three months to 
five years. According to subsection 6, an attempt is also punishable, except in 
offences of subsection 4(3), 4(4) and 5. 
Aggravated forms of sexual abuse of a child are set out in Section 176a of the 
German Criminal Code. There are various aggravating factors in this section. First 
subsection concerns sexual abuse of a child offences under Section 176(1) and 
176(2) and applies when the actor has already been convicted of such offence within 
the previous five years. Conviction here means the final judgment. If these 
conditions are at hand, the actor is sentenced to imprisonment of at least one year. So 
this aggravating circumstance is recidivism and meant to protect children from 
sexual offenders. 
According to subsection 6, any period during which the offender was detained in an 
institution pursuant to an order of a public authority is not credited to this 5 years 
term of subsection 1. An offence resulting in a conviction abroad shall be equal to an 
                                                
103 Hörnle §184g, 3, in Joecks and Miebach 2012, p. 1615.  
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offence resulting in a domestic conviction if it under German criminal law would 
have been an offence under Section 176(1) or (2). 
Subsection 2 includes more specific situations. It also concerns sexual abuse of a 
child offences under Sections 176(1) and 176(2), but the actor needs to be over 18 
years of age. If this actor performs sexual intercourse or similar sexual acts with the 
child, which include a penetration of the body, or allows them to be performed on the 
actor by the child, the actor shall be sentenced to imprisonment of not less than two 
years. Similarly are sentenced the actors when the offence is committed jointly by 
more than one person, or if the actor by their offence places the child in danger of 
serious injury or substantial impairment of the child’s physical or emotional 
development. 
Subsection 3 includes specific cases where the actor under Section 176(1) to (3) 
engages or induces the child into sexual activity with the actor or a third person, 
under 176(4)(1) engages in sexual activity in the presence of the child, under 
176(4)(2) presents the child pornographic material or under 176(6) attempts the 
offences. If the actor in these offences acts as a principal or secondary participant 
with the intent of making the act the object of a pornographic medium (per Section 
11(3)) which is to be disseminated pursuant to Section 184b(1) to (3), the actor is 
sentenced to imprisonment for at least 2 years. 
It is noteworthy that aggravated sexual abuse of a child also has a less serious form 
possible. According to subsection 4, in less serious cases under subsection 1 
concerning the recidivists the penalty shall be imprisonment from three months to 
five years, and in less serious cases under subsection 2 from one to ten years. 
The gravest form of aggravated sexual abuse of a child is set out in subsection 5. 
According to this subsection, a person who under Sections 176(1) to 176(3) seriously 
physically abuses the child or places this child in danger of death shall be liable to 
imprisonment of not less than five years. The sentence is thus the same as in the 
gravest form of the rape offence in Section 177. 
As we have now seen, German criminal law gives the most protection for the 
children under 14 years of age. However, there is also a separate offence in Section 
182 concerning abuse of juveniles. According to Section 182(1), the actor who 
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abuses a victim under 18 years of age shall be sentenced to imprisonment for at most 
5 years.  
This abuse can be committed by taking advantage of an exploitative situation by 
engaging in sexual activity with this victim or suffering this victim to engage actively 
in sexual activity with the actor, or by inducing the victim to engage in sexual 
activity with a third person or to suffer sexual acts committed on their own body by a 
third person. The same penalty shall, according to subsection 2, apply to the actor 
over 18 years of age who abuses a victim under 18 years of age by engaging in 
sexual activity with them, or by inducing the victim to suffer sexual acts committed 
by the actor on their own body for a financial reward. 
There are again quite different age requirements in the offence of subsection 3. 
According this subsection, the actor over 21 years of age who abuses a victim under 
16 years of age shall be sentenced to imprisonment for at most 3 years, or is given a 
fine. This abuse is committed by engaging in sexual activity with the victim or by 
causing the victim to engage actively in sexual activity with the actor or by inducing 
the victim to engage in sexual activity with a third person or to suffer sexual acts 
committed on their own body by a third person. To be convicted the actor also needs 
to, by either of these acts, exploit the victim’s lack of capacity for sexual self-
determination. 
According to subsection 4, attempts of Section 182 offences shall also be punishable. 
Subsection 5 states that in cases under subsection 3 above the offence may only be 
prosecuted upon request unless the prosecuting authority considers propio motu (of 
their own initiative) that prosecution is required out of special public interest. 
There is also a possibility of discharge of Section 182 provisions set out in this 
section’s subsection 6. In cases under subsections 1 to 3, the court may order a 
discharge under these provisions, if in consideration of the conduct of the person 
against whom the offence was committed, the harm of the offence is of a minor 
nature. 
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3.5 The Netherlands 
3.5.1 Rape offences 
Dutch criminal law includes a wide range of sexual offences. The Dutch Penal Code 
has been detailed with sexual offences since its drafting.104 I will now take a brief 
look on three of these sexual offences, rape, sexual assault and indecent assault. 
The offence of rape is defined in Article 242 of the Dutch Penal Code. According to 
this section, it is an offence of rape to force another person into allowing an act 
consisting of or including sexual penetration of the body, by an act of violence, threat 
of violence or threat of another act. The actor of this offence is sentenced to 
imprisonment of up to 12 years or given a fine of the fifth category. 
Both men and women can be actors and victims in this offence. In Dutch criminal 
law the term “sexual penetration” doesn’t only mean sexual intercourse. The 
Supreme Court has had an important role defining the limits of this term. Oral sex105 
can also fulfill the offence of rape, and even active French kissing has been seen in 
the Supreme Court case NJ 1998, 781106 as sexual penetration and considered as 
rape. However, in recent case NJ 2013, 437107 the Supreme Court ruled that this was 
no longer the case.  
Sexual assault including penetration is defined in Article 243 of the Dutch Penal 
Code. This section makes it a criminal offence to commit sexual acts that include 
penetration of the body where the victim is in a state of unconsciousness, impaired 
consciousness or physical incapability, or where the victim’s impaired mental 
development leaves them unable to give consent or indicate their resistance to these 
sexual acts. The actor of this offence is sentenced to imprisonment of up to 8 years or 
given a fine of the fifth category. 
Lastly, Article 246 of the Dutch Penal Code states that the actor is guilty of indecent 
assault (aanranding van de eerbaarheid) if they by violence or threat of violence or 
by other act force another person to commit or tolerate indecent acts (ontuchtige 
                                                
104 Rayar and Wadsworth 1997, p. 7. 
105 HR 22 November 1994, NJ 1995, 157. 
106 HR 21 April 1998, NJ 1998, 781. 
107 HR 12 March 2013, NJ 2013, 437.  
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handelingen). The actor of this offence is sentenced to imprisonment of at most 8 
years or given a fine of fifth category. 
3.5.2 Sexual offences against children 
In Dutch criminal law there is an specific offence criminalizing sexual acts with a 
child under 12 years of age, as well as an offence criminalizing indecent or sexually 
abusive acts with a child older than 12 but younger than 16 years of age. I will now 
take a look at these. 
Sexual assault on a child is criminalized in Article 244 of the Dutch Penal Code. 
According to this article, it is a criminal offence to perform sexual acts comprising of 
or including penetration of the body of the victim under the age of 12. So this offence 
includes penetration, as well. The only other requirement is that the victim is under 
12 years of age, so no violence or taking advantage is needed besides of the young 
age. The consent of this victim can’t negate the intent. The actor of this offence is 
sentenced to imprisonment for up to 12 years or given a fine of the fifth category. 
There is definite list of indecent or sexually abusive acts (ontuchtige handeligen). 
When the law was changed, it was stated in the explanatory memorandum that this 
term covers all acts that have a sexual nature and which are in conflict with the social 
and ethical standards, but are still not extraordinarily horrific.108 It depends largely 
on the circumstances and context as well as on the intent of the actor whether the act 
is seen as indecent. Under Article 246, for example, a victim having to tolerate the 
actor touching briefly a breast of the victim and saying “nice tits” has been seen as an 
indecent act.109 
Article 245 of the Dutch Penal Code deals with cases of extramarital penetration, 
when the victim is older than 12 but younger than 18 years of age. An actor that 
performs indecent acts comprising or including sexual penetration of the body of this 
kind of child, and is not married to this child, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for 
at most 8 years or given a fine of the fifth category. 
                                                
108 Kamerstukken II 1988/89, 20 930, nr. 3, p. 2. 
109 HR 13 December 2005, LJN AU4825. 
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Indecent act can also be charged under Article 247 of the Dutch Penal Code in cases 
where the actor performs indecent acts with a victim whom the actor knows to be 
unconscious or physically unable to resist or to be suffering from such a degree of 
mental defect or mental disease that the victim is incapable or not sufficiently 
capable of exercising or expressing will in the matter or of offering resistance, 
performs indecent acts.  
This offence of indecent act is also at hand when the actor performs indecent acts 
with a person under 16 years of age or induces this person to perform or submit to 
these acts with a third party. Like in Article 245, offences of indecent acts with a 
person under 16 year-old apply only if the actor and this child are not married. The 
actor liable for the offence of indecent act under Article 247 is sentenced to 
imprisonment of up to 6 years or is given a fine of the fourth category. Next I will 
take a look at the English sexual offences. 
3.6 England 
3.6.1 Rape offences 
The current English sexual crimes legislation is also relatively new. According to the 
old law, Sexual Offences Act 1956 and its Section 1(2), a man had committed rape if 
he had had sexual intercourse with another person (whether vaginal or anal) who at 
the time of the intercourse had not consented to it (actus reus); and at the time he had 
known that the person had not consented to the intercourse or had been reckless as to 
whether that person had consented to it (mens rea). Thus recklessness used to be the 
threshold of mens rea. 
According to the new law, Sexual Offences Act 2003 and its Section 1(1), an act 
constitutes a rape offence, if person (A) has intentionally penetrated with his penis 
the vagina, anus or mouth of another person (B) without B’s consent if A did not 
reasonably believe that B consented. The requirement of penis penetration means 
that the offence has to be committed by a man. The victim, however, can be either a 
man or a woman. After oral penetration with a penis was also added into the rape 
definition of the new law, it now includes vaginal, anal and oral penetration. Only 
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man can commit rape as a principal offender110, but both man and woman can be 
accomplices to rape. Rape can be committed against a male or female.111 
Thus the threshold of mens rea has changed in the new law, which has left 
recklessness out of the offence definition and mens rea is now a question of 
reasonable belief. So what is this “reasonable belief”?  
According to subsection 2, whether a belief in consent is reasonable is to be 
determined having regard to all the circumstances, including any steps A has taken to 
ascertain whether B consents. According to subsection 3, sections 75 and 76 of the 
Sexual Offences Act apply to rape offence. These sections deal with evidential 
(Section 75) and conclusive (Section 76) presumptions about consent. These 
presumptions can be used either as a presumptions of the lack of consent or as 
presumptions of the lack of reasonable belief of the victim’s consent. 
There is a reversed burden of proof in the question of consent and mens rea in certain 
circumstances, which are included under Section 75. So under these circumstances 
the actor can rebut the presumption that this act was a rape without consent and 
without reasonable belief that the consent existed. However, under the circumstances 
under Section 76, the actor can’t rebut the presumption that the victim didn’t consent, 
so in these cases the actor has had the required mens rea for rape offence.112 
In this new definition of rape, unreasonable, but honest mistake about consent does 
not negate mens rea anymore, like it did in the case DPP v. Morgan113, because 
person A can only lack mens rea, if their mistake about consent has been reasonable. 
In Morgan case Mr. Morgan had brought three other men to his house, told these 
men that his wife would act like she didn’t consent but would still consent to sexual 
intercourse with them. The men had then had sexual intercourse with Mrs. Morgan 
without her consent and with her clearly protesting to the intercourse. The House of 
Lords concluded that the men had made an unreasonable, but honest mistake about 
whether Mrs. Morgan had consented to the sexual intercourse with them. 
                                                
110 Ashworth and Horder 2013, p. 340. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ashworth and Horder 2013, p. 347. 
113 [1976] AC 182. 
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Besides the offence of rape, there is another serious sexual offence in the Sexual 
Offences Act, assault by penetration. Section 2 of the Sexual Offences Act covers the 
situation where a person (A) intentionally penetrates the vagina or anus of another 
person (B). This penetration can by done by a part of A’s body, e.g. a finger114 but 
also with anything else, e.g. a bottle115. However, this penetration needs to be sexual. 
According to Section 78 of the Sexual Offences Act, penetration, touching or any 
other activity is sexual if “a reasonable person would consider that whatever its 
circumstances or any person’s purpose in relation to it, it is because of its nature 
sexual, or because of its nature it may be sexual and because of its circumstances or 
the purpose of any person in relation to it (or both) it is sexual.” This excludes, for 
example, intimate searches and medical procedures116, although even proper medical 
examination of penis or vagina could be seen as sexual, if there is no necessity or 
consent.117 
In addition to this, the offence of assault by penetration also has the same mens rea 
elements as in the offence or rape, so it requires that B does not consent to the 
penetration and A does not reasonably believe that B consents. According to 
subsection 3, Sections 75 and 76 apply also to this offence. Unlike in rape, a male or 
a female can commit this offence and it can be committed against a male or a female. 
Section 3 criminalizes the offence of sexual assault. According to Section 3(1), a 
person (A) commits this offence if they intentionally touch another person (B), the 
touching is sexual, B did not consent and A did not reasonably believe that B 
consented to this act. So Section 78 applies here, as well, when determining whether 
the touching could be considered as sexual. The mens rea elements regarding 
consent, reasonable belief, any steps A has taken to find out whether B consented, 
and Sections 75 and 75 about the presumptions all apply in this offence too. 
According subsection 2, the actor guilty of sexual assault is liable, on summary 
conviction to imprisonment for at most 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory 
                                                
114 Ashworth and Horder 2013, p. 343. 
115 Ibid. 
116 Herring 2004, p. 415. 
117 Ashworth and Horder 2013, p. 344. 
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maximum or both; or on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for at most 10 
years. 
There are also another sexual offences in the Sexual Offences Act, for example, the 
offence of causing a person to engage in sexual activity without consent under 
Section 4. I will not look closer to this, but only state that this offence requires 
intentionally causing, sexual activity, lack of consent and lack of reasonable belief of 
consent. There are same provisions concerning consent as are in offences of Sections 
1–3. I will now move to sexual offences specifically targeted against children. 
3.6.2 Sexual offences against children 
In English criminal law there is a specific offence of rape of a child under 13. 
According to Section 5 of the Sexual Offences Act, a person commits this offence if 
he intentionally penetrates the vagina, anus or mouth of another person with their 
penis, and this other person is under 13. According to subsection 2, a person guilty of 
the offence of rape of a child under 13 is liable, on conviction on indictment, to 
imprisonment for life. So we are speaking of a really severe sentence. 
As we can see, actus reus of this offence is the same as is in the rape offence under 
Section 1. So the penetration with a penis can be vaginal, anal or oral. However, 
there are no similar mens rea elements in this rape of a child under 13 years of age. 
Only the penetration itself needs to be intentional. 
Similarly is constructed the offence of assault of a child under 13 by penetration. 
According to Section 6(1) of the Sexual Offences Act, a person commits this offence 
by intentionally penetrating the vagina or anus of another person with a part of his 
body or anything else if this penetration is sexual and the other person is under 13. 
So the actus reus here is similar to the offence of assault by penetration under Section 
2 of the Sexual Offences Act, but Section 6 doesn’t have elements of consent. 
According subsection 2, the person guilty of an offence assault of a child under 13 is 
liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for life. So the sentence is the 
same as is for the offence of rape of a child under 13. 
Section 7 criminalizes the offence of sexual assault of a child under 13. According to 
Section 7(1), a person commits this offence if they intentionally touch another 
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person, the touching is sexual, and the other person is under 13. So the touching 
needs to be intentional as well as of sexual nature. Like in Section 3, this is 
determined with having regard to Section 78 of the Sexual Offences Act. 
According subsection 2, the actor guilty of this offence is liable, either on summary 
conviction to imprisonment for at most 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory 
maximum or these both; or they can be liable on more serious cases, conviction on 
indictment, to imprisonment for at most 14 years. Thus there is a very wide 
sentencing range in this offence.  
In addition to these sexual offences with a child as a victim, in the Sexual Offences 
Act there is also, for example, an offence of causing or inciting a child under 13 to 
engage in sexual activity under Section 8. This requires intentionally causing or 
inciting, sexual activity and that the victim is under 13 years of age. Next I will cross 
the Atlantic to the United States. 
3.7 United States 
3.7.1 Rape offences 
As was stated earlier, the Model Penal Code has also various substantive criminal 
law provisions. Article 213 of the Model Penal Code deals with sexual offences. 
However, it is good to remember that the Model Penal Code was accepted in 1962 
and last time it was updated in 1981, so these provisions aren’t very modern. I will 
however take a look at these, since it’s very good to see the similarities and 
differences to the laws of the countries that I have now already covered in this thesis. 
Firstly, there are in Section 213.0 some definitions, which apply to sexual offences 
under Article 213, unless a different meaning plainly is required in the offence. 
According to 213.0(2), the term "sexual intercourse" can be mean oral (per os) or 
anal (per anum) intercourse, with some penetration however slight it is; emission, 
however, is not required. According to subsection 3, the term "deviate sexual 
intercourse" means oral or anal intercourse between human beings who are not 
husband and wife. It also applies to as any form of sexual intercourse with an animal. 
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The offence of rape is criminalized in Section 213.1. According to 213.1(1), a 
male118 who has sexual intercourse with a female, other than his wife119, is guilty of 
rape, if he compels her to submit by force or by threat of imminent death, serious 
bodily injury, extreme pain or kidnapping, to be inflicted on anyone. So firstly, the 
rape offence can be committed by force or by serious threats. 
Rape also occurs if the male actor has substantially impaired her power to appraise or 
control her conduct by administering or employing without her knowledge drugs, 
intoxicants or other means for the purpose of preventing resistance; or if the female 
victim is unconscious or less than 10 years old. All these conditions are about the 
vulnerability of the victim. We can also see from these definitions that only a man 
can commit rape and it can only be committed against a woman. 
Rape is a felony of the second degree, but as an exception it is a felony of the first 
degree, if the actor inflicted a serious bodily injury upon anyone, or the victim was 
not a voluntary social companion of the actor upon the occasion of the crime and had 
not previously permitted him sexual liberties.120 
There is also the offence of gross sexual imposition in Section 213.1(2). This offence 
requires that a male has sexual intercourse with a female, other than his wife, by 
compelling her to submit by any threat that would prevent resistance by a woman of 
ordinary resolution; or knowing that she suffers from a mental disease or defect 
which renders her incapable of appraising the nature of her conduct; or knowing that 
she is unaware that a sexual act is being committed upon her or that she submits 
because she mistakenly supposes that he is her husband. 
Section 213.2 criminalizes the offence of deviate sexual intercourse by force or 
imposition. Offence by force or its equivalent applies when a person engages in 
deviate sexual intercourse with another person, or causes another to engage in 
deviate sexual intercourse. In addition to this, the offence requires that one of the 
four acts or conditions set already in the offence rape applies, so compelling another, 
impaired victim, victim’s unconsciousness or victim’s age being under 10 years. 
                                                
118 Today the statutes are commonly gender-neutral, see Robinson in Heller and Dubber 2011, p. 590. 
119 About spousal exception and abolishment of this exception, see Robinson 1997, pp. 762–763 and 
Robinson in Heller and Dubber 2011, p. 590. 
120 This ”date rape” rule has been abolished in many states. See Robinson 1997, p. 763. 
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The offence of deviate sexual intercourse can also be committed by other imposition. 
According to subsection 2, a person who engages in deviate sexual intercourse with 
another person, or who causes another to engage in deviate sexual intercourse, 
commits a felony of the third degree, if the actor compels the other person to 
participate by any threat that would prevent resistance by a person of ordinary 
resolution; or the actor knows that the other person suffers from a mental disease or 
defect which renders the victim incapable of appraising the nature of the actor’s 
conduct; or the actor knows that the other person submits because the victim is 
unaware that a sexual act is being committed upon them. 
Lastly, there is also the offence of sexual assault, set out in Section 213.4. This 
offence criminalizes the sexual contact with another person, not their spouse, and 
causing this other to have sexual contact with the actor. According to subsection 2, 
this required “sexual contact” refers to any touching of the sexual or other intimate 
parts of the person for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire. 
One of the eight circumstances had to apply to this sexual contact in order the 
offence to be fulfilled. Firstly, the actor knew that this sexual contact was offensive 
to the other person. Secondly, the actor knew that the victim suffered from a mental 
disease or defect, which rendered the victim incapable of appraising the nature of 
their conduct. Thirdly, the actor knew that the victim was unaware that a sexual act 
was being committed. Fourthly, the person was less than 10 years old. 
Fifthly, the actor had substantially impaired the other person's power to appraise or 
control their conduct, by administering or employing without the other's knowledge 
drugs, intoxicants or other means for the purpose of preventing resistance. 
Sixthly, the other person was less than 16 years old and the actor was at least 4 years 
older than this person. Seventhly, the other person was less than 21 years old and the 
actor was their guardian or otherwise responsible for general supervision of their 
welfare. Lastly, the other person was in custody of law or detained in a hospital or 
other institution and the actor had supervisory or disciplinary authority over him. 
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3.7.2 Sexual offences against children 
As we just saw in the previous chapter, the age of the victim is important already in 
many general sexual offences, especially when the victim was under 10 years of age. 
Section 213(6)(1) includes two provisions concerning the mistake as to age of the 
victim in sexual offences. If the offence requires that the victim is under 10 years of 
age, the actor has no defence of mistake when they didn’t know the child’s age or 
reasonably believed the child to be older than 10. These offences are rape, deviate 
sexual intercourse by force or imposition and sexual assault. Thus there is a strict 
liability in regard to the age in these offences when the victim is under 10 years. 
Second provision concerns the offences where the victim needs to be older than 10 
years of age. In these cases the actor has a defence of mistake as to the child’s age, if 
they can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they reasonably believed the 
child to be above the critical age. This provision applies to offences of corruption of 
minors and seduction and sexual assault, if the victim is under 16 years of age and 
the actor is at least four years older. This provision applies also to sexual assault, if 
the victim is under 21 years of age and the actor is victim’s guardian or otherwise 
responsible for general supervision of their welfare. Thus the actor needs to rebut the 
presumption of culpability in these cases. 
In addition, there is also the offence of corruption of minors and seduction in Section 
213.3 of the Model Penal Code. According to Section 213.3(1), this offence can 
apply when a male has sexual intercourse with a female other than his wife, or when 
any person engages in deviate sexual intercourse or causes another to engage in 
deviate sexual intercourse. 
In addition to sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse, one of the four 
circumstances has to apply. The offence is fulfilled if the victim is less than 16 years 
of age and the actor is at least 4 years older; or if the victim is less than 21 years of 
age and the actor is their guardian or otherwise responsible for general supervision of 
their welfare; or if the victim is in custody of law or detained in a hospital or other 
institution and the actor has supervisory or disciplinary authority over him; or if the 
victim is a female who is induced to participate by a promise of marriage which the 
actor does not mean to perform. 
48 
 
 
I have now finished with this chapter and with the substantive laws concerning 
sexual offences. In the next chapter I will change to somewhat different kind of 
violence, even more clearly physical and even life-threating type of offences. 
4 Intentional homicides and assaults 
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 4 of my thesis I will continue my research with the substantive laws and 
take a closer look into the substantive laws concerning homicides and assaults. 
Especially the latter might bring differences in forms and requirements among the 
different countries. Even more interesting is what is needed for the intentional forms 
of homicides. I will again start with Finland and the Finnish Criminal Code, where 
the applicable criminal offences and their statutory offence elements can be found. 
4.2 Finland 
4.2.1 Intentional homicides 
Chapter 21 of the Finnish Criminal Code deals with homicides, assaults and other 
bodily injuries. Finnish criminal law has a clear tripartite model of intentional 
homicide, with a standard homicide offence, an aggravated homicide offence and a 
less serious homicide offence. There is also a homicide committed negligently. 
The standard homicide offence in Finland is voluntary manslaughter (tappo), briefly 
defined in Chapter 21, Section 1. According to this section, a person who kills 
another shall be sentenced for voluntary manslaughter to imprisonment for a fixed 
period of at least eight years. An attempt is also punishable. So there are not many 
statutory elements here, only the killing of another person. The death of this person 
needs to be a causal and objectively foreseeable consequence of the actor’s act.121 
This killing needs to be intentional. It can be the actor’s aim to kill, but intent also 
applies when it was certain to the actor they would cause the death of another. 
However, the death rarely is certain to occur. So more important and easier to prove 
is the lowest level of intent, probability-intent, where the death of another person 
                                                
121 Matikkala 2014, pp. 195–196. See also KKO 1998:2, where the death by cardiac arrest was not 
seen as a foreseeable consequence of short-term strangling. 
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needs to have been a quite probable consequence of the actor’s act.122 It is also 
noteworthy, that if the actor thought they were killing a deer but killed another 
person, they are acquitted of voluntary manslaughter, but can be convicted of 
involuntary manslaughter.123 However, if the actor wants to kill person A, but kills 
person B, the actor is still convicted of voluntary manslaughter, since both A and B 
have the same value.124 
Murder (murha) is a voluntary manslaughter under aggravating circumstances and 
generally needs to be premeditated and/or brutal. According to Chapter 21, Section 2, 
a manslaughter can be a more aggravated offence, murder, if it is premeditated, 
committed in a particularly brutal or cruel manner, committed by causing serious 
danger to the public, or committed by killing a public official on duty maintaining 
public order or public security, or because of an official action. The offence also 
needs to be aggravated when assessed as a whole. The actor of murder offence shall 
be sentenced to life imprisonment. An attempt is also punishable. 
Murder requires the same intent as voluntary manslaughter, but the aggravating 
factor of killing another person because of an official action requires purpose-intent 
in regard to the motive of killing this person.125 The aggravating factor of 
premeditation should not be, however, seen to mean that only purpose-intent would 
apply.126 The aggravating factor of particularly brutal or cruel manner requires that 
the actor knows what facts make the manner to be assessed as brutal or cruel.127 
Killing (surma) is a voluntary manslaughter under mitigating circumstances. 
According to Section 3 of the Criminal Code, Chapter 21, if the manslaughter, in 
view of the exceptional circumstances of the offence, the motives of the offender or 
other related circumstances, when assessed as a whole, is to be deemed committed 
under mitigating circumstances, the actor is convicted of killing to imprisonment for 
at least 4 and at most 10 years. An attempt is also punishable. 
                                                
122 E.g. KKO 1984 II 142 and KKO 2004:120. Of cases that the death wasn’t quite probable, e.g. 
KKO 1988:21 and KKO 1998:2. 
123 Lappi-Seppälä in Lappi-Seppälä et al. 2009, p. 472. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Lappi-Seppälä in Lappi-Seppälä et al. 2009, p. 498. 
126 Matikkala 2014, p. 211. 
127 Lappi-Seppälä in Lappi-Seppälä et al. 2009, p. 498. See also KKO 2005:7. 
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If the actor has killed the victim, because the victim has with his firm will asked the 
actor to do it, so a case of active euthanasia, this situation could be considered as the 
offence of killing instead of voluntary manslaughter.128 The exceptional 
circumstances can be, for example, when the actor has been strongly provoked to act 
or when the killing has felt for the actor to be the only way out of the situation.129 
There is also the intentional offence of infanticide in Section 4 of the Criminal Code, 
Chapter 21. I won’t, however, now go into that offence in my thesis, but continue 
with non-lethal offences, assaults, which can also sometimes lead to death, but with 
the actor being convicted only of aggravated assault and negligent manslaughter. 
4.2.2 Intentional assaults 
Section 5 of the Criminal Code, Chapter 21, criminalizes assault (pahoinpitely). A 
person shall be convicted of assault, if they employ physical violence on the victim, 
or, without such violence, injures the health of the victim, causes pain to the victim 
or renders the victim unconscious or into a comparable condition. The sentence for 
assault can be a fine or imprisonment for at most 2 years. According to subsection 2, 
an attempt is also punishable. 
The violence needs to be physical, but it doesn’t need to wound or injure the 
victim.130 The other possibility is to injure the health, cause pain or render the victim 
unconscious. According to the Government Proposal HE 94/1993, infecting another 
person with a disease by “caressing” (hyväilyin) can be assault, if there is no consent 
to do this.131 This fact can be used HIV-infection exposure cases, which I will 
discuss more later on in this thesis. 
The offence of assault needs to be intentional, so either the violence or injuring needs 
to be intentional. The probability-intent is enough. If the actor had injured the victim, 
but hadn’t considered the injury as a quite probable consequence of their act, they 
can only be convicted of the offence of causing an injury under Section 10.132 
                                                
128 HE 94/1993, p. 94. 
129 Lappi-Seppälä in Lappi-Seppälä et al. 2009, p. 499. 
130 Matikkala 2014, p. 231. 
131 HE 94/1993, p. 95–96. 
132 Lappi-Seppälä in Lappi-Seppälä et al. 2009, p. 506. See also KKO 2001:7. 
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Section 6 deals with an aggravated form of assault (törkeä pahoinpitely). This is at 
hand, when grievous bodily injury or serious illness is caused to the victim or the 
victim is placed in mortal danger, or the offence is committed in a particularly brutal 
or cruel manner, or a firearm, edged weapon or other comparable lethal instrument is 
used in the assault. The offence also needs to be aggravated when assessed as a 
whole. The actor is convicted of aggravated assault to imprisonment for at least 1 
year and at most 10 years. According to subsection 2, an attempt is also punishable. 
The lowest level of intent is enough in the aggravated form of assault, too. The actor 
needs to have intent also with regard to the aggravating factors. It is generally seen 
that the victim can’t give effectively their consent to aggravated assault, as opposed 
to standard assault.133 So the victim might not be able to give their consent to the 
exposure, or rather to the transmission, of HIV either, if HIV-infection is considered 
as a serious illness.134 
If the actor has placed the victim in mortal danger, but not considered their death as 
quite probable, the offence of aggravated assault applies, but if the actor has 
considered the death as a quite probable consequence of their act, this is a question of 
attempted voluntary manslaughter.135 This threshold is also important in my thesis. In 
the cases of stabbing another person the assessment depends where the victim was 
hit136, but more problematic assessment might arise, for example, if the actor has 
driven with a vehicle towards the victim. But first we will go now to Sweden. 
4.3 Sweden 
4.3.1 Intentional homicides 
Chapter 3 of the Swedish Penal Code deals with crimes against life and health. 
According to Chapter 3, Section 1, the actor that takes the life of another shall be 
convicted of murder (Mord) to imprisonment for at least 10 years or for life. Thus in 
Sweden the offence of murder is the standard offence for killing another person. 
Unlike in Finland, it doesn’t have a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. 
                                                
133 Lappi-Seppälä in Lappi-Seppälä et al. 2009, p. 507. 
134 For the chances of transmitting HIV and how HIV-cases are dealt in criminal law, see Chapter 6.6.  
135 Lappi-Seppälä in Lappi-Seppälä et al. 2009, p. 515. 
136 Ibid. 
52 
 
 
According to the Supreme Court decision NJA 2007, s. 194137, the life imprisonment 
is used for the most serious and brutal cases. 
Murder needs to be intentional. It doesn’t require that it was the actor’s purpose to 
kill another. The offence is also intentional when the actor was certain that it would 
occur as a consequence of their act, but also when they foresaw it as a possible 
consequence and was indifferent to this consequence. 
According to Section 2, if in view of the circumstances that led to the act or for other 
reasons, the offence referred to in Section 1 is considered to be less serious, the actor 
shall be convicted of manslaughter (Dråp) to imprisonment for at least 6 and at most 
10 years. Similarly to murder, manslaughter needs to be intentional. The lowest level 
of intent is enough. The higher levels of intent might usually lead to conviction of 
murder instead of manslaughter.  
The cases where the victim was related to the actor and/or was defenseless against 
the actor, are rarely considered to be less serious.138 Rather those are aggravating 
factors that might lead to life imprisonment for murder. There are also some 
mitigating factors in Section 3 of the Swedish Penal Code, Chapter 29, that might 
lead to less severe sentence. In the Supreme Court case NJA 2013, s. 376139, the actor 
would have been otherwise convicted to life imprisonment, but their sentence was 
reduced due to mental disorder at the time of the offence of murder. 
There is also the intentional offence of infanticide in Section 3. However, unlike in 
Finland, there is no third intentional homicide in Sweden. The offence of 
manslaughter already is an intentional homicide offence under mitigating factors. 
According to Rung, the actor that has acted having foreseen the risk of death of 
another person as a consequence of their act is considered to have been indifferent 
not just to this risk but also to this consequence. This would lead to the conviction of 
murder in all serious assaults cases that have led to death of another person.140 
                                                
137 NJA 2007, s. 194. 
138 Cf. see NJA 1985, s. 10 and NJA 2002, s. 116. 
139 NJA 2013, s. 376. 
140 Rung 2006, pp. 257–258. 
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In the case NJA 2004, s. 479141, the Supreme Court considered whether the intent of 
indifference should be applied to the case. In this case a 15-year old actor P had 
stabbed the victim G with a knife in the face, neck and back. The first stab was 
severe, but the third one was life threatening and would have led to G’s death if the 
medical care wouldn’t have arrived on time.  
According to the Supreme Court, it was not clear how likely P had considered G’s 
death and that there was no evidence that P had yet reached such development and 
experience that he could know that at least the third stab had a substantial risk of G’s 
death. The Supreme Court convicted P of aggravated assault and not of attempted 
murder. 
4.3.2 Intentional assaults 
The offence of assault (misshandel) is defined in Section 5 of the Swedish Penal 
Code, Chapter 3. According to this section, a person commits assault if they inflict 
bodily injury, illness or pain upon another person or renders the victim powerless or 
in a similar helpless state. The actor convicted of this offence shall be sentenced to 
imprisonment for at most 2 years or, if the crime is petty, to a fine or imprisonment 
for at most 6 months. Thus the statutory definition doesn’t include, unlike the Finnish 
offence of assault, the cases of pure physical violence without injury, illness or pain. 
If the offence referred to in Section 5 is considered aggravated, the sentence for 
aggravated assault (grov misshandel) shall, according to Section 6, be imprisonment 
for at least 1 year and at most 10 years. According to Section 6(2), in assessing if the 
offence is aggravated, special consideration shall be given to whether the act 
constituted a mortal danger or whether the offender inflicted grievous bodily harm or 
severe illness or otherwise displayed particular ruthlessness or brutality. 
Unlike in Finland, in Swedish criminal law there is an explicit provision concerning 
consent under Section 7 of the Swedish Penal Code, Chapter 24. According to this 
section, an act committed with the consent of the person towards whom the act was 
directed, constitutes a crime only if the act, having regard to the injury, violation or 
danger which it involved, its purpose, and other circumstances, is indefensible 
(oförsvarlig). Pain and mild injury has been considered to be under this provision, 
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but more severe injuries not. For example, consensual cutting another person’s 
forearm with a piece of glass has not been considered to fit under this section.142 
4.4 Germany 
4.4.1 Intentional homicides 
Chapter 16 of the German Criminal Code deals with offences against life, including 
murder and manslaughter. Like Finnish criminal law, German criminal law has a 
tripartite model of intentional homicide, with a standard homicide offence, an 
aggravated homicide offence and a less serious homicide offence. 
Most serious homicide in Germany is a murder (Mord), where killing needs to be 
committed under specific aggravating circumstances. According to Section 211, 
whosoever commits murder under the conditions of this provision shall be liable to 
imprisonment for life. A murderer under this provision is any person who kills a 
person for pleasure, for sexual gratification, out of greed or otherwise despicable 
motives, by stealth or cruelly or by means that pose a danger to the public or in order 
to facilitate or to cover up another offence.  
Dolus eventualis is generally enough for the offence of murder, but killing another 
for pleasure requires direct intent, because an actor’s purpose needs to be killing the 
victim for killing’s sake.143 The intent to kill under “in order to facilitate or to cover 
up another offence” can be dolus eventualis, but the intent to facilitate or to cover up 
another offence needs to be direct intent.144 
A standard homicide offence in Germany is a voluntary manslaughter (Totschlag) in 
Section 212. According to this section, whosoever kills a person without being a 
murderer under Section 211 is convicted of manslaughter and is sentenced to 
imprisonment of not less than 5 years. In especially serious cases the penalty shall be 
imprisonment for life. 
A less serious homicide offence is voluntary manslaughter under mitigating 
circumstances (Minder schwerer Fall des Totschlags). According to Section 213, if 
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the killer under Section 212 was provoked to rage by maltreatment inflicted on them 
or a relative, or was seriously insulted by the victim and immediately lost self-control 
and committed the offence, or in the event of an otherwise less serious case, the 
penalty shall be imprisonment from 1 to 10 years. 
A lesser homicide offence is also mercy killing or killing at the request of the victim 
(Tötung auf Verlangen). According to Section 216, if a person is induced to kill by 
the express and earnest request of the victim the penalty shall be imprisonment from 
six months to five years. Thus this concerns the cases of active euthanasia. An 
attempt is also punishable. 
4.4.2 Intentional assaults 
Chapter 17 of the German Criminal Code deals with offences against the person, 
including causing bodily harm (Körperverletzung). This is criminalized in Section 
223 of the German Criminal Code and requires physically assaulting or damaging the 
health of another person. The actor of this offence is sentenced to imprisonment for 
at most 5 years or given a fine. 
Section 224 of the German Criminal Code defines the offence causing bodily harm 
by dangerous means (gefährliche Körperverletzung). According to this section, 
bodily harm is caused by dangerous means if its caused by administering poison or 
other noxious substances, using weapons or other dangerous instrument, acting by 
stealth, acting jointly with another, or by methods that pose a danger to life. The 
sentence can be imprisonment from 6 months to 10 years. If the case is less serious, 
the range is from 3 months to 5 years. 
An even more serious offence is causing grievous bodily harm (schwere 
Körperverletzung) under Section 226. This requires that the injury has resulted in the 
victim losing their sight in either or both eyes, hearing, speech or ability to procreate; 
losing or permanently losing the ability to use an important member; or being 
permanently and seriously disfigured or contracting a lingering illness, becoming 
paralyzed, mentally ill or disabled. The actor in these cases shall be sentenced to 
imprisonment from 1 to 10 years. According to subsection 3, in less serious cases the 
range shall be from 6 months to 5 years. 
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The offence requires intent and conditional intent is enough for conviction. However, 
the level of intent is an aggravating according to subsection 2, which states that if it 
was the actor’s purpose (absichtlich) to cause the result or if they caused it 
knowingly (wissentlich), the minimum sentence is 3 years of imprisonment. Unless 
this kind of situation is still considered as a less serious case, when the sentence shall 
be, according to subsection 3, from 1 to 10 years. So here we can see a case of 
statutory definition where the higher levels of intent lead to mandatory higher 
minimum sentences. 
The offence of female genital mutilation (Verstümmelung weiblicher Genitalien) 
under Section 226a is quite a new offence in German Criminal Code, added in July 
2013. Such specific offence doesn’t exist in Finnish or Swedish laws. This offence 
applies only to women, so male circumcision is excluded. 
Lastly, the offence of infliction of bodily harm causing death (Körperverletzung mit 
Todesfolge) is criminalized in Section 227. This concerns inflictions of bodily harm 
under Sections 233 to 226a. The actor causing the death through such harm is 
convicted to imprisonment for a minimum of 3 years, or in less serious cases to 
imprisonment from 1 to 10 years. 
Noteworthy is the provision under Section 228 concerning consent, which kind of 
explicit consent exception can’t be found in the Finnish Criminal Code. According to 
this section, the actor that has caused bodily harm with the consent of the victim shall 
be deemed to act lawfully. The exception to this are the cases where this act has 
violated public policy (guten Sitten verstößt), in these cases the consent is irrelevant. 
So the defence by consent can be seen as broader than the Swedish one.  
What is this public policy restriction? Most probably included are at least the cases 
where the harm has led to the victim’s death145 or has created concrete endangerment 
to their life, like in a German case, where the victim was consensually tied to bed, 
poured with three liters of gasoline and where the victim then asked the actor to play 
                                                
145 BGH 22.4.2005 – 2 StR 310/04. In this case the actor, with consent, killed and ate the victim. This 
act clearly doesn’t fit under the German consent provision. 
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with a lighter. The gasoline caught fire and the victim died.146 This is an interesting 
case concerning the conditional intent, too. 
4.5 The Netherlands 
4.5.1 Intentional homicides 
According to Article 287 of the Dutch Penal Code, a person that intentionally 
deprives another of life is guilty of voluntary manslaughter (doodslag), which is 
punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 15 years or a fine of the fifth category. 
Thus this article prohibits general killing. 
Article 289 of the Penal Code prohibits murder (moord), which is killing with 
intention and premeditation (opzettelijk en met voorbedachten rade). A sentence for 
murder can be imprisonment for life or up to 30 years, or a fine of the fifth category. 
So premeditation is the aggravating factor in the Netherlands and the sentence for 
murder is much more severe than what it is under Article 287. According to 
Blomsma, this is based on the idea that the actor shows a higher degree of free 
decision, control and danger when the actor can have planned and weighed their 
motives and directed how the events will go.147 There is a clear contrast to situations 
where the act has been done impulsively. According to NJ 2000, 605148 the 
requirement of premeditation means that it is sufficient that the actor had time to 
reflect on the taking the decision, the opportunity has existed and the actor has made 
the decision realizing the significance and consequences of their intended act. 
Article 293 of the Penal Code criminalizes killing another person at this person’s 
request. According to this article, the actor that intentionally terminates the life of 
another person, at this person’s explicit and earnest request, shall be sentenced to 
imprisonment for at most 12 years or given a fine of the fifth category. There are 
specific requirements that have to be fulfilled so that physicians are not culpable 
under this active euthanasia offence. 
According to subsection 2, an act of killing is not punishable, when it was committed 
by a physician acting with the requirements of due care, which are in Article 2 of the 
                                                
146 BGH 20.6.2000 – 4 StR 162/00. 
147 Blomsma 2012, p. 45. 
148 HR 27 June 2000, NJ 2000, 605. 
58 
 
 
Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide Act. According to that article, 
these requirements include, for example, being convinced that person’s request to die 
is voluntary and carefully considered, as well as that the suffering is unbearable and 
there are no prospects of improving.  
The physician also needs to report the cause of death to the municipal coroner in 
accordance with Article 7, second subsection, of the Burial and Cremation Act. The 
provisions concerning physician-assisted suicide entered into force on April 1, 
2002.149 It was tested already in December 2002, when the Supreme Court upheld the 
conviction of a physician, who had given lethal pills to an 86-year old patient tired of 
living. However, he didn’t get any sentence.150 
Article 294 also concerns euthanasia and criminalizes intentionally inciting another 
person to commit suicide or intentionally assisting in the suicide of another as well as 
procuring for that person the means to commit suicide. The sentence for this offence 
is imprisonment for at most 3 years or a fine of the fourth category. So the help needs 
to be intentional. The second subsection of Article 293 applies here as well. 
4.5.2 Intentional assaults 
The Dutch Penal Code includes several forms of the offence of assault. A distinction 
is also made between assault and aggravated assault. Article 300 of the Penal Code 
defines the standard form of assault (mishandeling). According to subsection 1, 
physical abuse is punishable by imprisonment for at most 2 years or a fine of the 
fourth category. 
According to subsection 2, where serious bodily harm ensues as a result of the act, 
the offender is liable to a term of imprisonment of not more than 4 years or a fine of 
the fourth category. 
If the actor’s act was intended to bring about a serious bodily injury to another 
person, the offence of assault is considered aggravated. According to NJ 2001, 
329151, the injury is considered serious when the common language use (gewoon 
                                                
149 The progress towards allowing physician-assisted suicide had started with Schoonheim case, HR 27 
November 1984, NJ 1985, 108. In this case the physician was acquitted on a defence of necessity. 
150 HR 24 December 2002, NJ 2003, 167. 
151 HR 13 March 2001, NJ 2001, 329. 
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spraakgebruik) for this injury labels it serious enough. The Supreme Court has ruled 
that this injury can be e.g. a broken nose, but only if it the nose is permanently 
disfigured.152 A serious injury can also be tattooing another person’s stomach, when 
the removal was painful and the victim couldn’t perform as ballet dancer.153 Also 
HIV-infection has been considered as a serious injury.154 
The maximum penalty for an assault offence is also dependent on the severity of its 
impact. An assault that leads to death is distinguished from homicide and 
manslaughter. According to subsection 6, where death ensues as a result of the act, 
the offender is liable to a term of imprisonment of not more than six years or a fine 
of the fourth category. 
According to subsection 4, intentionally injuring a person's health is equivalent to 
physical abuse. However, according to subsection 5, an attempt to commit the 
serious offence of physical abuse is not punishable. 
Article 301 of the Penal Code includes the same provisions but in regard to 
premeditated physical abuse (mishandeling gepleegd met voorbedachten rade), 
which is considered to be a more aggravated form of assault. According to 
subsection 1, this kind of premeditated physical abuse is punishable by imprisonment 
for at most 3 years or a fine of the fourth category. 
According to subsection 2, if a serious bodily harm ensues as a result of the act, the 
offender is sentenced to imprisonment for at most 6 years or a given a fine of the 
fourth category. According to subsection 3, if death ensues as a result of the act, the 
actor is sentenced to imprisonment for at most 9 years or given a fine of the fifth 
category. 
According to Article 302 of the Penal Code, a person that intentionally inflicts a 
serious bodily harm on another person is convicted of aggravated physical abuse 
(zware mishandeling) and sentenced to imprisonment for at most 8 years or given a 
fine of the fifth category. If death ensues as a result of the act, the actor is sentenced 
to imprisonment for at most 10 years or given a fine of the fifth category. 
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According to Article 303 of the Penal Code, premeditated aggravated physical abuse 
(zware mishandeling gepleegd met voorbedachten rade) is punishable by an 
imprisonment for at most 12 years or a fine of the fifth category. If death ensues as a 
result of the act, the actor is sentenced to imprisonment for at most 15 years or given 
a fine of the fifth category. 
According to Article 304, the imprisonment sentences in offences of Articles 300-
303 may be increased by one third, if the actor committed the serious offence against 
their mother, their legal father, their spouse, their companion, their child, a child 
under their authority, or a child they take care of and educate; or if the serious 
offence was committed against a public servant during or in connection with the 
lawful execution of their duties; of if the serious offence was committed by 
administering substances injurious to life or health. 
Article 304a increases also the sentences, by one half if the offence under Article 302 
or 303 has been committed with a terrorist intent, and if it has been imprisonment for 
at most 15 years, the actor is sentenced to life imprisonment or for at most 30 years. 
4.6 England 
4.6.1 Intentional homicides 
There are no codified legal definitions of homicides in English criminal law. 
However, there are formally two homicide offences in English criminal law, murder 
and manslaughter. Manslaughter can be either voluntary or involuntary. In addition, 
there are also infanticide and specific offences relating to death caused while driving. 
In English criminal law homicide offences are not just limited to intentional killings. 
According to Sir Edward Coke, the definition of murder in 17th century was: 
“Murder is when a man of sound memory, and of the age of discretion, unlawfully 
killeth within any country of the realm any reasonable creature in rerum natura 
under the king's peace with malice fore-thought, either expressed by the party or 
implied by law.”155 
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Today the actus reus element of the offence of murder is defined as “the unlawful 
killing of another person in the Queen's peace”.156 Thus it requires causing the death 
of another person. Defence of self-defense can make the act to be not unlawful.157 
The term “Queen’s peace” refers to those killings that have not occurred during 
war.158 
The offence of murder used to have a rule that restricted the liability of the actor to 
those cases where the death of the victim had occurred within a year from the act. 
However, this rule was abolished by the Law Reform (Year and a Day Rule) Act 
1996.159 However, Section 2 of the Act still sets some restrictions. According to this 
section, if the actor has already been convicted of a non-fatal offence and the victim 
then dies after more than three years from the occurrence of this offence, the actor 
can only be put on trial with the consent of the Attorney General. 
The mens rea element of the offence of murder is defined as intention to cause death 
or grievous bodily harm to the victim.160 Thus it is not limited only to intent to kill, 
but instead the offence of murder is at hand also when the actor has had intention to 
cause grievous bodily harm and the victim has died as a result. This definition is 
based on the case R v Cunningham161. 
Unlike in the Netherlands, the offence of murder doesn’t need to be premeditated, 
but this has been used as a reason for more severe sentencing in recent English 
guidelines.162 The question of the mandatory sentences for murder has been lately 
quite controversial and today the sentence depends not only of the act, but also of the 
actor.163 The attempted murder needs intent to kill and it is not enough that the actor 
had intent to cause grievous bodily harm. The actor also needed to commit an act that 
was more than merely preparatory.164 
Murder is considered to be the standard homicide offence in England. The offence of 
manslaughter is a less serious and mitigated homicide offence. Manslaughter can be 
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either voluntary or involuntary. I will now focus on the offence of voluntary 
manslaughter, since it’s mens rea requirement is higher than in involuntary.  
Voluntary manslaughter occurs when the actor kills another person and has the intent 
to kill the victim or cause grievous bodily harm to the victim. What separates this 
offence from murder offence is that manslaughter needs to have some mitigating 
circumstance that reduces the blameworthiness of the actor’s lethal act. So this far 
this looks like the Swedish model of homicides. However, these mitigating 
circumstances are very exact in English criminal law. 
The first mitigating circumstance is the loss of self-control. Before 2009, only 
provocation was accepted as a circumstance reducing the culpability.165 In some 
English provocation cases even suspended manslaughter sentences have been 
given.166 After the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, also the fear of serious violence is 
a mitigating factor reducing the blameworthiness from murder to manslaughter. This 
Act abolished the old common law defence of provocation and replaced it with the 
loss of self-control, which includes both provocation and the fear of serious violence. 
The loss of self-control is defined in Section 54 of the Coroners and Justice Act. 
According to Section 54(1), the actor is not to be convicted of murder if his acts or 
omissions doing (or being a party to) the killing resulted from loss of self-control, 
this loss had a qualifying trigger and a person of their sex and age, with a normal 
degree of tolerance and self-restraint and in the same circumstances, might have 
reacted the same way. According to subsection 2, it doesn’t matter whether the loss 
was sudden or not. So there is no requirement of an immediate response to the 
qualifying trigger. 
The second mitigating circumstance is diminished responsibility. Today this is 
defined also in the Coroners and Justice Act, under Section 52. According to this 
section, the actor is not to be convicted of murder if they were suffering from an 
abnormality of mental functioning, which had arisen from a recognized medical 
condition, had substantially impaired their ability to understand the nature of their 
conduct, to form a rational judgment or to exercise self-control. This abnormality 
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also needs to explain the actor’s acts and omissions in doing (or being a party to) the 
killing of another. 
Compared to defence of insanity that acquits the actor of charges167, diminished 
responsibility only mitigates the culpability to manslaughter. In diminished 
responsibility, the actor has a burden to show that this mitigating circumstance 
existed.168 The conditions include, for example, dementia and schizophrenia, but also 
the effects of alcohol dependency.169 Related to this is the Dowds case170, where the 
actor was heavily intoxicated and stabbed his wife with 60 stab wounds. He tried to 
plead diminished responsibility. The Court of Appeal ruled that voluntary acute 
intoxication can be a recognized medical condition, but in this case it was not enough 
for diminished responsibility. The Court dismissed the appeal for manslaughter 
conviction instead of murder conviction. 
There is also the offence of doing an act capable of assisting or encouraging suicide 
or attempted suicide under Section 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961. This act can lead to 
imprisonment for at most 14 years. Factors against prosecution under this section are, 
for example, that the act was wholly motivated by compassion and the assistance was 
only minor.171 The Criminal Law Revision Committee (CLRC) has also proposed a 
new mercy killing offence, with lesser sentences of maxim 2 years imprisonment. 
CLRC concluded that the concepts of mercy killing should be reviewed first.172 
Involuntary manslaughter can be committed by an unlawful and dangerous act or by 
gross negligence. There is also a quite new offence of corporate manslaughter 
concerning manslaughters committed by companies.173 The mens rea is lower in 
these and the actor hasn’t intended to kill and not even intended grievous bodily 
harm.174 However, I won’t now look closer than this at these offences. 
In addition to these, English criminal law has several offences concerning causing 
death by driving. The offence of causing death by dangerous driving under Section 1 
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of the Road Traffic Act 1988 requires a high degree of negligence as to the damage 
or injury, and can lead to imprisonment of 14 years. If the actor driving a vehicle and 
causing the death of another person had been grossly negligent, they can be 
convicted of manslaughter175, and if they had had intent they can be convicted of 
murder.176 
4.6.2 Intentional assaults 
The Offences against the Person Act 1861 includes two offences that could be 
considered as assaults, even though the offence of common assault is a separate 
offence. These offences are the offence of wounding or causing grievous bodily harm 
(GBH) with intent177 under Section 18 and the offence inflicting a wound or grievous 
bodily harm178 under Section 20. I will now take a look at these. 
According to Section 18, the offence of wounding or causing grievous bodily harm 
with intent is at hand, when the actor unlawfully and maliciously wounds any person 
by any means or causes any grievous bodily harm to any person, and had intent to do 
some grievous bodily harm to the victim, or had intent to resist or prevent the lawful 
apprehension or detention of any person. 
So the actus reus of this act is wounding or causing grievous bodily harm. The actor 
of this offence is guilty of a felony. The maximum sentence for this offence is life 
imprisonment. It is noteworthy that this offence can be committed on any person, 
which would include the actors themselves, as well.179 In regard to the mens rea 
element, this offence requires intent, either intent to cause GBH or intent to resist or 
prevent the lawful apprehension or detention of any person.  
According to Section 20, the offence of inflicting a wound or grievous bodily harm is 
at hand, when the actor unlawfully and maliciously wounds or inflicts any grievous 
bodily harm upon the victim, either with or without any weapon or instrument. The 
actus reus is in this offence is unlawfully wounding or inflicting GBH on another 
                                                
175 See Adomako case, [1995] I AC 171. 
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person. R v Burstow180 established that under Section 20 “inflicting” means the same 
as “causing” and that the term “bodily harm” also includes a serious psychiatric 
injury. 
The actor of this offence is guilty only of a misdemeanor, so this offence is less 
serious than the offence under Section 18. We can see that also in the maximum 
sentence, which is 5 years imprisonment. The requirement for the mens rea element 
is also lower, requiring only recklessness and requiring only that some harm was 
foreseen and accepted by the actor. This was established in the cases R v Savage v 
Parmenter181. These cases were decided at the same time. Savage and Parmenter 
were initially convicted under Section 20, but substituted to be convicted under 
Section 47 by the Court of Appeal in Savage’s case and by the House of Lords in 
Parmenter’s case.  
This Section 47 of the Offences against the Person Act states that, whosoever shall 
be convicted upon an indictment of any assault occasioning actual bodily harm 
(ABH) shall be liable to be kept in penal servitude. According to case R v 
Donovan182, an ABH can be “any hurt or injury that is calculated to interfere with the 
health or comfort of the victim”183. According to case DPP v Smith184 cutting another 
person’s ponytail can also be an ABH. When it comes to intent, according to case R v 
Meachen185 the actor must have intent or recklessness in regard to the ABH. 
In English criminal law, there are also the offences of common assault and battery, 
both charged with under Section 39 of the Criminal Justice Act. Any touching of 
another person or applying unlawful force on them can cause the offence of 
battery,186 while the assault is causing apprehension of this touching or unlawful 
force.187  
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Battery can be direct as in touching another person’s hair or indirect as in digging a 
hole for another person to fall into.188 In case DPP v Santana-Bermudez189 the actor 
was seen to have created a danger by omission when he had given the police officer 
searching him a dishonest assurance that he didn’t have a needle on him. 
So the force needs to be unlawful, not for example self-defense, but an even more 
interesting point is the consent of the other person. In cases of ABH the consent has 
been seen irrelevant, but in cases of assault and battery instead it is considered as 
more relevant. In the case R v Brown190, the consent of the person harmed in 
consensual S&M sexual acts was not a defence to Section 20 (wounding) and 47 
(ABH) of the Offences Against the Person Act. Similarly was ruled case R v 
Emmett191. In Brown case, Lord Templeman, who was against the consent as a 
defence, stated that “pleasure derived from the infliction of pain is an evil thing.”192 
So a person can consent to a kiss, which could constitute battery, but generally not to 
an actual bodily harm. There can still be some cases where consent is relevant, as in 
case R v Wilson193, where the actor had used a hot knife and branded his initials with 
it on his wife. The wife’s consent was seen to be relevant in this case. The view of 
the court was very different from Brown case, when Russell LJ in this case stated 
that consensual activity between husband and wife is not even a matter of criminal 
investigation.  
So in England, there is a clear difference when the act has happened between a man 
and a wife, compared to the group of homosexuals in Brown case. Is this some kind 
of social utility? German and Sweden are clearly more permissive when it comes to 
consent negating the intent in assaults. I will discuss about HIV-cases and consent on 
these cases a little later. First I will conclude my research in substantive laws by 
investigating them in the United States. 
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4.7 United States 
4.7.1 Intentional homicides 
Section 210 of the Model Penal Code includes homicide offences. According to 
Section 210.1(1), a person is guilty of criminal homicide if they purposely, 
knowingly, recklessly or negligently cause the death of another human being. 
Homicides are thus divided into different forms of culpability. 
According to Section 210.2(1)(a) a criminal homicide constitutes a murder, when it 
is committed purposely or knowingly. So as a general rule: an actor that has caused 
another person’s death purposely or knowingly is guilty of murder.  
Exceptions to this rule are the cases in 210.3(1)(b), when a homicide is committed 
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is 
reasonable explanation or excuse. This constitutes only manslaughter. The 
reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint 
of a person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as they believe them to 
be.  
So the actor must have been under the influence of disturbance and the disturbance 
must have been reasonable. In the more objective common law doctrine of 
provocation this kind of killing usually needs to be a result of temporary excitement 
and immediate response, in comparison to premeditated wickedness of heart.194 
Compared to this doctrine, the Model Penal Code doesn’t exclude the cases where 
some time has already passed from the event that provoked the actor to kill the 
victim.195 
Murder needs to be intentional, meaning that causing the death of another person 
needs to have been the actor’s conscious object (purposely) or that the actor needed 
to be practically certain (knowingly) that his act would cause the other person’s 
death. The actor also needs to have had aware that they were killing another 
human.196 
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According to Section 210.3(1)(a), a criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if it 
is committed recklessly. This is the general rule for reckless mens rea. However, as 
an exception in Section 210.2(1)(b), a homicide constitutes murder when it is 
committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the 
value of human life. This kind of recklessness and indifference is presumed if the 
actor has engaged or has been an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to 
commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery, rape or deviate 
sexual intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary, kidnapping or 
felonious escape. This is “felony murder” and generally the actor needs to be the one 
to cause the death of the victim, but complicity principles can also lead to a situation 
where an accomplice to a crime, like robbery, shall be convicted of murder.197 
4.7.2 Intentional assaults 
Section 211.1 of the Model Penal Code includes assault offences. According to 
Section 211.1(1), a person is guilty of the simple form of assault if they attempt to 
cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or if 
they negligently cause bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or if they 
attempt by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. 
According to Section 211.1(2), a person is guilty of aggravated assault if they 
attempt to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury purposely, 
knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the 
value of human life; or if they attempt to cause or purposely or knowingly cause 
bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon. 
5 Further analysis of intent in sexual crimes 
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 5 of my thesis I will now look closer to intent in sexual crimes and I will 
compare and analyze these. I will first look at intent in rape offences in Finland and 
Sweden. I will go through a few important and new court cases concerning these 
offences and intent. I will then take a broader look at the intent in sexual offences 
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against children. In the last subchapter I will take a brief look at how buying sex 
from an adult is criminalized, if it is, and what is the required intent in these cases. 
5.2 Intent in rape offences in Finland and Sweden 
In Finland the offence of rape requires intention, as it is not stated in the law 
otherwise. As we have seen earlier, the Finnish rape offence is not clearly based on 
consent and lack of it198. Similar situation is in Swedish criminal law. So the focus of 
the intention assessment is then elsewhere, in the act of forcing in Section 1(1) of the 
Finnish Criminal Code, Chapter 20, and in Section 1(1) of the Swedish Penal Code, 
Chapter 6, and in the act of taking advantage in subsections 2 of those sections. 
How can we show that the victim is forced into sexual intercourse? In Finland this 
Section 1(1) doesn’t require that the victims need to physically resist the sexual 
intercourse or put themselves in danger to prevent the act. It is enough that the victim 
clearly demonstrates their opposition to sexual intercourse and that the violence or its 
threat has forced the victim to submit to this intercourse.199 So what is the required 
degree of intention? 
In cases where violence or its threat has been used, the requirement of intention has 
been seen to mean that in these situations the actor needs to have understood that the 
victim has submitted themselves to the actor’s will because of this violence or threats 
of its use.200 According to Rautio, there have been problems with proving this kind of 
intent mostly in cases where the actor has used a relatively slight degree of violence 
or threats of violence.201 Previously, this kind of cases could be convicted more 
likely as coercion into sexual intercourse rather than rape, but this offence has now 
been repealed. The recent law amendment concerning rape offence has not changed 
the view that the actor needs to have understood that the victim has submitted 
themselves to the actor’s will because of the violence or threats of its use. The 
probability-intent is enough for the conviction. 
In cases that concern situations referred in subsection 2, where the victim has been 
unable to defend themselves or to form or express their will, the actor needs to have 
                                                
198 For further discussion about consent, see Hahto 2004, pp. 239–251. 
199 HE 6/1997 vp, p. 172. 
200 Rautio in Lappi-Seppälä et al. 2009, p. 428. 
201 Ibid. 
70 
 
 
understood that the victim was unable to defend themselves or to form or express 
their will because of their helpless state, and that the victim had submitted 
themselves to sexual intercourse with the actor because of this.202 This means that the 
actor needs to have understood that the reason they got to have the sexual intercourse 
with the victim was the victim’s such vulnerability that had resulted in the victim 
being unable to defend themselves or to form or express their will.203 Probability-
intent is enough in these cases, as well. 
This subsection 2 doesn’t require that the actor themselves has aroused this helpless 
state in the victim, only that the actor has taken advantage of it. Prior the law 
amendment concerning this Section of the Finnish Criminal Code that entered into 
force on 1.6.2011, the actor needed to be the one arousing this helpless state in the 
victim. However, even then rape wasn’t seen to require that the actor’s purpose from 
the beginning had been to rape the victim, but enough was that the actor had later 
taken advantage of the victim’s helpless state they had first aroused in them.204 
Today these factors matter only when the Court is determining the length of the 
sentence for the offence.205 
Section 3 concerning coercion into sexual intercourse has been repealed since 
1.9.2014 and section 1 subsection 3 now includes the less serious rape cases, where 
lesser or non-violent threats have been used, or the offence is assessed otherwise to 
be less serious as a whole. In regard to intention, it is sufficient that the actor had 
understood that the victim had submitted to the sexual intercourse because of these 
threats. Probability-intent is thus enough. 
Subsection 3 does not apply if the actor has used violence, not even a violence of 
slight degree, unlike the old Section 3, which was applied also in the Finnish 
Supreme Court case KKO 2013:96206. In this case the actor X had grabbed for the 
victim A’s intimate areas and pushed A into the bedroom, despite A’s verbal and 
physical resistance, and later in the bedroom sat on top of A. According to the Court 
these acts met the requirement of violence in forcing a person into having sexual 
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intercourse, when as a result of this violence A was helpless and in a state of fear. X 
was convicted of coercion into sexual intercourse, because the violence used was of 
slight degree, but today X would be convicted of rape under Section 1, subsection 1. 
In this decision KKO 2013:96 the actor X claimed he hadn’t understood that he was 
forcing the victim A into sexual intercourse, especially not after A had given him a 
condom. According to the Supreme Court, if a victim has physically or verbally 
ceased to resist other person’s intimate advances or sexual intercourse after first 
resisting these, this doesn’t alone mean that the victim has consented to these further 
advances or intercourse.207 So intention is not negated merely by the fact that the 
actor assumes the victim has changed their mind without any verbal or otherwise 
clear statement of this change of mind. According to the Court, giving a condom 
can’t be regarded as this kind of statement in the circumstances of this case.208 
In a Finnish Court of Appeal case RHO 2013:4209, the actor A had had sexual 
intercourse with B. A was charged with rape, committed by taking advantage of 
sleeping B who had not been able to express their will. A denied this, stating that 
their sex had been consensual. The District Court concluded that B had been asleep 
and drunk, and in this kind of state might have by their unconscious moving affected 
responsively to A’s conduct. The Court also viewed that mitigating factors in this 
case were that B had invited A to come to their house to drink alcohol and that A had 
immediately stopped their act after B had woken up and protested to the intercourse. 
The District Court convicted A of coercion into sexual intercourse rather than rape. 
According to the Court of Appeal, A had not made sure if B was awake even when A 
had to perceive that B had still been sleeping despite their possible movements. The 
facts that A had not planned to take advantage of B and that A had stopped their act 
were only mitigating factors when determining the sentence and not reasons to view 
the act as coercion into sexual intercourse instead of rape. The Court of Appeal 
convicted A of rape. So in this case A was viewed to have considered quite probable 
that B was still sleeping when A engaged in sexual intercourse. A had a reasonable 
grounds to suspect that B was still sleeping and A still didn’t make sure they were. 
How is this kind of situation handled in Sweden with the intent of indifference? 
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In a Swedish Court of Appeal decision RH 2010:37210 the actor E had been partying 
with the victim M. They had gone to E’s place, drank some more wine, kissed and 
fell asleep on the couch with some clothes on. E had woken up a few hours later and 
had wanted to have sex with M. He had then pushed first one and then two fingers 
into M’s vagina, while M was still sleeping. E claimed that M had reacted nicely to 
this despite still sleeping. E had then woken M up and immediately suspended his act 
when she had protested. According to E, she had later woken up to M having sexual 
intercourse with her. M admitted inserting fingers, but not the sexual intercourse. 
The District Court in this case ruled that inserting two fingers in the drunk and 
sleeping M’s vagina was a sexual act comparable to sexual intercourse, E had had 
taken advantage of victim’s helpless state and that the actor E was culpable of rape. 
However, M’s story of the sexual intercourse wasn’t considered credible. The Court 
of Appeal upheld the conviction. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeal 
viewed this as a less serious rape, sentencing E respectively to imprisonments of 8 
months and 1 year. The decision doesn’t really assess E’s intent, since E has 
admitted his act and the other act hasn’t been proven to have occurred. Clearly in this 
case E has been at least indifferent to whether E was still sleeping, but a Finnish 
court would have ruled similarly, since E can be even known that M was sleeping. 
In another recent Swedish decision NJA 2013 s. 548211 the Swedish Supreme Court 
ruled that the actor was culpable of rape, when he had pushed two fingers to his 
female partner’s genital area. The motive of the actor had been to find out whether 
she had been unfaithful to him. Even though there was no clear sexual motive for the 
act and no intent to get sexual gratification for the actor, the Supreme Court ruled 
that this act was an act referred in the statutory offence definition of rape. Thus the 
actor was convicted of rape. So we can see that it’s not only the actor’s intention that 
matters, but also acts that are considered to have sexual character. 
Even more recent Swedish rape case was RH 2014:32212. In this case the actor M 
was charged with rape. M had been in victim A’s house and stayed for the night. 
Nothing sexual had happened before they went to sleep in the same bed, both having 
their own blankets. During the night M had penetrated A’s vagina with his penis and 
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finger, while A had been asleep. With A’s statement and forensic evidence the act 
was proven to have occurred. M was seen to have taken advantage of the A’s 
vulnerable state of being asleep and M was charged with the offence of rape. 
M’s defence from the beginning was based on lack of intent, since he had been 
asleep and didn’t remember that sexual acts would have happened. An expert opinion 
in this case admitted that such behavior is possible but very rare. In the District Court 
M’s ex-girlfriend told that one such incident had occurred before. However, M 
himself didn’t remember this incident in the investigations. 
A told in the District Court that some time after the act, M had got up from the bed 
and visited the balcony while A was there and had asked A to come back to bed. M 
had no memory of this. According to the court, this balcony episode could be seen to 
be contrary to the sexsomnia theory, when M had been able to reason in such way. 
The District Court convicted M of rape and sentenced him to imprisonment for 2 
years, the minimum sentence for this offence. 
The Court of Appeal heard several witnesses. M’s mother and aunt testified about 
M’s sleepwalking habits and that it ran in the family. The police officer who had 
come to A’s apartment in the morning testified how M had acted when he had woken 
up when the police came for him. A second expert opinion was also given, stating 
that this condition possibly was hereditary, and that in this kind of condition there 
could be short periods of wakefulness up to 3 minutes without memories of them. 
The Court of Appeal concluded that it was possible that the balcony sequence had 
happened during 3 minutes in which M had been in lingering unawareness. The court 
also stated that A’s testimony couldn’t clarify whether M had been asleep during the 
act and aware of his actions or not.  The court also concluded that both expert 
opinions had stated that the condition of sexsomnia was possible and that it could be 
hereditary, which was supported by M’s mother and aunt.  
The Court of Appeal found that the prosecutor hadn’t in this case rebutted M’s 
defence based on him being asleep. The court acquitted M. It concluded that M had 
been asleep and had not been aware of the sexual acts. Thus M had not the intent that 
the offence of rape would have required. 
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In 2012 there had been a similar case B 564-12213, where the Court of Appeal had 
acquitted the actor A. In this case, A had had a history of sleepwalking behavior, as 
well as risk factors, when A was under the influence of alcohol and had slept only a 
little. A was acquitted since the theory of him being asleep couldn’t be refuted. 
5.3 Intent in sexual offences against children 
5.3.1 Finland 
In Finland the offence of sexual abuse of a child requires intention, as it is not stated 
in the law otherwise. The actor needs to have intent for all statutory offence elements 
of the act, such as the age of the victim in the offence of sexual abuse of a child, 
where a certain threshold of age requirement has been set. As I have earlier written, 
this age is generally 16 years of age and in specific situations 18 years of age.  
These age restrictions are essential in defining what kind of conduct is specifically 
criminalized, that is sexual interaction with a person not mature enough to participate 
in this kind of conduct. In regard to intention, it is noteworthy that a child under 16 
years of age can’t consent to sexual intercourse or sexual acts in such a way that 
would negate the actor’s intent. 
So when can we say that the actor has had the required intent? Intent in regard to the 
age of the victim in the offence of sexual abuse of a child requires that the actor has 
been aware he is having sexual intercourse or a sexual act with a person under the 
age of 16.214 So what if the actor thinks that their partner might be old enough or 
might not yet be old enough? 
It is quite natural that a person can be seen to have some responsibility of the fact 
that their partner is legally old enough, since the sexual crimes against children and 
the age thresholds that those sexual offence definitions set, for example 15 years of 
age, are meant to protect the children from the sexual interaction harmful to them. So 
should this person and when should this person clarify their partner’s exact age? 
Matikkala has written that the partner’s age is not necessarily on the actor’s mind and 
working memory as well as is the sexual intercourse itself with this partner, but the 
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knowledge that the sexual intercourse with a child is a crime might be able to make 
the actor to consider the age, as well.215 Similarly might work the actor’s previous 
experiences and criminal charges of similar acts.216 
The actor can have the required intent also in cases where he has tried to clarify 
whether the victim was old enough, since the intent is not negated by the mere fact 
that the victim has lied about their age if the actor has been able to come to the 
conclusion that the victim has not yet reached the legally required age of 16.217 So it 
is important to consider the circumstances, such as the place where the actor has met 
the victim and the victim’s appearance. This kind of circumstances can make the 
actor aware he is dealing with a person under the legally required age. 
In the Finnish Supreme Court case KKO 2004:71218 the actor A was charged with 
attempted sexual abuse of a child. A hadn’t met the 11-year-old victim B, so he had 
not been able to make any conclusions about the victim’s age based on her 
appearance or bodily development. However, according to the Court, her age being 
under 16 years of age must have been clear to A from B’s pen-pal ad, where she had 
told her age, and from subsequent emails.219 The Court still concluded that there had 
been no real danger of the offence occurring, when A had stopped sending messages 
to B without knowing B’s real identity or asking her contact information.220  
In the recent Court of Appeal of Turku case221 39-year old actor H had had sexual 
intercourse with a 13-year old victim A. A had been in the company of other girls 
and met H, whom she had asked to come to her home, where they had had sexual 
intercourse by A’s initiative. H denied having known at the time that A had been 
under 16 years of age. A had been taller and dressed differently than the other girls in 
her company. According to the District Court, this could have given H the 
impression that A was older than her age.  However, A had been in the company of 
girls of the same age than her and H had considered these girls to be under 16. So 
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observations of others in the victim’s company can have relevance too, like the 
courts assessed in this case. 
In the District Court A’s and other girls’ behavior was assessed to be like a behavior 
of a person of their age. According to the Court, considering all the circumstances H 
should have had doubts about the accuracy of his observations and should have 
clarified whether A was old enough. Now H hasn’t even claimed to have tried to 
clarify the A’s age, though he had had a chance to do that and a good reason to 
suspect that A wasn’t yet 16 years old. According to the Court, H had taken a risk 
that his perception of A’s age was not correct. Despite this risk, H had now neglected 
to find out the A’s age and by engaging in sexual intercourse with A he had 
intentionally sexually abused a child under 16 years of age. 
The Court of Appeal heard two new witnesses, one telling that the girls had told in 
A’s house that A was 14, but didn’t know whether this was before or after the sex. 
She also didn’t think A had looked older than she was. The other witness told that 
either she or another girl had told already in the bus stop that A was under 16 years 
of age. The Court of Appeal thought that this supported the other evidence that H had 
had good reasons to suspect that A had been under 16 years of age.  
As we have seen, a child’s consent can’t negate the intent, but it can be relevant 
when the blameworthiness of the act is assessed. When the victim in this case had 
clearly been the initiator to sex, the District Court didn’t consider the act to have 
been aggravated sexual abuse of a child and convicted him of sexual abuse of a child. 
The Court of Appeal upheld this conviction. 
The recent Finnish Supreme Court decision KKO 2014:54222 was a case about intent 
in sexual abuse of a child. In the case, actor A had had sexual intercourse with victim 
B, who had been 15 years of age at the time and had turned 16 in exactly two months 
from this sexual intercourse. A had known B’s year of birth and had assumed that B 
was already 16 years of age, but had not known or clarified B’s exact age. Both the 
District Court of Central Finland and the Court of Appeal of Vaasa had acquitted A 
of intentional sexual abuse of a child. The Supreme Court now had to assess whether 
A had intent required for the offence of sexual abuse of a child. 
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According to the Supreme Court, intention should not be negated in a sexual abuse of 
a child case where it can be inferred from the circumstances that the actor has 
intentionally kept themselves ignorant of the victim’s age. The Supreme Court has 
dealt with this kind of deliberate ignorance in a drug case KKO 2006:64223, where it 
concluded that deliberate ignorance of two drug runners about the nature of the drugs 
did not negate their intent in regard to these drugs.  
In recent years, the Supreme Court has without exception used the intent based on 
probability also in the cases where it has dealt with intent in regard to offence 
elements other than consequences. The Supreme Court has also acknowledged this in 
the case and has now set this form of intent as the starting point of its interpretation 
in this case. 
A had not known B previously, but had come to know B’s year of birth during that 
night before the sexual intercourse had occurred. According to the Supreme Court, 
since A had known B’s year of birth, A has been able perceive to be much more 
likely that B had already turned 16 than that B had not. A had also been able to 
compare B’s appearance with that of A’s own sister, who had already turned 16, and 
from this comparison come to the conclusion that B was older. A’s friend R as a 
witness in this case had come to this conclusion, as well, considering B as 16 or 17 
years of age. 
According to the Supreme Court, the circumstances in this case don’t indicate that A 
would have intentionally stayed ignorant whether B had already turned 16 or not.224 
So even though the Supreme Court has earlier in this decision acknowledged the 
possibility of giving relevance to the attitude the actor has had towards finding out 
the victim’s age225, it has now not given any particular relevance to the fact that A 
had not tried to clarify B’s exact age. 
The Supreme Court concluded that A had not under these circumstances considered 
at the time of the sexual intercourse that B would quite probably be under 16 years of 
age. Thus A had not acted intentionally and could not be held guilty of the sexual 
abuse of a child offence that needs to be committed intentionally in all regards. 
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The actor has been convicted of sexual abuse of a child when they have shown their 
penis in public and asked the child to evaluate it. The fact that the acts have been 
done near a school in the morning and that the victim has looked young three years 
after the act have been considered enough for proving intention.226 This offence 
doesn’t necessarily require physical act or even meeting the child. Detailed 
describing of sexual acts to the child and discussing sexual fantasies with the child 
can be enough, when these are seen harmful to the child’s development. The medium 
for this can be almost anything: phone, text messages or instant message chat 
services, but often it has been some Internet-site, which young people tend to use.227  
If the age of the victim has been visible in this kind of page, the actor is seen to have 
known about the age.228 If it hasn’t been, the intent concerning the age has to be 
proven some other way. In a Court of Appeal case, the actor had known that the 
victim went to upper comprehensive school (yläaste), which usually means that the 
person is under 16 years of age. When the actor had continued sending sexual 
messages without trying to clarify the victim’s age and there hadn’t been any other 
reason to think that the victim was already 16, the act was considered intentional.229 
There has been from time to time some discussion and proposals of extending the 
scope of the age of the victim offence element of sexual crimes against children to 
cover negligence, too. For example, the Parliament of Åland has made an initiative 
about reviewing the sexual offences legislation and in this initiative LTB 35/2011230, 
among other things, included a proposal of extending the scope of criminal 
responsibility in sexual crimes to cover negligence, too. The Constitutional Law 
Committee of the Finnish Parliament rejected the initiative, since it was out of the 
jurisdiction of the Parliament of Åland. Professor Niemi has also suggested that 
negligence could be enough in regard to the age of a victim, since sexual abuse of a 
child is harmful for the child, no matter how old the child looks.231 
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5.3.2 Sweden 
In Sweden, there used to be a form of intent called “dolus Alexanderson”, named 
after a Supreme Court judge, who was prominent in the Supreme Court’s decision 
NJA 1941, s. 466232, which shaped this form of dolus. This was a sexual abuse of a 
child case, where the actor H had had sexual intercourse with a child under 15 years 
of age.  
To avoid the awareness of the 14-year-old victim M’s age and intention thereof, he 
was seen to have intentionally avoided finding out her exact age, because then his 
knowledge of the age could have been proven. So he kept himself in uncertainty, like 
Alexanderson later wrote (“jag måste alltså hålla mig i ovisshet om hur det är med 
hennes exakta ålder”).233 H himself had told the Court he had asked the age and M 
had replied she was 15, but M denied this having happened.   
The Supreme Court convicted H based on his deliberate ignorance of the age, when it 
must have been clear to H that M wasn’t yet 15 from her appearance and when H 
knew she still went to school. Dolus Alexanderson and its form sparked a lot of 
academic debate and was later rejected, for good also in cases concerning the age of 
the victim in sexual offences against children, when in the new Swedish Penal Code 
actor’s negligence was seen to be enough. 
Today Swedish criminal law doesn’t require intent in regard to the age of the victim 
in cases of sexual abuse of a child. According to Section 13 of the Swedish Penal 
Code, Chapter 6, the criminal responsibility in offences of Chapter 6, where the 
victim needs to be under certain age, is not limited to actors with intent regard to the 
victim’s age, but it extends also to those negligent actors that had not realized the 
victim’s age, but had had reasonable grounds to believe (skälig anledning att anta) 
that the victim had not reached the required age. 
This expression needs to be interpreted with great caution. If the actor has 
demonstrated a high degree of negligence in relation to the child's age, this is enough 
for conviction.234 If the child under 15 years of age has given their consent to the acts 
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that fulfill the statutory definition of rape of a child under Section 4, this consent 
can’t lead to impunity of the actor.235 However, Section 14 can be under certain 
circumstances applied to the offence of sexual abuse of a child under Section 5.236 
So great caution and careful assessment is needed in the application of sexual 
offences where the victim is a child under 15 years of age, especially taking into 
consideration this Section 14 of the Swedish Penal Code, Chapter 6, concerning 
cases where there is only a little age difference between the actor and the child under 
15 years of age. For example, if the actor is 15 and their sexual partner is 14 years 
old, there could be a reason to believe that no crime has occurred. 
In Swedish Supreme Court case NJA 2007, s. 201237, the actor was a 17-years old 
boy, who had had sex with a 14-year-and-seven-month old girl. The Supreme Court 
concluded that there had been no abuse of the girl and the case was not considered as 
a criminal offence. According to the court, the girl was under 15, but still very near 
it, and the boy wasn’t much older than the girl. 
5.3.3 Germany 
According to Frisch, dolus should be understood as acceptance of a prohibited 
risk.238 He has suggested that an actor takes a prohibited risk if the uncertainty in 
circumstances like the age of the sexual partner could be easily removed, but the 
actor still goes ahead with the act without removing this uncertainty.239 But what 
kind of intent is required today in Germany? 
In Germany, the offence of sexual abuse of a child requires at least conditional intent 
in regard to the age of the victim. This has been stated, for example, in cases BGH 
12.8.1997 – 4 StR 353/97240 and BGH 16.4.2008 – 5 StR 589/07241. In Germany, the 
actor must have held it at least to be possible that the child was under 14 years of 
age. If the actor, however, had not given any thought to the age of the child, there is 
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no required intent for the offence of sexual abuse of a child.242 The actor’s attempts 
to justify their behavior should be, however, regarded with caution. 
In cases where the actor denies having had the required intent as to the age, 
conditional intent can’t be inferred yet from the fact that the actor has known the 
victim for some time before the offence. Instead, the court needs to assess the 
victim’s appearance and bodily development.243 
If the actor had made a mistake about the child’s age, thinking the victim to be older 
than the victim really was, this can lead to mistake of fact.244 Mistake of fact is 
defined in Section 16(1) of the German Criminal Code. According to this section, the 
actor who at the time of the commission of the offence was unaware of a fact, which 
was a statutory element of the offence, shall be deemed to lack intention. According 
to Section 16(2), the actor that at the time of commission of the offence mistakenly 
assumed the existence of facts, which would satisfy the elements of a more lenient 
provision, may only be punished for the intentional commission of this more lenient 
provision. So if the actor that had thought the victim was older than 12 years of age 
but less than 18 years of age, they can still be charged and convicted of the offence 
of abuse of juvenile according to Section 182(3) of the German Criminal Code. 
Conditional intent is enough for the sexual offence under Section 176(2).245 
5.3.4 England 
Sexual Offences Act 2003 offences “rape of a child under 13” (Section 5), “assault of 
a child under 13 by penetration” (Section 6), “sexual assault of a child under 13” 
(Section 7) and “causing or inciting a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity” 
(Section 8) are strict liability offences. This means that it is irrelevant whether there 
is consent given to these acts by a child under 13 or not. This means also that there is 
no need to show that a defendant was aware that the child was under 13. So there is 
no defence of reasonable mistake for a defendant who thought a child to be 13 years 
old of age or older. 
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The only mens rea requirement is the intent to penetrate, to touch or to cause the 
child to engage in sexual activity. Thus, for example, rape of a child under 13 is 
automatically committed by intentionally having sexual intercourse with a child 
under the age of 13. Only that this act has happened and the age of the victim need to 
be proved in the court. Ashworth has suggested that the threshold of reasonable 
belief could have been too favorable to the actors committing sexual offences, when 
they could pretend to have been ignorant or mistaken.246 
The age of criminal responsibility in England is 10. Thus children of the age of 10–
12 can be convicted of having sexual acts meant in sections 5–8 with a child of 
similar age. With the strict liability sex offences there is a great reliance on 
prosecutorial discretion not to convict of cases where no real harm has happened. 
According the guidelines given by the Crown Prosecution Service, no child will be 
prosecuted unless there is coercion, deception or other untoward circumstances.247 If 
other children are to be charged of the offences against children under 13, it can also 
by done through Section 13 and Sections 9 to 12 of the Sexual Offences Act, with 
less severe sentences than the sentences are on the general rape offences. 
Strict liability was enforced in R v G248. In this case, a 15-year old actor was charged 
with rape of 12-year old victim. According to this decision the offence of rape of a 
child under 13 in Section 5 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 imposes strict liability 
as to the age of the victim. The majority of the House of Lords was unwilling to 
accept human rights arguments that this kind of strict liability can be seen to breach 
the presumption of innocence under Article 6(2) of the European Convention of 
Human Rights as well as the same convention’s Article 8 of the rights of the accused, 
who in this case was only 15 years of age.  
Strict liability is necessary here in order to ensure the protection of children from the 
sexual attention of others. Allowing a defence of reasonable mistake (a negligence 
standard) would reduce that protection unacceptably. The unfairness and stigma of 
convicting a mistaken defendant of this serious offence is seen to be less important, 
even when that defendant is also below the age of consent and could have been 
charged with a lesser offence under Sections 9 to 12. 
                                                
246 Ashworth and Horder 2012, pp. 365–366.  
247 CPS, Sexual Offences Act 2003, Code for Crown Prosecutors – Child defendant (under 18). 
248 [2008] UKHL 37. 
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Next I will shortly take a look at a specific offence, buying sexual services from an 
adult selling them. How is this criminalized, if it is, and what kind of intent is 
needed? 
5.4 Intention in offences of purchase of sexual services 
Section 8(1) of the Finnish Criminal Code, Chapter 20, criminalizes inducing a 
victim of procuring or human trafficking to engage in sexual intercourse or in a 
comparable act by promising or giving remuneration. According to subsection 2, 
likewise is punished the actor who takes advantage of the remuneration promised or 
given by a third person, by engaging in sexual intercourse or a comparable sexual act 
with the victim. So it is illegal to buy sex from the victims. These are intentional acts. 
In the Supreme Court case KKO 2012:66249, the actor X had bought sexual services 
from A, who was a victim of procuring. The actor needs to be aware that the person 
is such a victim in order to their act to be seen as intentional and to be committed as a 
crime. The Supreme Court had to assess whether X had acted intentionally, thus 
whether he had known about the procuring or at least considered it quite probable. X 
denied this. 
The Supreme Court quashed X’s conviction of abuse of a victim of sex trade. Unlike 
the District Court and the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that it 
couldn’t be proven that X had considered it to be quite probable that A had been a 
victim of procuring. X had known that A came from some Baltic country, but this 
wasn’t enough to indicate X’s intent, which would have required some more solid 
evidence, for example, A’s complete lack of language skills or X handing the money 
to another person than A. After the decision, Tapani suggested lowering the required 
awareness so that the act would be criminal also as a negligent act, if the actor could 
have and should have known that they were buying sex from a victim of sex trade.250  
The high threshold of intent clearly came as a surprise to the legislator, which almost 
immediately started the process to change the law. Finally on November 13, 2014, 
the Government Proposal HE 229/2014251 was given. It proposed criminalizing the 
                                                
249 KKO 2012:66. 
250 Tapani 2012, p. 619. 
251 HE 229/2014 vp. 
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negligent act, too. For the reasons of proportionality and rule of law, the 
Constitutional Law Committee of the Finnish Parliament would have set the 
threshold to gross negligence.252 However, the Law Committee of the Finnish 
Parliament decided to set it lower, to standard negligence, fearing that otherwise the 
threshold would be still too high.253 With this change, the act requires that the actor 
buying sex had a reason to suspect that the seller was a victim of procuring of human 
trafficking. This reason can be, for example, the lack of language skills or some other 
external circumstance that has created for the actor a reason to suspect that the 
person is a victim, even if they otherwise wouldn’t have thought that their act would 
fulfill this offence.254 According to the Law Committee, in the end this is an overall 
consideration, where the relevance of individual circumstances varies.255 
The Finnish Parliament passed this law amendment on March 14, 2015. According to 
the Government Proposal HE 229/2014, it will enter into force either on June 1, 2015 
or January 1, 2016.256 According to this new subsection 3, similarly to subsections 1 
and 2 is punished the actor who has committed an act referred in subsection 1 or 2 
and has had reason to suspect (syytä epäillä) that the other person, the sex seller, was 
a victim of procuring or human trafficking. This is a negligent act. According to new 
subsection 4, an attempt of intentional act is also punishable. The sentence for all 
subsections is a fine or imprisonment for at most 6 months. 
Sweden has had a sex purchase ban in force since 1999. All buying of sex is illegal, 
but selling is not criminalized257. According to Section 11(1) of the Swedish Penal 
Code, Chapter 6, the actor that acquires a temporary sexual relationship (tillfällig 
sexuell förbindelse) against remuneration shall be convicted of purchase of a sexual 
service (köp av sexuell tjänst) and sentenced to a fine or to imprisonment for at most 
1 year. According to subsection 2, this applies also if the remuneration was promised 
or paid by another person. If the seller is a child, Section 9 applies instead of this. 
The actor needs to have intention in regard to all the statutory offence elements.258 
According to Section 15, attempted purchase is also punishable. 
                                                
252 PeVL 56/2014 vp, pp. 2–4. 
253 LaVM 38/2014 vp, p. 3. 
254 HE 229/2014 vp, p. 8. 
255 LaVM 38/2014 vp, p.4. 
256 At the time of turning in this thesis, it wasn’t yet sure when the amendment would enter into force. 
257 The seller is not guilty of any crime, see Holmqvist et al. 2009, 6:50. 
258 Holmqvist et al. 2009, 6:50. 
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In England, it is a crime to pay for sexual services of a prostitute subjected to force. 
According to Section 53A(1) of the Sexual Offences Act, the actor A commits this 
offence if they make or promise payment for the sexual services of a prostitute B, 
who has been induced or encouraged to provide these services by C that has engaged 
in exploitative conduct of likely to induce or encourage the selling of sexual services. 
Required is also that C has engaged in that conduct for or in the expectation of gain 
for themselves or another person (not A or B). According to subsection 3, C has 
engaged in exploitative conduct if they have used force, violent or non-violent threats 
or any other form of coercion, or if they have practiced any form of deception. 
According to subsection 2, it is irrelevant where in the world the sexual services are 
to be provided and whether those services are provided, and whether A is, or ought to 
be, aware that C has engaged in exploitative conduct. So this is a strict liability 
offence. It doesn’t matter if A has known that they were buying sex from a person 
subjected to force or other exploitative conduct. If the sex seller has been such a 
victim, A has automatically committed this offence by paying for their sexual 
services. This is even stricter than in Finland, but also not surprising since sexual 
offences against a child under 13 have this strict liability too. The vulnerability and 
need for protection in both cases is considered to need this kind of heavy measures. 
The Netherlands and Germany don’t have any kind of ban on buying sex from adults. 
Often these countries are seen as one of the main destinations for human trafficking 
in sexual exploitation purposes. However, there has been no desire to ban purchasing 
sex.  
Now I have finished with sexual offences and I will take a deeper and more 
comparative look at intent in homicides and assaults. 
6 Intention in homicides and assaults 
6.1 Introduction 
In the sixth chapter, I will take a brief look at two famous Dutch homicide cases that 
have shaped the Dutch form of lowest level of intent, conditional intent, remarkably. 
Then I will briefly look at murder discussion in 6.2, before taking three larger 
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subchapters of case study comparison of court cases about Russian roulette, driving 
towards the police officer and HIV-cases. I will look at how these cases have been 
ruled and what the intent has been. After this chapter, I will conclude my thesis and 
present my conclusions. 
6.2 The Netherlands: Hoorn Pie and Porsche 
The Hoorn Pie case259 for the first time defined conditional intent in Dutch criminal 
law, but it also defined it in a murder case. In this case, the actor Beek had bought a 
pie, added a lethal amount of arsenic, and sent the poisoned pie to M, whom Beek 
wanted dead. However, it wasn’t M but his wife who ate the pie and died as a result. 
Beek’s defence was that he lacked intent to kill the wife. The Supreme Court 
convicted Beek of murder, concluding that Beek’s plan to kill M also included the 
possibility of death of those other people who could eat the pie, especially M’s wife. 
The much more recent Porsche case260 can be considered as one of the most relevant 
Dutch cases when it comes to defining the Dutch concept of intention and defining 
the threshold of conditional intent. In this case, the actor A’s extremely dangerous 
driving with his Porsche had resulted in deaths of five other people. The Court of 
Appeal convicted A of voluntary manslaughter, when he had consciously accepted 
the substantial chance of causing the deaths. 
The Supreme Court now had to consider whether A had acted intentionally and 
whether he was guilty of five counts of voluntary manslaughter under Section 287 of 
the Dutch Penal Code or had only acted negligently. Thus the Supreme Court had to 
consider especially whether very dangerous driving can be a proof of conditional 
intent, where the actor can be seen to have accepted the substantial chance of his 
actions causing death. 
A had first gotten drunk at bars, then driven his Porsche at excessive speeds, turning 
corners with burning tires and driving through red lights. He had already overtaken 
several cars with quick maneuvers, when he tried to overtake a Seat. However, his 
three attempts to overtake it were unsuccessful. He tried the fourth time, changed to 
                                                
259 HR 19 June, 1911, W 9203. 
260 HR 15 October 1996, NJ 1997, 199. 
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the other line and collided directly head-on with a car oncoming on this line. All four 
people of this car and A’s friend travelling in A’s car died in the crash. 
Especially relevant in this case was how the Supreme Court interpreted whether A’s 
conditional intent to kill and the substantial chance of causing the death of another 
person could be reconciled with the foreseeable and undesirable thought that he 
himself would also die if his car crashed as a result of A’s very dangerous driving. 
The conditional intent requires that the actor has consciously accepted the substantial 
chance of causing the result, but in a situation like this Porsche case, can A really 
seen to have accepted his own death? 
The Dutch Supreme Court acquitted A of intending to kill the victims of the car 
crash. The Court concluded that A had not accepted the risk the conditional intent 
would have required, since this kind of acceptance would have implied that he would 
have taken into the bargain also his own death. A was later convicted of negligent 
homicide in traffic. 
In some cases, conditional intent has been accepted, when the actor has shown no 
indication that they have tried to avoid a collision, but in the Porsche case, A had 
already aborted several of his attempts to overtake, which didn’t support the notion 
that he would have accepted the possibility of his own death. 
6.3 England: Too broad or too narrow murder definition? 
In England, as we now have seen, the offence of murder requires either intent to kill 
or intent to cause grievous bodily harm. This can be described with a view that the 
actor A had intended to kill if it had been their aim to kill by their act (or omission), 
in such a way that they would have considered it to have been a failure if V hadn’t 
died as a result.261 According to Ashworth, the golden rule in English criminal law is 
that intention should be left without further description or definition other than this in 
most cases and the broader, full definition should be only used for cases where the 
actor claims that their purpose for their act had been something else than to cause 
injury to V.262 It is naturally easier for the jury to understand a more simple 
definition. It is important to remember that in common law countries England and 
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the United States, the jury decided whether there has been the required mens rea 
element, not the judge, like in civil law countries. 
The full intention is considered to include, in addition to the proof of the actor A’s 
aim or purpose of killing, the proof that A had foreseen the victim V’s death to have 
been virtually certain to result from A’s act or omission. In this case there is no 
difference, whether A had considered V’s unlikely survival of A’s act as a failure to 
achieve A’s purpose.263 If in a homicide case the jury is sure that A had acted this 
way, acting despite knowing to be virtually certain, they are entitled to find that A 
had intended to kill. However, for the murder conviction it is already enough that the 
prosecution is able to show that A had intended to cause grievous bodily harm to V, 
which means that it is enough to show that A had foreseen a grievous bodily harm to 
V as virtually certain consequence of A’s act.264 
This is based on the case R v Cunningham265, where the actor, thinking that the 
victim was having an affair with the actor’s fiancé, went to a bar and struck the 
victim on the head repeatedly with a bar chair, causing injuries to the victim, from 
which the victim died a week later. The actor was convicted of murder and appealed 
to the House of Lords, stating that he had not intended to kill. According to the 
House of Lords, the intent to cause grievous bodily harm is sufficient for murder and 
it doesn’t need proof that the actor has even contemplated the possibility that death 
would result as a consequence. This is a clear distinction between English criminal 
law and criminal laws of civil law countries, which explicitly require that the actor 
was aware that their act could result in another person’s death.  
Today the law on murder has been seen both too broad and too narrow.266 For 
example, Lord Steyn has stated that the new definition could be “intention to kill or 
intention to cause really serious harm coupled with awareness of the risk of 
death.”267 The terrorist example by Pedain268 has been often used to define the limits 
in the English law definition of intent in murder offences. According to this example, 
a terrorist plants a bomb in a public place. Usually in these cases this act would 
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easily constitute murder when the actor intends to kill or cause grievous injury by 
planting the bomb. But Pedain’s example asks, what if this terrorist is not intending 
to kill anyone, but is instead seeking to gain publicity? In this example the terrorist 
sets the bomb to go off in two hours’ time and gives the police a warning, so that the 
place can be evacuated in time.269 So clearly the terrorist doesn’t unconditionally 
want the bomb to explode. 
However, in this example, a bomb disposal expert is killed when they are trying to 
dismantle the bomb. Should the terrorist be convicted of this? The terrorist has 
clearly intentionally created a risk of death, which has resulted in the bomb expert’s 
death. But the terrorist has not intended to kill or to cause grievous bodily harm. If 
the terrorist didn’t foresee the death, they cannot be convicted of murder. Pedain, 
however, argues that the terrorist should and could be convicted of murder, since 
they have created this risk of harm, which risk has been essential for them to achieve 
their purpose of gaining publicity and thus they have approved the possible harmful 
consequences, like death, which can be undesired but not disassociated from.270 
In November 2006, the Law Commission gave its report on the law reform of 
homicide.271 The Commission proposed a new homicide offence structure with first-
degree murder, second-degree murder and manslaughter. First-degree murder with 
mandatory life penalty would include cases where the actor has killed another 
intentionally or where the actor has had the intention to cause serious injury, coupled 
with an awareness of a serious risk of causing death.272 
Second-degree murder would include cases where the actor has intended to do 
serious injury to the victim. It would also include cases where the actor has intended 
to cause some injury or a fear or risk of injury, and has been aware of a serious risk 
of causing death. This could include cases like Russian roulette, if the victim would 
be seen to have had a fear of injury.273 Also partial defences, like diminished 
responsibility, would deem the act to be second-degree murder where otherwise it 
would have been first-degree.274 Manslaughter would include the cases where the 
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actor has killed through gross negligence as to the risk of causing death, or if the 
actor has killed another with a criminal act that was intended to cause injury of where 
there was an awareness that this act involved a serious risk of causing injury. 
Manslaughter would also include cases of participating in a joint criminal venture, 
where another would do the second-degree murder.275 So in this new model, the actor 
could be convicted of murder only if they had been aware of the risk of death of 
another person. This would be much more reasonable than the situation now and it 
would be also more similar to murder offences in other countries of my research. 
6.4 Case study: Russian roulette 
An interesting case are Russian roulette scenarios, where an actor places a single 
round in a revolver, places the muzzle against another person’s head and pulls the 
trigger. Is there intent to kill? Mathematically the probability is 1/6 or 16,67% that 
the round is in the chamber and the revolver fires. Is this kind of chance enough? 
According to Frände, an actor doing this can be seen to have intended to kill another 
person.276 So the killing would then have been their purpose and purpose-intent 
would be enough for conviction of voluntary manslaughter, if the person dies, and of 
attempted voluntary manslaughter, if the person does not die. 
But if the person dies without the actor having intended to kill the person, Frände 
thinks that dolus eventualis doesn’t apply either, since the actor has not considered 
the death of the person as a quite probable consequence of their action. Thus there is 
no intent based on probability and therefore no intent at all. The actor could be 
convicted only of a negligent offence, of negligent manslaughter, if the person has 
died.277 
According to Frände, cases of Russian roulette are no reason to abandon the intent 
threshold based on probability, since this kind of cases are so rare.278 This is the case, 
not only in Finland, but elsewhere too. In Germany, the closest to this scenario has 
come the hanging play in the case BGH 7.4.1983 – 4 StR 164/83.279 In this case the 
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actors S and W had decided to play hanging with the victim D and a rope had been 
tied around D’s neck. S had then pushed D in the back, the rope had tightened around 
D’s neck and D had been hanging 35 cm above the ground. D had felt fear of death, 
until he had fallen down to the ground because the rope had either snapped or the 
knot dissolved. S had then immediately loosened the rope around D’s neck. 
The District Court convicted S and W of attempted manslaughter. The BGH, 
however, considered that S and W hadn’t known that their act could lead to D’s 
death and hadn’t approved this possible consequence. S and W hadn’t discussed how 
the hanging game should exactly be played. They had also thought that death in 
hanging could only come by suffocation, not knowing about the more immediate 
death possibility by broken neck. Matikkala has written about this case and compared 
it with the Russian roulette situation where participants in Russian roulette would 
have firmly believed that the revolver has less revolver rounds than it actually had, 
when S and W now had not known about the other possibility D could have died.280 
In the Swedish case NJA 2004, s. 176281, the Swedish Supreme Court mentioned 
cases of Russian roulette as an example that does not work with intent based on 
probability, because the probability of killing another person with one round in the 
magazine is mathematically low. However, according to the Court, a person’s life is 
at stake and intent can be seen to reasonably exist. Thus intent based on pure 
probability is not suitable as a limit of intent (“knappast är lämpligt som en generell 
avgränsning av uppsåtets”).282 
The United States has had a Russian roulette case, Commonwealth v. Malone283 
already back in 1946, so before the Model Penal Code. In this case, the 17-years old 
actor Malone found a revolver and used it to play Russian roulette with the 13-years 
old L. Malone put a bullet in one chamber of the five-chamber revolver, placed it 
against L’s head and three times pulled the trigger. On the third time the revolver 
fired, killing L. 
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Malone denied having had the intent to kill and claimed having thought that the 
bullet was in the last chamber, and that at most he had been reckless to L’s death. 
However, Malone was charged with murder and the Trial Court convicted him of 
second-degree murder. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the conviction. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that the first-degree murder requires specific 
intent to kill and the second-degree gross recklessness and a reasonable anticipation 
that it will lead to death of another. According to the Court, L’s death resulted from 
Malone’s intentionally committed act with reckless disregard of the consequences. 
The Court stated that the chances of L’s death were at least 60 %284 certain from 
Malone’s three attempts to discharge the revolver, which was aimed at L’s vital body 
part and had a bullet. Thus this was murder with malice “evidenced by the intentional 
doing of an uncalled-for act in callous disregard of its likely harmful effects on 
others.”285 Under Section 210.2(1)(b) of the Model Penal Code, he would also have 
been convicted of murder, when his act was committed “recklessly and under 
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life”.286 
A recent Finnish Supreme Court case KKO 2013:82287 was about Russian roulette 
and whether it should be seen as attempted voluntary manslaughter, when the victim 
hadn’t died. In this case defendant A had twice randomly spun the revolver cylinder 
and after each spin pulled the trigger while the revolver was a meter away from 
victim B’s forehead. There was a single round in the revolver, so only one revolver 
chamber out of six chambers was loaded. 
The Court now had to assess, whether B’s death as a result of A’s act could be held 
quite probable in such way that A should be held liable to attempted voluntary 
manslaughter. Thus this case was about probability intent and about as how probable 
A had considered B’s death. 
                                                
284 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania apparently assessed that the first time had the probability of 
20 %, the second 40% and the third 60%. It could be, however, argued that the chances instead were 
respectively 20 %, 25 % and 33 %. Unlike in the Finnish case, as we will see, in this case the actor 
didn’t shuffle the chambers before each time he pulled the trigger. 
285 354 Pa. 180, 47 A.2d 445, p27. 
286 The actor’s young age could, however, lead to jury deciding that the actor has been rather ignorant 
than indifferent. See Robinson 1997, p. 723. 
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According to the District Court of Oulu it could not be ruled out that A was aware 
that the single round was on the revolver chamber so that the firing of the revolver 
would not pose an immediate threat to B’s life. The Court dismissed the charge of 
attempted manslaughter and convicted A of menace and causing danger. 
The Court of Appeal of Rovaniemi overruled the District Court's decision and 
convicted A of attempted voluntary manslaughter. According to the Court, B had 
been in mortal danger both times the trigger was pulled and A had to perceive this. 
The probability of A’s act causing B’s death was so substantial that A's conduct met 
the statutory offence elements of attempted voluntary manslaughter. 
The Supreme Court now had to consider the question whether B’s death as a result of 
A’s actions could be seen as a quite probable on the basis of facts given by the Court 
of Appeal’s judgment. The Supreme Court concluded that B’s death could not be 
held as a quite probable consequence of A’s act. Thus because A had not even dolus 
eventualis intent to kill B, he could not be convicted of attempted voluntary 
manslaughter, but only of menace (laiton uhkaus) and imperilment (vaaran 
aiheuttaminen). 
According to the Supreme Court, in order to have a sufficient intent, A should have 
considered B’s death more probable than B’s staying alive. However, it was clearly 
more probable that A’s actions wouldn’t result in B’s death, and according to the 
Court there had not been any such circumstances regarding the revolver or events 
that would make it necessary to assess probability differently from A’s perspective at 
the time of the act. 
But was it clearly more probable that B would not die? The Supreme Court relied in 
its ruling on the legislation preparatory work regarding intention, according to which 
it is not the aim of the law that probability would be assessed with statistical 
estimates, but instead with everyday evaluation made from the perspective of the 
actor of how plausible he considers fulfillment of statutory offence elements. Unlike 
the District Court, the Supreme Court didn’t use mathematical probabilities, which 
had been assessed in the District Court as 17 %. 
According to the Supreme Court, fulfillment of probability-intent can be assessed by 
examining the facts that actor has been able to consider regarding the consequences 
94 
 
 
of his actions at the time of the acts. The Supreme Court did not consider whether A 
could see in which chamber the single revolver round was. 
There had been evidence presented in the Court of Appeal showing that when the 
revolver magazine cylinder was attached to the revolver, a round could be seen from 
the side of the revolver only if the round was on the notch left side of the revolver, 
and otherwise only when rotating the revolver and from the front of it, but not 
directly from behind the revolver when pulling the trigger. The Supreme Court's 
ruling does not contain any of this kind of reflection and examination. 
The Supreme Court's arguments are very limited and do not indicate how the 
Supreme Court has exactly come to the conclusion that in this case it has been much 
more probable that A's described conduct would not cause B's death. In practice, the 
Supreme Court can be considered to have reached this solution, because the 
probability was not “quite probable” by not exceeding the 50% probability often 
proposed in the legal literature, even though the Supreme Court has been now careful 
not to use maths and statistics. 
The Supreme Court has held to be quite probable only the fact that a revolver round 
in the chamber at the point of the firing pin would have quite probably caused B's 
death, but the number of rounds (one) and spins before the two times trigger was 
pulled have decreased the probability of B's death.  
If we compare this case to Malone, there are some clear differences. In Malone, the 
revolver had five chambers instead of six, so pure mathematical chances of firing the 
revolver were lower in the Finnish case. In this Finnish case, the chambers were also 
shuffled before each time the trigger was pulled. So in theory it could take any 
number of times before the revolver would fire. Surely at some point there needs to 
be some limit to this game where the actor is seen to have been too indifferent of the 
result of the revolver firing, which is almost certainly another person’s death. This is 
not like the HIV-cases, where there is a comparably low probability of infecting 
another person with a virus and with today’s treatment possibilities, an infection will 
only under certain circumstances lead to this person death.288  
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If we apply the theory of intent based on quite probably threshold, a million times 
pulling the trigger and shuffling afterwards would still never reach over 50 % chance 
when each time triggered would still be that 17%. Should we at least in this kind of 
cases change what we require from intent? Malone was convicted of murder and 
would have been convicted also under the Model Penal Code. The Dutch Supreme 
Court applies the requirement of a considerable chance, which can sometimes be 
quite a low chance, and in Germany the volition of the actor is more important than 
the chance. Even with the Hemmschwellentheorie the Russian roulette cases could be 
ruled there differently. In Sweden, with intent of indifference, this could be an even 
clearer case with the actor being indifferent to another person’s life and death. 
Related to this case, Professor emeritus Virolainen has suggested on his blog that the 
intent evaluation should shift from “quite probable” to the assessment on whether the 
actor could perceive the occurrence of the consequence and in spite of that awareness 
still acted in a way that shows indifference in their attitude towards the occurrence of 
the consequence.289 This kind of approach would take the assessment of intent closer 
to the Swedish version of indifference of intent. The Supreme Court, however, has in 
the Russian roulette case been unanimous in its ruling, and there has been now no 
judges suggesting an intention threshold lower than the probability-intent. 
6.5 Case study: Running over a police officer 
Other examples of intention and risk assessment in the relation between dangerous 
driving and intentional killing are the cases where a car driver is ordered to stop by a 
police officer. If the driver refuses to stop and continues to drive, the police officer 
has to jump aside to escape collision with the car. How should these situations be 
viewed in terms of intention and risk? I will now review how this kind of cases have 
been dealt with differently in different countries. 
In the Netherlands, a driver risking the collision is often convicted of attempted 
intentional killing, if the police officer manages to avoid the collision. In the case NJ 
2008290, the actor D drove a car without lights on straight towards a police officer, 
increasing the speed of the car instead of stopping his car. At the last moment, D 
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steered to the left to avoid the collision, but could not see what happened to the 
officer. 
The Supreme Court considered whether D had knowingly exposed the victim to a 
significant risk that a collision will happen. According to the Court, to establish that 
the actor knowingly exposed the victim to such a risk, it is not only required that the 
actor had knowledge of the significant risk that the result will occur, but also that at 
the time of the conduct they had consciously accepted this risk. According to the 
Supreme Court, in this case, D had by driving in the dark without his car lights on 
and by increasing the speed of his car exposed the victim to a considerable risk that 
the car could hit him and that serious injury would be inflicted on the victim. 
According to the Supreme Court, the actor D couldn’t foresee how the police would 
react to his act, so he consciously accepted the substantial risk and “took into 
bargain” (op de koop toe heeft genomen) that the police officer would in response to 
the actor’s actions jump off in a different direction than the actor anticipated or might 
fall down when trying to evade the car and collide with it, resulting in a serious 
injury. This was supported by D’s own statement that he hadn’t foreseen how the 
victim would react to D’s act. Based on this the court concluded that the conditional 
intent was proven of inflicting grievous bodily harm to the victim. 
In Germany, it is widely acknowledged that somebody acts with conditional intent if 
they recognize that there is a risk of causing the relevant result and yet accept this 
risk or at least live with it. Therefore, the Federal Court of Justice holds that the 
objective dangerousness of an action for the life of others cannot suffice to infer 
intent. It may only be regarded as an indication of the actor’s mens rea. So the court 
demands a close examination of all the circumstances in each individual case. 
In Germany, however, charges of attempted intentional killing in these cases are 
usually unsuccessful and are overruled in the Federal Court of Justice. The Court 
generally uses its inhibition threshold theory to acquit actors of intentional killings. 
According to this theory, a person is generally assumed to have a high inhibition 
threshold for the acts that could cause another person’s death. Thus the threshold for 
conditional intent is higher. 
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In Germany, an actor that drives straight at a police officer who is giving them a sign 
to stop, can generally bank on the reaction of the police officer and them jumping 
aside to avoid the collision, even if this endangered officer could only save 
themselves by jumping into the ditch.291 
This has been based on statistics that these situations hardly ever have led to fatal 
results in Germany292 and on experience that people generally try to avoid the 
collision by quickly getting off the road. Police officers are seen to expect that not all 
drivers will stop at their stop sign and police officers are already mentally prepared 
to jump aside. 
Thus it is reasonable for a driver to assume that the police officer will jump aside and 
that there is no substantial risk of the police officer’s death. The actor might accept 
endangering the police officer, but the actor can still be seen having considered the 
chance of the officer’s death as improbable.293 This kind of actor’s awareness of only 
a small chance of the police officer’s death suggests that the actor has not accepted 
the chance of police officer’s death. Thus in Germany continuing to drive and 
forcing a police officer to jump aside to avoid a collision has not been considered to 
constitute intentional attempted killing. 
This is the starting point, but exceptions to the rule exist. For example, the Federal 
Court of Justice has upheld a conviction of attempted murder in a case where the 
victim had turned their back on the actor, who had driven directly towards the victim 
and then over the victim. 
There has been some case in Finland, too. The case KKO 2010:19294 was such a case 
brought to the Supreme Court of Finland. In this case, a police officer had managed 
to avoid getting run over by jumping aside at the last moment. In the Raasepori 
District Court, the defendant M had been convicted of attempted murder and other 
crimes and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. The Court of Appeal of Turku, 
however, quashed the attempted murder conviction, as well as the secondary charge 
of attempted aggravated assault. The case was then brought to the Supreme Court. 
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In the case, defendant M had been suspected of drunk driving and had been ordered 
to stop, but he had continued driving with his car towards the police officer O with a 
speed of 80 km/h. According to the Supreme Court, M must have realized that if he 
hits O with his car, the result will quite probably be O’s death or a serious bodily 
injury to him. The Supreme Court then considered, how probable M had considered 
the car’s collision with O. 
According to the Supreme Court, it can be held as a premise that a police officer 
seeks to evade if he notices that a driver is not going to comply with the stop sign. 
However, this requires circumstances that make it possible to notice in advance what 
the driver is going to do and succeed in avoiding the collision. There are always 
considerable risks in driving through in these situations. 
The location of the traffic stop in this case was in a long straight road. Thus the 
police officer O had plenty of time to observe M’s oncoming car and its movements. 
O had noticed the car had approached the traffic stop with steady speed without 
breaking or reacting to the stop sign. 
According to the Supreme Court, M could conclude from the stop sign that O had 
already noticed him from a distance. There were no conditions in this case that would 
show that M would have intentionally made it harder for O to evade the collision. 
According to the Supreme Court, it could still have been possible that O could have 
interpreted the situation wrongly and failed to jump aside or tripped getting hit by 
M’s car. In these circumstances, however, it was significantly more likely that O 
would survive unharmed from this potentially hazardous situation. 
Thus the Supreme Court concluded that the collision between M’s car and the police 
officer O and consequently O’s death or serious bodily harm to O were not so 
probable consequences of M’s actions that M could be held guilty of attempted 
murder or attempted aggravated assault. Instead, M was convicted of violent 
resistance to a public official and of causing a serious traffic hazard. 
Vihriälä has suggested that A’s purpose was to collide with the police officer O or to 
get away from the scene at the risk that it would require driving over O. Thus only 
the consequences of the collision would be assessed with probability, which could 
99 
 
 
lead to conviction of at least attempted aggravated assault.295 According to Vihriälä, 
this was not a normal traffic situation, but instead A has used his car as a means of 
assault, which would support the conviction, when A would be held responsible for 
all the quite probable consequences of his deliberate action.296 
In Sweden the Supreme Court decision NJA 2002 s. 449297 is also a good example of 
this assessment. In the case, actor KB was ordered to stop by a police officer, but KB 
continued to drive past a police car parked on the road and towards the police officer, 
who had to jump aside to escape the collision with K’s car. 
The District Court convicted K of attempted aggravated assault. The court concluded 
that if K had collided with the police officer N, N would have been seriously injured. 
The Court of Appeal used the hypothetical test and concluded that it was not certain 
that K would have acted the way he did had he considered the collision with the 
police officer to be certain. K had never been previously convicted of violent crimes. 
The Court of Appeal then considered whether K had acted intentionally even if his 
action would not fulfill any traditional definition of intention. Thus it considered also 
the criticism against the hypothetical test and the proposal of new form of intention 
(insiktsuppsåt) that had been made in SOU 1996:185. The Court of Appeal 
concluded that, despite his intoxication, the actor K must have realized that a very 
high possibility existed that N would be very seriously injured by the way K was 
driving the car. The court upheld the conviction given by the District Court. 
According to the Supreme Court, indifference can be intention, too. If the defendant 
has acted although a consequence has been very probable (en mycket hög 
sannonlikhet), they can be seen to have acted with indifference to the consequence. 
Majority of the Supreme Court then rejected the use of previously used hypothetical 
eventual intent and the hypothetical test as a threshold of intention and its lowest 
form dolus eventualis. Instead it applied a new form of intention based on 
indifference.  
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According to the Court, indifference combined with probability assessment could 
establish liability. Intent of indifference had been suggested already earlier and been 
considered as an alternative to the hypothetical test, but now it was used for the first 
time by the Swedish Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court ruled that the risk of serious bodily injury was considerable and 
that K's behavior showed indifference to the possible consequence. The Supreme 
Court convicted K of aggravated attempted assault. The decision wasn’t unanimous. 
One dissenting judge would have upheld the Court of Appeal’s decision as it was; 
another judge would have used the hypothetical test to this case and dismissed the 
charges against K. 
The Supreme Court didn’t in this case yet first examine whether the actor had 
foreseen the risk of criminal consequence as a result of his act and then consider the 
actor’s indifferent attitude toward the predicted consequence and the realization of 
this consequence. This finer version of intent of indifference developed only later. 
6.6 Case study: HIV-cases and intent 
Another interesting case is the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), its relation to 
criminal offences and the chance of being infected with HIV. If a person is aware 
that they have the infection, but hides this fact from their sexual partner, how should 
this situation be viewed? If the person intentionally tries to infect another, should this 
be treated even as attempted manslaughter or maybe as intentional infliction of 
grievous bodily injury? How likely must the consequence of infection be in order to 
accept conditional intent? Is it rather a negligent crime or no crime at all if there is no 
purpose of transmitting the virus? Can the consent of the partner negate the intent in 
HIV-cases? 
For a long time, the decision in R v Clarence298 from 1888 was the leading case in 
English criminal law concerning a sexually transmitted disease. In this case, the actor 
Clarence infected his wife with gonorrhea through their consensual intercourse. In 
the 19th century, gonorrhea was still considered as an incurable and fatal disease. 
Clarence had known about his disease, but hadn’t told his wife about it. 
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He was charged with and convicted of offences under Sections 20 and 47 of the 
Offences against the Person Act 1861, inflicting grievous bodily harm and assault 
occasioning actual bodily harm. However, on appeal the Court of Crown Cases 
Reserved quashed the convictions. 
According the majority of the court, a person infecting another with a life-threatening 
disease is not guilty of inflicting grievous bodily harm or assault occasioning actual 
bodily harm, since transmitting this disease couldn’t constitute infliction of grievous 
bodily harm, when the natural and plain meaning of the word ”inflict” suggested an 
immediate and necessary connection between the actor’s conduct and the harm 
suffered by the victim. According to Stephen J., rather than assault, this infection was 
kind of poisoning under Sections 23 and 24, maliciously administering any poison or 
other destructive or noxious thing. 
Another, maybe even more relevant question in this case was the question of consent. 
The wife had consented to sexual intercourse with Clarence, but in the court she told 
that she wouldn’t have consented had she know about the disease. Clarence’s 
defence relied on consent, stating that relevant is whether the person had consented 
to the activity in which the infection has occurred, not the consent to this infection 
itself. The majority of the court accepted this view, founding that fraudulent conduct 
only vitiates the victim’s consent when it has been related to the nature of the act 
itself, or to the actor doing this act.299 According to the majority, sexual intercourse 
with a diseased person wasn’t different in its nature compared to one with a healthy 
person, and Clarence’s failure to disclose his disease didn’t constitute a fraud 
vitiating the consent. 
Finally in 2004, in the case R v Dica300, it was ruled that Clarence was no longer a 
law. In this case a HIV-positive actor had known about his infection, but had had 
unprotected sexual intercourse with two women, transmitting the HIV-virus. 
According to the Court of Appeal, the fact that the women had consented to sexual 
intercourse didn’t mean that they had consented to a grievous bodily harm from a 
sexually transmitted HIV. So the defence of consent didn’t apply here. Had there 
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Clarence see R v Williams, [1923] 1 KB 340. 
300 [2004] EWCA Crim 1103. 
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been consent to the risk of infection, according to the court, this would have provided 
a defence under Section 20.  
It is noteworthy that Dica wasn’t convicted of intentionally causing grievous bodily 
harm under Section 18, but of inflicting a grievous bodily harm under Section 20, 
which merely requires recklessness rather than intent. According to the court, 
consent wouldn’t even have applied as a defence under Section 18. In 2003, Dica had 
been initially charged and also convicted for intentionally causing the infections 
under Section 18 to imprisonment for 8 years, but in retrial he was convicted under 
Section 20 and sentenced to imprisonment for 4,5 years. 
The conviction of Dica was the first HIV-transmission conviction in England, but the 
same questions were soon considered in another Court of Appeal case R v 
Konzani301. In this case, HIV-positive Konzani had repeatedly had unprotected 
sexual intercourse with three women. The defence of Konzani was that the women 
had by consenting to unprotected sexual intercourse consented to a risk of getting a 
sexually transmitted disease. However, according to the Court of Appeal, since the 
women didn’t know that Konzani was HIV-positive, they couldn’t give their fully 
informed consent required for the defence against conviction under Section 20 of 
inflicting a grievous bodily harm. Konzani was convicted of this offence in Crown 
Court and the Court of Appeal upheld this conviction and the sentence of 
imprisonment for 10 years. In this case Konzani wasn’t even tried under Section 18.  
As we can see, both of these cases concern recklessness and the risks of transmitting 
HIV were seen in these cases to be unreasonable. In English criminal law, this 
assessment is not only based on the probability of the risk, but also on the wider 
perspective and on the social utility of the act. This can lead to a small risk of great 
harm, which HIV could be, becoming a relevant and unreasonable risk.302  
Blomsma even goes so far as suggesting that “there is no social utility in having 
unprotected instead of protected sexual intercourse”303. This, of course, also refers to 
how easy it is to avoid the risk and that having protected sex significantly reduces the 
risk of HIV-transmission, which already in many unprotected sex cases today can be 
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considered very low. Naturally, a case where the HIV-positive actor has known 
about their disease and still had unprotected sexual intercourse without disclosing the 
risk of infection to their sex partner, can also indicate this actor’s reckless attitude.  
But these English cases didn’t go as far as finding Dica and Konzani having had 
intent to infect, or even the intent to kill the victim by transmitting a lethal disease, 
which would require both the actus reus and mens rea elements of murder or 
manslaughter proven. This kind of intent could be hard to prove, even with the 
provision that the actor can be convicted of murder also when they have intended to 
cause a grievous bodily harm and the victim has died as a result of this. However, 
such convictions in HIV-cases haven’t been given in England and Section 20 has 
been instead applied. As we have seen, recklessness can be seen to cover the same 
cases as dolus eventualis, so now I will take a closer look whether these cases are 
considered intentional in the countries applying the concept of dolus eventualis. 
In a BGH case BGHSt 36, 1304 an HIV-positive actor A had twice had unprotected 
anal sexual intercourse with another man D as well as received unprotected oral 
sexual intercourse from D. However, A had on both times put a condom on before 
ejaculating. A hadn’t told D about his HIV-infection. D didn’t get infected with HIV. 
The court now had to assess what kind of risk of HIV-transmission A had created. 
The District Court and BGH both carefully assessed the risk of HIV-transmission. 
Based on expert opinions it wasn’t possible to find the exact probability for infection, 
but the risk of infection got greater the more the disease progressed towards AIDS. 
Unprotected anal sex was seen especially dangerous compared to other forms. 
Withdrawing from the intercourse before the emission reduced the risk, but didn’t 
eliminate it. This had been also told to A when had been diagnosed to have HIV. 
According to the District Court, infecting another person with HIV can constitute the 
offence of causing bodily harm by dangerous means under Section 223a (now 
Section 224). The Court assessed there was a risk of infection required for 
conditional intent, and the Court held that A had accepted and condoned this 
possibility of infecting D. A was convicted of three offences of attempted causing of 
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bodily harm by dangerous means, and was sentenced to imprisonment for 2 years. 
The BGH accepted this reasoning of the District Court.  
This German case is a good example of conditional intent and that low, but not 
remote, chance of the occurrence of the consequence can still be significant and 
enough for conditional intent. It can also be seen to apply the Approval theory. The 
intent in this case wasn’t, however, seen to be enough intent for attempted homicide 
charges.305 In Germany, this case has also been the leading case of intentional 
offence of HIV-exposure and there has been many other convictions since.306 
The Dutch Supreme Court has been less eager than German courts to use conditional 
intent. In case NJ 2005, 154307, the Supreme Court stated that conditional intent 
generally requires certain circumstances that increase the risk (bijzondere 
risicoverhogende omstandigheden) of the infection of sexually transmitted disease, 
for example, according to an expert in this case, the risk in unprotected anal 
intercourse was from 1/200 to 1/300, high in medical sense. Since in this case there 
weren’t such special circumstances, the Supreme Court didn’t now assess the risk of 
HIV-infection as considerable and actor A was thus acquitted. 
In case NJ 2007, 313308, the Supreme Court stated that having unprotected 
intercourse doesn’t alone mean that the HIV-positive person would have accepted the 
risk of infecting their partner. In this case, repeated unprotected anal and oral 
intercourse in a relationship didn’t constitute conditional intent, though it was seen to 
have increased the risk. According to the Supreme Court, the fact that the HIV-
positive actor A had lied to his partner whether he had HIV-infection could mean 
that he had knowingly accepted the risk of infecting the partner, but this didn’t either 
increase the risk of infection.  
The District Court had convicted A of premeditated aggravated physical abuse under 
Article 303 of the Dutch Penal Code, which a quite severe offence with maximum 
imprisonment of 12 years. A had been sentenced to imprisonment for 1 year and 3 
months. The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction. The Supreme Court considered 
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whether A was guilty under Section 302 and intentionally inflicting serious bodily 
harm, not under the more aggravate Section 303. The Supreme Court acquitted A.309 
The more recent Dutch case Groningen HIV310 was even more about causality than 
intent. In this case, three men were accused of injecting their HIV-positive blood into 
victims in gay sex parties between 2005-2007. 12 men were diagnosed with HIV-
infection. The District Court and Court of Appeal convicted the actors P and H of 
intentionally inflicting a serious bodily harm, under Section 302 of the Dutch Penal 
Code, to five of the HIV-infected. P was sentenced to imprisonment for 12 years and 
H for 9 years. A third actor D had been convicted by the District Court for 1 year. 
According to the Supreme Court, in this case it couldn’t be proven that the men had 
got infected because of these blood infections. The Supreme Court didn’t find it 
highly unlikely (hoogstonwaarschijnlijk) that any of the men had got infected as a 
result of having unprotected anal intercourse with someone who was HIV-positive. It 
was also uncertain whether the men had been drugged or they had by themselves 
used too much drugs in these sex parties. 
The Supreme Court stated that the fact that the risk of HIV-infection in this way is 
much smaller compared to injections with HIV-positive blood doesn’t mean that the 
risk in anal sex would be so small that it could be considered as highly unlikely. The 
Supreme Court emphasized that this was a very specific case and that determining 
the causality doesn’t always require that every possible scenario that offers an 
alternative to one in the offence charges would need to be excluded with certainty. 
According to the Supreme Court, there still remained a reasonable doubt that the 
victims had been infected already before this by having unprotected anal sex rather 
than being infected in this sex party with injected HIV-positive blood. The Supreme 
Court sent the case back to the Court of Appeal, which gave its new decision311 with 
lower sentences. P was sentenced to imprisonment for 8 years and H for 5 years. 
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In the Finnish Supreme Court case KKO 1993:92312, the HIV-positive actor S had 
during the years 1986-1987 repeatedly had unprotected anal sex with his partner P 
without disclosing to P his HIV-infection. P had got infected with HIV and 
eventually died as a result of AIDS in 1990. The District Court convicted S of 
aggravated assault and negligent manslaughter and sentenced him to imprisonment 
of 2 years. The Court of Appeal convicted S of aggravated assault and gross 
negligent manslaughter and sentenced him to imprisonment of 4 years. 
The Supreme Court convicted S of aggravated negligent manslaughter. More serious 
charges of voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault were dismissed. 
According to the Supreme Court, there was no evidence shown about S’s intention to 
infect his partner. Considering the information available at that time about the 
magnitude of infection risk, there were no grounds to assume that S had considered 
the materialization of infection as a certain or very probable consequence of his 
action. So in this case S was only convicted of negligent offence. The dissenting 
Judge Pellinen would have convicted S of aggravated assault and negligent 
manslaughter, stating that S must have understood that repeated unprotected sexual 
intercourse would quite probably result to P getting HIV-infection as a consequence. 
The Finnish Supreme Court decision KKO 1993:92 also set the probability-intent 
and a Finnish version of the intent of indifference, positiivinen tahtoteoria, against 
each other. This form of intent emphasized the actor’s volitional element, the actor 
was having the required intent when they accepted the consequence or was 
indifferent to it.313 So this is quite similar to what Sweden now uses. This theory by 
Honkasalo used to be popular in Finland, but as we have seen, the Finnish Supreme 
Court has adapted the probability-intent with the threshold of a quite probable 
consequence. The Court used the probability-intent in this case, too. It is probable 
that if the intent of indifference would have been applied, S could have been seen to 
act intentionally and would have been convicted of voluntary manslaughter or 
aggravated assault. 
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Later that year, the Court of Appeal of Helsinki in its decision 10.12.1993314 
convicted an HIV-positive and Hepatitis B-positive actor K of attempted voluntary 
manslaughter. The Court concluded that K must have known that it was at least quite 
probable that the victim would get infected with HIV-virus as consequence of A’s 
act. According to the Court of Appeal, already one sexual intercourse can be enough 
to transmit the virus, and with Hepatitis B the risk was several ten times the normal 
risk. A dissenting judge would have convicted K only of imperilment, concluding 
that he had had no intent to kill or harm the health of the victim. 
In the more recent 2004 HIV-exposure decision315 an HIV-positive actor A had 
several times had unprotected sexual intercourse with several victims. A hadn’t 
disclosed his HIV-positivity to any of the victims. A was charged with several counts 
of attempted voluntary manslaughter, but instead both the District Court and the 
Court of Appeal convicted A of several counts of attempted aggravated assault. Both 
courts ruled that since an HIV-infection can be treated today so that it won’t anymore 
lead to death of infected person, these acts couldn’t be seen as attempted voluntary 
manslaughters. The Supreme Court didn’t grant the leave to appeal. 
These cases are already 10 and 20 years old. How about today, if a person knows 
about their HIV-infection, but doesn’t intend to infect their partner, does dolus 
eventualis apply? Frände thinks not, even if there are multiple sexual acts, since 
every individual act is assessed separately in regard to probability of infection.316 In a 
single act of sexual intercourse, the probability that an infection occurs is much 
smaller than the probability that the infection doesn’t occur. So every single act only 
has that small probability.317 
Matikkala, however, has suggested that multiple sex acts between an HIV-positive 
actor and an HIV-negative victim should be assessed as a single act, if the actor at 
the time considered that they were repeating the dangerous act towards this victim.318 
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With this logic, multiple acts would together constitute a single act in the legal sense 
and the chance of infection would be calculated as more probable than if the 
probability would be calculated separately for every act. 
The low probability of HIV-transmission has been seen in the Swedish courts, too. 
NJA 2004, s. 176319 was a Swedish HIV-case in which the Supreme Court of Sweden 
had to assess whether the HIV-positive actor S should be convicted of attempted 
aggravated assault or only of creating danger to another. In this case, S had had 
unprotected sexual intercourse with ten different people. None of them was infected 
with HIV as a result of intercourse with S. 
S admitted having had unprotected sexual intercourse but stated that he had such a 
low values of viral particles in his blood that he could not transmit an HIV-infection 
or at least he had been convinced that he could not transmit the infection. The 
defence thus argued then that he had lacked the intent to aggravated assault. 
Both District Court and the Court of Appeal convicted S for attempted aggravated 
assault. According to the District Court, S had lacked both direct and indirect intent, 
but the lowest form of intent was fulfilled. S was sentenced to imprisonment for 4 
years. The Court of Appeal reduced the sentence to 3 years of imprisonment, but 
otherwise agreed on the judgment with the District Court. 
The Supreme Court quashed this conviction and instead convicted S of the gross 
negligent offence of creating danger to another under Section 9 of the Swedish Penal 
Code, Chapter 3. He was sentenced to imprisonment for one year. According to the 
Supreme Court, the statistical probability of transmitting an HIV was very low and 
the probability that the consequence would occur was less than considerable. 
Considering this low chance of infection, S was considered not to have been 
indifferent, as required by the intent of indifference, about the consequence of 
transmitting the HIV. In this case indifference explicitly was assessed in regard to the 
consequence, as the Swedish rule in this form of intent now is.  
Even when there was now no required intent in this case, the Supreme Court ruled 
that since the HIV-positive S hadn’t used a condom, he had created an unacceptable 
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risk and had been negligent. There have been many similar convictions after this. 
The new Communicable Diseases Act (Smittskyddslag) entered into force in Sweden 
on April 21, 2004, a little after the Supreme Court decision. The act requires an HIV-
positive person to inform their partner of HIV-positivity and to practice only 
protected sex.320 Failure to comply with these requirements of disclosure and safe sex 
has lead to various convictions, mostly of the offence of creating danger to 
another.321 
A quite recent Swedish HIV-exposure case might have changed this course. On 
29.10.2013, the HIV-positive A was acquitted by the Court of Appeal for Skåne and 
Blekinge.322 The District Court had convicted A of creating danger to four women by 
having unprotected vaginal intercourse with them and having not disclosed his HIV-
positivity to any of the women. None of the women was infected. A had been 
sentenced to imprisonment for one year. 
The Court of Appeal agreed on what had happened, but concluded that the risk of 
infection was very small, even in unprotected sex, since A’s HIV-treatments had 
worked well and his virus levels were undetectably low. The assessment of the risk 
was largely based on expert opinions given by the Swedish Institute for Infectious 
Disease Control and Professor Albert from the Karolinska Institute. According to 
these opinions, when the HIV-positive person is under stable medical treatment, the 
risk of infection is so small that there is no real danger. Similarly had stated a little 
before this decision the National Board of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen).323 
According to the Court of Appeal, the conviction would have required a concrete 
danger (konkret fara) that the women would be infected. According to the court, it 
was not enough that the act could have caused the infection, but there also needed to 
be some probability in such way that it would have been reasonable to expect the 
infection as a consequence. Now this wasn’t the case. Unlike in many other Swedish 
HIV-cases before this case, A was now acquitted.  
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The Swedish Supreme Court didn’t grant the prosecutor the leave to appeal, stating 
that the circumstances in this case were similar than in case NJA 2004, 176, which 
case, according to the Supreme Court, is still the indicative (vägledande) case instead 
the new one given by the Court of Appeal for Skåne and Blekinge.324 
After this Swedish case, the Court of Appeal of Turku has also given a decision on 
an HIV-exposure case.325 In this case, the HIV-positive actor K had had unprotected 
sexual intercourse with the victim T. K had known about her infection and that the 
virus might be transmitted in the intercourse, but hadn’t told T about her HIV. 
According to T’s testimony, K and T had met in a bar and then went to T’s place. In 
the morning, T had started to caress K, performed unprotected oral sex on her and 
briefly penetrated her with a condom on. Later they had sexual intercourse again, but 
T stopped it after 30 seconds having realized he had forgotten condom. Later they 
had sex one more time and they went separate ways.  
T later found out that K was HIV-positive and called her, but K told him that she had 
no disease that could infect T. K had not talked about her infection with T during the 
time were together and T had been the one to take the initiative for protected sex. T 
had not been infected. K was charged with the offence of imperilment, which 
requires that the actor had intentionally or through gross negligence placed another 
person in serious danger of losing their life or health. 
In the District Court, K denied that any kind of sexual intercourse had occurred, and 
secondarily denied having placed T’s life or health in serious danger. Based on 
testimonies by K, T and T’s friends, the court concluded that the acts had occurred.  
The court then assessed the risk of infection and concluded that since K had been 
under treatment, the statistical risk of infection had been less than 0,001 %, but based 
on medical reports and an expert opinion, the risk is also affected by other individual 
factors, which are not always known to the actor.  
According to the court, even more important than the probability in this case and in 
gross negligence is the greatness of risk the actor has taken, what their attitude 
towards the risk has been and if it has been a risk the other person was aware of.  In 
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this case, K had not told T about her HIV-infection and had taken the risk that T 
might get a disease that could be lethal if untreated. K had known about the risks and 
how she should have acted. According to the court, K had been grossly negligent 
towards the use of condoms and had not taken precautions to avoid the risk of 
infecting T. T hadn’t known about the HIV-infection, so there had been no shared 
risk. 
The District Court concluded that K had acted with indifference towards the risk of 
infecting T with a serious disease. She has been convicted already before and she 
hadn’t changed her attitude, which, according to the court, increases the 
blameworthiness of the act. The court convicted K of imperilment under Section 13 
of the Criminal Code, Chapter 21. K was sentenced to imprisonment for 6 months. 
The Court of Appeal accepted the District Court’s reasoning and upheld the 
conviction. It also stated that the risk of infection always exists despite the small 
statistical probability, and that this is why a HIV-positive person needs to follow the 
clear guidance given to them of having only safe sex, since the person can never 
know all the factors affecting the risk of infection. 
According to the Court of Appeal, K should have followed this guidance, which she 
had told having understood, and at least K should have told T about her infection. K 
had acted with indifference and against her duty of care in a situation where the risk 
of infection hadn’t been only theoretical, because K had not been able to control all 
the factors affecting this risk. 
According to the Court of Appeal, the seriousness of the possible consequence has a 
greater emphasis in this case than the probability of infection. The court stated that 
an actor who intends to create a danger to the victim usually intends to harm this 
person and that this could be seen as intentional offence of assault. In this case, the 
court didn’t think that K had had the intent to cause a serious danger to T’s health, 
but K had still been reckless and indifferent to an causing infection to T. According 
to the court, she should have had only safe sex and at least told T about her HIV-
infection. 
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According to Court of Appeal, K had consciously taken the risk that T could get 
infected and as a whole had acted with high degree of indifference. Thus the court 
concluded that she had acted with gross negligence and was guilty of imperilment. 
This offence requires at least gross negligence, so the actor doesn’t need to have 
intent. The question of intent wasn’t truly considered in this case, even though K was 
seen to have been indifferent not only to the risk of infection, but also to the 
consequence of T getting infected. The Court of Appeal also concluded that K had 
consciously taken the risk that T could be infected. It’s still not likely that this kind 
of case could cross the required threshold of quite probable. In this case, the number 
of unprotected acts was still very small, even if the last act would have been 
unprotected, too. The Supreme Court has in 2013 granted two leave to appeals in 
HIV-cases, both of them concerning unprotected sexual intercourse without the HIV 
disclosure, one of attempted aggravated assault326 and one of imperilment327. 
7 Conclusions 
7.1 The threshold of intent 
As we now have seen, the threshold of intent in Finland, Sweden, Germany and the 
Netherlands is dolus eventualis with different variations, this extended version of 
dolus where the consequences can be seen to have been intended by the actor, even 
though they were not wanted or known for sure. As we can see from this research, 
the most heinous acts and even most of all the criminal offences need to be 
intentional. There are even specific provisions in the criminal codes stating that 
negligent acts are not crimes, unless otherwise is stated explicitly in the statutory 
offence definitions. If there are no such exceptions in these definitions and no 
negligent counterparts to intentional offences, the line between intent and negligence 
is a very important line. We have now seen how severe the sentences might be. It 
could be either that or acquittal. Some times the too high threshold of intent has led 
to changes in laws, like in Finland with purchasing sex from a victim of sex trade. 
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Naturally, the offences of my thesis are of the gravest kind, taking another person’s 
life, body and health. But when the sentence can be imprisonment for life, it is 
important to know that only those whose acts and thoughts have been with guilt and 
fault are convicted of these crimes. All the countries of this research have different 
forms and levels of homicides, sexual crimes and assaults, some more mitigating or 
aggravating forms and factors than others. The question of intent is important in all 
of these fields. If, for example, a person has the condition of sexsomnia, the 
imprisonment for 2 years and the label of rape offender could be considered quite 
more than an excessive punishment for an act they weren’t aware of. It could be 
argued that people with sexsomnia should be given obligations to be careful like 
HIV-positive persons. But it is questionable whether either of these conditions 
should lead to criminal convictions if such guidelines weren’t followed. 
It can be argued that in many cases the punishment for negligent offences would be 
too low if there was nothing like dolus eventualis between higher forms of dolus and 
negligence. The borderline for negligence can be a fine line. The line still has to be 
set somewhere. England sets a strict liability about the age of a child in sexual 
offences against children and about the sex seller being a victim of exploitative 
conduct. English recklessness can still be compared with dolus eventualis, but has 
completely eliminating the mens rea element gone too far? So far the other countries 
of my research haven’t gone a similar way. Strict liability in general should be used 
very carefully. The Swedish form of indifference intent is much more humane, when 
the actor still needs to be both aware of and indifferent to the consequence. 
Can people be set with requirements to know that specific conduct is dangerous? 
With acts like stabbing another person in the heart this question can probably be 
quite easily answered. It doesn’t really matter if the actor didn’t know the exact 
probability that the person would die. But not all the acts are as apparent. It might be 
much easier to prove the probability-intent or the conditional intent with possible and 
not too remote consequences than it is to prove that the actor wanted something to 
happen or knew that it was certain to happen. But when it comes to homicides, 
should we convict the actor who has known that death was a quite probable 
consequence of their act, or just a possible consequence of the act, and should this 
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actor be convicted like the one that has planned and wanted to kill another human 
being? As we now have seen, the answer to this question varies. 
In Germany, the BGH has set its own line that lethal offences require more from the 
intent than in less serious offences, where any chance of consequence materializing 
might be enough if this is accepted. We have now seen this German theory of 
Hemschwelle, that people are naturally against the active killing of other people, and 
that it is rather presumed that the actor’s has not taken the deaths in kauf (has not 
accepted them), so a German court needs to seriously consider whether there is the 
possibility of conscious negligence in lethal acts rather than dolus eventualis, 
regardless of what the facts of the case at first indicate, with exceptions in extremely 
violent acts. In the Netherlands, the intent in non-lethal offences has been often 
concluded from the knowledge of the high risk that the act has had. Lethal offences, 
however, need also more than that. As we have seen in the Porsche-case, it can be 
argued that there is a strong assumption that the actor doesn’t accept a consequence 
if it can also cause his own death. But is this kind of caution limited just to the 
context of driving a vehicle? And in this context, too, some people might want to die. 
When the person knows that something is dangerous and likely to cause a dangerous 
result as a consequence of the act, it can be assumed that when this person still acts, 
that they have accepted the consequence, if not even wanted it to happen. However, 
it is good to remember that in Germany trusting in a good outcome could negate the 
volitional element, if a person honestly and seriously believes that it will be fine. The 
actor aware of the risk is no longer intentional but negligent. This provision, of 
course, has limits, too, so it doesn’t go way too far with people’s hopes and 
beliefs.328 This kind of possibility is still very far away from English criminal law 
reasoning that intent to cause grievous bodily harm can lead to murder conviction 
without any awareness of death as a consequence. But maybe England will change 
this law eventually. Reports and proposals of a change have already been made. 
As we have now seen, the chance of the prohibited consequence occurring can be 
possible, considerable, substantial, probable or even certain. The problem then, of 
course, is how we measure these kinds of terms in percentages. In the Netherlands 
experts have often been used to assess the risks in probabilities using empirical data 
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and calculations. The Supreme Court of Finland, as well as the Finnish legislator, has 
been quite resistant to the idea of openly using “quite probably” to mean more than 
50 % probability. Some courts have been eager put more weight to statistical chances 
of transmitting HIV to another person, some have been less eager. This kind of 
difference can even be seen inside a country, like Sweden, where the Court of 
Appeal very recently acquitted the actor in an HIV-exposure case, but the Supreme 
Court has stated that their decision from 2004 is still the leading case. However, the 
recent Swedish acquittal is a clear indication that the risks of HIV-transmission are 
getting all the time smaller and also less severe from the criminal law point of view. 
If we use statistics, can we trust that the cases will keep on being similar to the ones 
that have been already dealt with or is it better to rule case by case, always taking a 
close look at the circumstances and every judge assessing their own probabilities 
enough to show the intent? And if we don’t use statistics and the risks keep on 
getting smaller and smaller, can we still trust on the old precedents given, for 
example, 10 years ago? Or should the laws and the courts always try to keep on with 
the progress of the world? We can see the clear difference between substantial laws 
of the American Model Penal Code from 1962 and the gender-neutral laws of today. 
In this Model Penal Code, the risk needs to be substantial and unjustified. What is 
unjustified? The legislator and the courts can give weight to different things. They 
can protect certain people or certain things. The value given to life or health by the 
legislator and the courts can prevent individuals from deciding about their lives and 
bodies by themselves. The legislation can go so far to protect the children that it will 
prohibit two same-age children from kissing or so far that it will prohibit two adults 
from freely having consensual rough sex. This has happened in England. It can go 
the other way round, too, like in the Netherlands, and allow cases of euthanasia and 
lower sentences for people who have acted out of compassion. There need to be 
some limits, too, who we require to know what is unjustifiable or dangerous. It is 
important that the age of criminal responsibility is high enough for the person to 
understand their conduct and the concepts intentional offences involve. Maybe the 
European Union will someday harmonize this age of criminal responsibility. 
In general, it can be said that criminal intent requires that the actor needed at the time 
of their act to be aware of the possible fulfillment of the consequences of this act. In 
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addition to this, in Germany acceptance or condoning is needed and in Sweden 
indifferent attitude towards this consequence. The Netherlands and Finland have 
been more likely to see that the high chance can include the volitional element. So 
there is a risk that something will happen and there is the awareness of this risk, and 
merely the risk may occur or the consequence will occur. Where does the intent need 
to be? Intent needs to go the farthest, not just to the risk, but also beyond the risk. 
Like the Finnish Supreme Court has been keen to say, the actor must have 
understood that X was a quite probable consequence of their act. Is this the best way? 
I would say that there has to be some kind of relation between the actor and a critical 
fact, whether it then is a consequence or any other element of the offence. I would 
say that the actor’s relation with this fact should always include two elements, both 
the knowledge and the volitional element. In cases of criminal consequences, this 
volitional attitude can then be baked inside the knowledge, thus into taking the action 
while being aware of the consequence that the act can have. 
So if the actor considers it to be probable, quite probable or a considerable chance 
that the victim will die if they stab the victim in the stomach and then goes and stabs 
the victim this way, taking this action itself shows that they have considered the 
consequence with an attitude of approval or with indifference. So it is not required 
that the volitional element is explicitly written out, but it is still there and this act 
would not have occurred without this actor’s approval or indifference. Cases where 
the actor has been extremely indifferent to another person’s life, like in Russian 
roulette, could still require a lower mathematical probability. I don’t think that it’s 
mandatory to have one specific percentage threshold for all the offences, without any 
margin to go below this, even though this kind of certain percentage could be seen as 
a way to maintain the principle of legal certainty. 
The condition elements other than the consequences are a bit different cases. For 
example, a child’s age is what it is, and it is not dependent on anyone else’s will or 
attitude, not even the actor’s. Thus it makes sense to somehow describe the actor’s 
attitude about the knowledge, because in any case the attitude is there if the actor 
takes an action to have sex with the child with the actor’s sufficient awareness about 
the child’s insufficient age. 
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This child’s age should be seen as a hard fact, and the actor’s knowledge and 
awareness of the certainty of their knowledge as separate issues from this fact. In the 
end, this awareness is significant, up to the point where we are in a situation where 
the actor is by different indications constructed duties to find out the age of the child. 
7.2 Limitations of this work and ideas for further research 
I have now researched the topic and theme quite thoroughly and achieved my goal to 
find and compare the thresholds of intent in the legal systems of Finland and other 
selected countries and to investigate recent developments in legislation and court 
decisions. However, the extent of the project as well as language barriers didn’t 
allow me to go to the core of all laws and provisions. 
The different languages have set some limits to my work and especially Dutch 
criminal law has been difficult, since it is not well covered in any other language 
than in Dutch. I have mostly had to do all the translations myself, especially from 
Finnish and Dutch. Luckily I have been able to find many good Dutch Supreme 
Court cases for my research and these have taken me better inside this legal system. 
The same can be said about German and Swedish court cases. 
I could not compare every aspect I investigated in the Finnish system with all of the 
other countries, as this would have extended my thesis too much. Thus further 
research should tackle these investigations and go fully to the core of the laws and 
legal systems of all the investigated countries. Further and deeper research would 
also be needed with more specific research questions concerning the differences in 
areas like risks and awareness. The concepts of recklessness have now been only a 
small part of my research. I would be interested to find out much more. 
Originally I wanted to also take a look at intent in European Union criminal law and 
in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, but I now thought that it 
would have been too much for this thesis and decided to specifically compare these 
countries. However, this even more multi- and international dimension is a very good 
idea for further research, as well as would be, for example, the comparison of 
Commonwealth countries. 
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